

A HISTORY

OF

AFGHANISTAN

By

Brig.-Gen. Sir PERCY SYKES K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G.

GOLD MEDALLIST OF THE ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL AND ROYAL EMPIRE SOCIETIES. AUTHOR OF 'A HISTORY OF PERSIA', 'A HISTORY OF EXPLORATION', ETC.

COPYRIGHT

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXIX				
THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR: THE OCCUPATION OF E	ABUL	•	-	PAGE
CHAPTER XXX				
THE SURRENDER OF AMIR DOST MUHAMMAD	•	•	•	13
CHAPTER XXXI				
THE RETREAT FROM KABUL	•	•	•	22
CHAPTER XXXII				
Retribution	•			38
CHAPTER XXXIII				
THE SECOND REIGN OF AMIR DOST MUHAMMAD	•		•	61

vi HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

CHAPTER XXXVIII The Second Afghan War	I I O
CHAPTER XXXIX Abdur Rahman is proclaimed Amir of Kabul	120
CHAPTER XL	
THE BATTLES OF MAIWAND AND KANDAHAR	139
ABDUR RAHMAN IS ACKNOWLEDGED AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN AND ITS Dependencies	151
CHAPTER XLII	
THE PANJDEH CRISIS AND THE RUSSO-AFGHAN BOUNDARY COM-	158
CHAPTER XLIII	

CONTENTS						
CHAPTER XLVIII HIS MAJESTY HABIBULLA KHAN VISITS INDIA	PAGE 225					
CHAPTER XLIX						
THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION	231					
CHAPTER L						
THE TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO THE AMIR DURING THE GREAT WAR	246					
CHAPTER LI						
The Assassination of King Habibulla and the Accession of Amanulla Khan	264					
CHAPTER LII						
The Third Afghan War	270					
CHAPTER LIII						
AFGHANISTAN ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE AN INDEPENDENT STATE .	283					

viii HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

CHAPTER LVIII						PAGE			
Tue Acces	PAINATION	of King	NADIR	SHAH	AND '	THE AC	CESSION	OF	INGE
NAME OF THE PARTY	70 <u></u> 31	SHAH, 193		•	•	•	•		327
EPILOGUE		•	•	•	•	•		•	337
Appendix	A: The	Simla Man	ifesto	•	•		•	•	339
,,	B: The	Treaty of	Capitul	ation	•	•	•	•	344
C: Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rah- man Khan, G.C.S.I., and Sir Henry Mortimer									
		Durand, K	C.I.E	., C.S.	I	•	•		352
"	D: Tran	nslation of t	he Tre	eaty		٠.			355
,,	E: Artic	cles of the	Anglo-	Russiar	n Agre	ement	as affec	cting	
		Afghanista	n.	•	•	•	•	•	356
,,	F: The	Treaty of	Peace o	of Aug	ust 8,	1919		•	358
"	G: Note	e on Propos	sals of t	he Brit	tish an	d Afgha	an Gov	ern-	
		ments for	a Trea	ty of F	riends	ship	•	•	360
,,	H: The	Treaty		•	•	•	•	•	364

ILLUSTRATIONS

H.M. King Muhammad Zahi	r Shah				•	Frontis	piece
						FACING	PAGE
The Kabul Gate of Ghazni	•	•	•	•	•	•	II
The City of Kabul from the I	Bala His	sar			•	•	19
Sirdar Akbar Khan .	•	•	•		•	•	3 I
Lord Mayo receives Amir Shi	r Ali Kl	nan at	Ambala,	, 1869	•	•	78
Maiwand: The Last Stand		•	•		•	•	143
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan	•	•		•	•		154
The Pul-i-Khisti	•	•		•	•		163
The Zulfikar Pass, looking no	rth-east		•	•	•	•	163
H.M. King Habibulla Khan	•	•	•	•	•	•	228
	MA	PS					
Sketch Map No. 1 .	•					٠	273
Sketch Map No. 2 .	•		•		•		275

CHAPTER XXIX

THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR: THE OCCUPATION OF KABUL

The inhabitants of Kabul manifested the most complete indifference to their new sovereign, and expressed no sign of welcome or satisfaction at his accession to the throne. Evidently their hearts and affections were with their previous sovereign, now a wanderer beyond the Hindu Kush.—SIR GEORGE LAWRENCE.

Lord Auckland settles his Policy.—During the siege of Herat, McNeill had sent Major Todd on a mission to induce Auckland to adopt vigorous measures against Persia, since the fall of Herat, in his opinion, was imminent. The Board of Control of the East India Company, realizing the aggressive spirit of Russia, had also urged the Governor-General to take strong action in defence of their eastern possessions. The siege of Herat by Muhammad Shah and his claims to the sovereignty of Kandahar undoubtedly constituted a serious menace to the British in India, and it was clear that a barrier of some

receipt of this satisfactory answer, Macnaghten went on to say that the Governor-General would supply Shah Shuja with money and officers. It was finally decided that the ex-Amir would march on Kandahar, while a Sikh force, with Timur, the son of Shah Shuja, would march on Kabul via Peshawar. The Maharaja, generally speaking, was not disposed to help the scheme enthusiastically, since he realized that, if it were successful, the power of the British would be increased to his own detriment, as also would that of Shah Shuja. Moreover, he was aware that the Khalsa feared the Khaibar Pass and its warlike custodians. Finally, he realized that he was to pull the chestnuts out of the fire or, to quote the apposite Persian metaphor, "the beak of appetite was to be tempted by the fruit of conquest and the berries of revenge". However, the Tripartite Treaty was duly signed on July 16 by Shah Shuja and on July 23 by the Maharaja. It was in effect a treaty between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja, which the British Government guaranteed.

The Instructions of the Board of Control.—In May 1838 Auckland had drawn up a minute in which he laid down that the only solution of the Afghan problem was the restoration of Shah Shuja to the throne, and it is a

Ranjit Singh refused to accept the full responsibility that it had been desired to lay upon him, while it was very difficult to believe that Shah Shuja could, within a reasonable time, raise and discipline a force which would ensure him success. Consequently, in July, Auckland came to the conclusion that a British force must be sent to Kabul to set Shah Shuja on the throne. It is only right, at this point, to place on record a letter which Burnes wrote to Macnaghten: " It remains to be reconsidered why we cannot act with Dost Muhammad. He is a man of undoubted ability, and has at heart a high opinion of the British nation; and if half you must do for others were done for him, and offers made which he could see conduced to his interests, he would abandon Russia and Persia tomorrow." Unfortunately Auckland and his chief advisers lacked vision and insight, and the stage was set for the First Afghan War.

The Simla Manifesto of October 1, 1838.—While a British force was being assembled, the Governor-General issued a Manifesto which denounced the attitude of Dost Muhammad, whose defensive measures against Sikh aggression at the mouth of the Khaibar appear in this document as "a sudden and unprovoked attack upon the troops of our ancient ally Ranjit Singh". Indeed the

The Raising of the Siege of Herat.—Before the proclamation was issued, the Shah, as we have seen, had retired baffled from Herat in September 1838. Surely, on the disappearance of the Russo-Persian menace, it would have been the obvious course to have cancelled the military expedition and to have assisted Dost Muhammad by subsidies to strengthen his position in Afghanistan. The Tripartite Treaty had, of course, to be taken into consideration, but it did not pledge the British Government to march troops into Afghanistan, and it seems clear that the invasion of that country should, under the new conditions, have been cancelled.

The Army of the Indus.—The British army for the invasion of Afghanistan was assembled at Ferozepur, 450 miles distant from Sukkur, the point at which the Indus would be crossed. From Sukkur to Kandahar was 400 miles, and from that city to Kabul was 325 miles. The original plan was that two Bengal divisions and one Bombay division should be employed, in case it might be necessary to attack the Persian army besieging Herat. Owing to the retreat of that force, the expeditionary army was reduced to one Bengal and one Bombay division under Sir John Keane, the Bombay Commander-in-Chief.

irregular cavalry regiments and one battery of horse artillery. Recruiting was necessarily hurried, but, under picked British officers, the Gurkhas, the Hindustani and Punjabi Moslems soon improved and constituted a force some 6000 strong.

The Appointments of Mr. W. H. Macnaghten and of Sir Alexander Burnes.—The very important post of "Envoy and Minister on the part of the Government of India at the Court of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk" was given to Macnaghten. At the same time Burnes was to be employed "under Mr. Macnaghten's directions, as envoy to the chief of Kalat or other states". Auckland explained to him that when the Kalat province had been crossed he would regard him as "an independent political officer to cooperate with Macnaghten".

The Line of March.—Owing to the objections of Ranjit Singh to the British army traversing the Punjab, it was decided that the line of march should run in a south-westerly direction through Bahawalpur and Sind, striking down to the Indus and crossing that river at Bukkur, an island fortress opposite Sukkur. From the Indus it would turn north-west to Shikarpur, would traverse the Bolan Pass to Quetta and thence across the Khojak Pass to Kandahar. It was much the same route

be found necessary to blow in the gate.1

The March of the Bombay Division.—In December 1838 the Bombay division under Sir John Keane landed at the mouth of the Indus, where Sir Henry Pottinger informed him of the hostility of the Amirs of Haiderabad. Keane thereupon called for the despatch of a reserve force, which arrived at Karachi early in February 1839. Since fire was opened by the Karachi fort, it was bombarded and seized by the British. In the meanwhile the Bengal division which had reached Bukkur had started to march down the Indus to support Keane, and the vacillating Amirs now realized that they must submit. They accordingly signed a treaty by the terms of which they paid tribute to the British, and the Bombay division joined the main force without further incident.

The March up the Bolan Pass.—The Bengal division now advanced to Shikarpur without experiencing difficulty as to supplies, but the next section of the march to Dadur, 146 miles in length, lay across an arid and more or less waterless tract. At Dadur little in the way of supplies had been collected, and Sir Willoughby Cotton, who was in command, decided to draw on the month's supply which accompanied his force, and thus relying entirely on this reserve, entered the difficult Bolan Pass.

by Keane to halt until his arrival, was now faced with famine, in arid Baluchistan, and Cotton perforce reduced the rations of the troops to one-half, while those of the unfortunate followers were reduced to one-quarter. For eleven days the force halted, idly consuming supplies and losing efficiency from lack of proper rations, alike for man and beast. No advantage was taken of this opportunity to send out reconnaissance parties to survey and report on the Khojak Pass. There was apparently no intelligence department in existence at that period.

The Mission of Burnes to the Khan of Kalat.—Burnes visited Mehrab Khan, the Chief of Kalat, who provided a small quantity of grain — there had been a blight in the previous year — and a considerable number of sheep. He frankly told his guest that the British might restore Shah Shuja to the throne, but that the Afghans were opposed to him and that we should fail in the end. He somewhat unwillingly sealed a treaty by the terms of which, in return for an annual subsidy of 11 lakhs of rupees, he agreed to "use his best endeavours to procure supplies, carriage and guards" in the Kalat province. Actually he had good reason to dislike Shah Shuja, whom he had succoured on his former campaign and now charged with ingratitude; alleging illness, he refused to

giving their allegiance to an Amir who was supported by a British army and who was considered to be unlucky. The Barakzai brothers, in the first instance, proceeded to Girishk and then rode off to Seistan. They received offers of a residence in India with allowances, but preferred to retain their liberty, hoping, no doubt, that the British troops would before long be withdrawn.

The Position at Kandahar.—Keane had now accomplished one of the main objects of the expedition and decided to rest his force and reorganize his transport train. The question of supplies was unsatisfactory, those available at Kandahar being scanty, but the crops were ripe and would soon be harvested.

The Mission to Herat.—After the retreat of the Persian army, Pottinger and Stoddart had remained at Herat to help its unfortunate inhabitants, who were starving. Yar Muhammad, the main source of whose income was slave-dealing, was hostile to the activities of the British officers. Later, Stoddart was instructed to proceed to Bukhara, where he was imprisoned and murdered by its ruler, while Pottinger was insulted and his house was attacked by the retainers of Yar Muhammad in January 1839. At the same time the infamous Vizier opened up relations with the Persian Court and the Kandahar brothers, with


The Position of Dost Muhammad.—The peaceful occupation by the British of Kandahar hardly astonished the Amir but nevertheless it constituted a blow to his position, since news reached him that the neighbouring Chiefs, won over by gold, were joining his enemy. He had despatched Akbar Khan to hold the passes against the Sikh army, which was assembling at Peshawar; another son, Haider Khan, garrisoned Ghazni, and Afzal Khan with a body of cavalry was stationed in the vicinity of the fortress. It had been reported that the British would march on Herat and again that they would mask Ghazni and march on Kabul. In any case the position of Dost Muhammad was one of very great difficulty.

The Advance up the Khaibar Pass of the Sikh Force.— Before describing the advance of the British army on Ghazni and Kabul, a brief notice of Prince Timur and his Sikh supporters is called for. Accompanied by Wade, he left Lahore in January 1839 and recruited troops at Peshawar with some difficulty, as the Sikh Commander thwarted his schemes by endeavouring to gain allies for Ranjit Singh. That potentate died on June 29, before the forcing of the Khaibar Pass by Wade's force, entirely by means of his own troops, helped to complete the success of a campaign in which he wished the British to be attacked on the march. Ghazni, however, with its parapet rising to a height of 70 feet and surrounded by a wide wet ditch, in the absence of siege guns, appeared to be as impregnable as Afghans boasted that it was. Fortunately, however, a traitor gave the priceless information that, although most of the city gates had been built up, the Kabul gate had been left open — presumably to serve as a bolt-hole. Supplies had fallen short, and rejecting the suggestion of the Chief Engineer to mask the fortress and march on Kabul, Keane gave orders to carry Ghazni by a coup de main.

Sir Henry Durand, at that time a lieutenant in the Bengal Engineers, was ordered to lead the powder party, and since the exploit was the crowning achievement of

the campaign, I am giving a full account of it:

The morning star was high in the heavens, and the first red streak of approaching morning was on the horizon, when the explosion party stepped forward to its duty. In perfect silence, led by the engineer Durand, they advanced to within 150 yards of the works, when a challenge from the walls, a shot, and a shout, told that the party was discovered. Instantly the garrison were on the alert; their musketry rang free and quick from the ramparts, and blue lights suddenly glared on the top of the battlements, brilliantly illuminating the approach to the gate. A raking fire from the low



KABUL GATE OF GHAZNI

The First Afghan War. Longmans Green)

gateway and followed by a dull heavy report, proved that the charge was sprung ".

Then followed a delay. Peat's bugler had been killed and, by mistake, a bugler with the main column sounded the retreat. Fortunately the error was speedily rectified; the storming column charged cheering through the gateway to be followed by the main column, and Ghazni was captured by storm, with slight losses in killed and wounded, on July 23, 1839.

At that time the Victoria Cross had not been instituted, but, some forty years later, Durand's exploit was commemorated by the foundation of a "Durand Medal", which is still awarded to Indian officers of the Corps of Sappers and Miners. The troops were honoured by a special Ghazni medal, and the storming party of the 13th Somerset Light Infantry gained a mural crown as a distinction for the regiment.

The Flight of Dost Muhammad.—The capture of Ghazni struck terror among the Afghans and paralysed the resistance of Dost Muhammad. He sent his brother, the Nawab Jabbar Khan, to the British camp with the proposal that the Amir should be prime minister to Shah Shuja, but Macnaghten coldly refused it, offering in its stead an "honourable asylum" in India. Jabbar Khan

his goal. No opposition was offered, and on August 7 Shah Shuja, without a show of welcome by his subjects, made his public entry into Kabul, thirty years after having fled the country. Thanks to British gold and British bayonets, he had been restored to the throne of his ancestors.

CHAPTER XXX

THE SURRENDER OF AMIR DOST MUHAMMAD

A mock King; a civil administration hated because under foreign dictation and dissonant from the feelings of the Afghans; an envoy, the real King, ruling by gleam of British bayonets, and thus enabled to impose his measures however crude or unpalatable; a large army, raising by its consumption the price of provisions, and preying on the resources of a very poor country; these were the inevitable concomitants of having shrunk from at once, in good faith and in good policy, withdrawing the British army, while the moral impression made by its entire success was fresh and deep upon the Afghan mind.—SIR HENRY DURAND.

The Views of Lord Auckland.—The objects of the Army of the Indus, which were the expulsion of Dost Muhammad, together with his brothers who ruled at Kandahar, and the restoration of Shah Shuja to the throne, had been accomplished. Dost Muhammad and his two sons, Afzal and Akbar, had fled to Bukhara and had virtually been made prisoners by the Uzbeg ruler. The tribes had submitted and, in Macnaghten's opinion,

Government was not prepared to face. The Governor-General accordingly laid down that a brigade of all arms should be sufficient to keep Shuja on the throne and that the rest of the army should be withdrawn. It is to be noted that the war was already constituting a very serious drain on Indian finances.

The Withdrawal of British Troops.—Keane, whose views coincided with those of the Governor-General, led a column of troops, which included horse artillery and cavalry, down the Khaibar Pass to India in October. The turbulent Afridis had been promised their customary allowances by Shah Shuja but, since his promise was not implemented, they attacked Ak Masjid and harassed detachments until Macnaghten decided to pay the recognized sums.

The Storming of Kalat.—The Bombay division was ordered to march back to India through the Bolan Pass. It turned aside to storm Kalat, where the behaviour of Mehrab Khan was considered to have been unsatisfactory. The Indian troops, who had not taken part in the storming of Ghazni, covered themselves with glory, since the fort was very strong and the resistance offered was desperate. It would appear that Mehrab Khan, who was killed, did not deserve his fate, but was betrayed by his own retainers.

on this occasion, reached Kabul with a body of troops which constituted a reinforcement. While at Peshawar he had also corresponded with various important Chiefs at Kabul and had done much to undermine the position of Dost Muhammad.

The Distribution of Troops in Afghanistan.—By a general order dated October 9, under the command of Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, the 13th Light Infantry, three guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery and the 35th Native Infantry were to remain at Kabul and to be accommodated in the Bala Hissar. The 48th Native Infantry, the 4th Brigade and 2nd Cavalry were to be cantoned at Jalalabad. Ghazni was to be garrisoned by the 16th Native Infantry, by a squadron of Skinner's Horse and by detachments of the Shah's contingent. Finally, under Major-General Nott, Kandahar was to be held by the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, with the 4th Co. 2nd Battalion Artillery, two squadrons of Skinner's Horse and some of the Shah's contingent.

The Despatch of Troops to Bamian.—The danger to the restored monarchy in Afghanistan lay principally in the possibility of Dost Muhammad returning to Afghan Turkistan and raising a force in that area. Accordingly a detachment of Shah Shuja's army with some field artillery with the usual custom of the Afghan rulers, left for Jalalabad, and Burnes, whose advice had apparently not been sought by Macnaghten, was left in temporary political charge. The economic position at Kabul was unsatisfactory, since the cost of living had been raised by the purchase of large quantities of supplies at high prices for the use of troops. The grain and forage that were grown in the neighbourhood did not suffice for the supply of the large demands made by the British.

The Russian Expedition against Khiva.—Upon receiving information of Perovski's expedition, which is described in Chapter XXXV, Macnaghten, who feared that the occupation of Khiva would have been followed by that of Bukhara, seriously thought of despatching a British force against the latter state in order to forestall Russia, thus proving his unsuitability for the very important post he was occupying. At this period he also proposed sending Burnes on a mission to the Russian camp. To this suggestion Burnes replied that he would willingly go if ordered, and not deeming this comment sufficiently enthusiastic, Macnaghten abandoned the plan. The complete failure of the Russian expedition transformed the situation and was a great relief to him.

The Sikh Question.—Another important question was


seeking the protection of the Persian Government and was proposing a treaty for the expulsion from Afghanistan of the infidel British!

As was to be supposed, Yar Muhammad hated Todd, who was anxious to abolish the slave trade in Central Asia, just as he had hated Pottinger. To meet the situation, Macnaghten strongly recommended that a British force should be despatched against Herat, which city, upon its capture, should be annexed to Shah Shuja's dominions. But Auckland decided to send money and still more money — and Yar Muhammad continued to intrigue with the Persian Government. Our policy was founded on bayonets or gold. Finally, realizing the folly of his money-bag policy — the advances to the people and Governor of Herat amounted to £200,000 — Auckland was disposed to resort to bayonets, but the Commanderin-Chief pointed out that any advance upon Herat or Bukhara was out of the question.

Before long, Yar Muhammad was proved guilty of inciting the Durranis of Zamindavar to rise. Moreover, in February 1841, he demanded still more money, and when Todd replied that he would require some guarantee that such concessions would not be thrown away, the Vizier demanded the money or the departure of the

them. With these troops occupying forts in commanding positions, taxes were levied and the turbulent Afghans, to some extent, were controlled. It is to be noted, however, that Macnaghten retained in his own hands the right to send out expeditions against revolting tribes. He settled the strength of each force and gave detailed instructions to their commanders as to the objectives and the method to be followed for their attainment. The British thus incurred unpopularity for these expeditions, many of which were necessitated by the tyranny and greed of the Shah and his favourites. They were undesirable from the military point of view, while the system was not only bound to be unpopular to the independent, fanatical Afghans but also to the Amir, who resented his lack of power. We have seen how Ahmad Shah instituted a feudal system under which each tribe was liable to military service. The new system, however, was far beyond the capacity of poverty-stricken Afghanistan to support and was thoroughly unsound.

From his own point of view, Shah Shuja realized that he was only a King in name and proofs were not lacking that he and his Ministers were secretly fomenting disturbances in Zamindawar and elsewhere. Indeed, it was only reasonable to expect that chafing under the system



some negotiations, Macnaghten decided to pay the Chiefs the equivalent of £3000 per annum, in return for guaranteeing the safety of the road.

In the Kalat area the youthful son of Mehrab Khan, crying for vengeance, attacked Kalat, and Newaz Khan, to whom it had been given, abdicated in favour of the rightful heir. The political officer, Lieutenant Loveday, was made a prisoner and was subsequently murdered.

The Adventures of Dost Muhammad.—At this period the refugee Amir escaped from Bukhara. His horse fell, tired out, but, dyeing his beard with ink, he thereby baffled the vigilance of the Amir's officials and crossed the Oxus. There he was welcomed by the Vali of Khulm and was able to raise a strong force among the Uzbegs of the province, so that, early in September, he advanced on Bamian at the head of 6000 men. The British had evacuated both Bajgah and Saighan, but an Afghan regiment, which had garrisoned these posts, deserted with its arms and ammunition to their late ruler.

The reappearance of Dost Muhammad on the scene had created a ferment not only in Kabul, but also in the Kuhistan to the north of the capital, and indeed all over the country. There was also proof that Nao Nehal Singh, the ruling Sikh Prince, was in communication with him, —The dauntless ex-Amir had said: "I resemble a wooden spoon: you may throw me hither and thither, but I shall not be hurt". He reappeared in the Kuhistan, where the lawless chiefs, who strongly objected to paying taxes, joined him. To meet this rebellion, Sale marched out and attempted to storm a strong fort, but failed. The rebels subsequently evacuated the position, but the failure of the storming party affected British prestige. The incessant activities of Dost Muhammad caused alarm at Kabul, and Macnaghten, fearing a siege, called for reinforcements from India. On November 2, at Purwandarra, Dost Muhammad engaged the Indian cavalry, which fled, while its British officers, charging the enemy unsupported, were killed or wounded. Among the killed was Dr. Lord. The Afghan horsemen then attacked the British infantry position, which remained firm, and the enemy were finally driven from the field. After this action Burnes, who was unduly depressed by it, advised Macnaghten that the force should fall back on Kabul, on which centre all British troops should be concentrated.

The Surrender of Dost Muhammad.—The virile Afghans hold high ideals as to valour, and the ex-Amir realized that, while he had scattered the Indian cavalry, he could not defeat the British. Considering then that

had no claim upon us. We had no hand in depriving him of his kingdom, whereas we ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the victim." 1 For this generous candour we can forgive much to Macnaghten.

On November 12, 1840, Dost Muhammad left Kabul under escort for India, where he was received with courtesy and generous hospitality. Granted an annual allowance of 2 lakhs of rupees, he settled down at Calcutta — and watched events.

The surrender and deportation of Dost Muhammad, which created a period of unprecedented tranquillity, would seem to have left no excuse for the British force remaining in Afghanistan. The only formidable rival of Shah Shuja had disappeared off the scene and the British army should have followed him to India, more especially as Shah Shuja considered that he could now maintain himself on the throne without our support.

To quote Durand: "No more striking event could be conceived for an honourable termination to the armed occupation of Afghanistan, and for the triumphant return of the Anglo-Indian army to its own frontier. By furnishing so unhoped for an occasion, Providence removed all reasonable ground of excuse or hesitation, and afforded

CHAPTER XXXI

THE RETREAT FROM KABUL

Their plain duty was to have attacked the rebels in the city the moment they realized what was going on, and those who refused or neglected to give orders to that effect, involved the many brave men who served under them, and who asked for nothing better than to die sword in hand, in undeserved blame.—Wellington.

In the pages of a heathen writer, over such a story as this would be cast the shadow of a tremendous Nemesis.—KAYE.

The Position in the Kandahar Province.—Upon hearing of the departure of the British Mission from Herat, Macnaghten wished to organize an expedition against that city. This proposal was not countenanced by Auckland or the Commander-in-Chief in India, but the aggressive designs of Yar Muhammad on Girishk and the hostility of the Durranis, which he had excited, rendered military operations necessary. The position at Kandahar was unsatisfactory. Prince Timur had been

many dead on the battlefield.

The proceedings of Aktur Khan, a son of Dost Muhammad, who was preparing a force to attack Kandahar, had next to be dealt with. A British column was despatched in July and found the Durranis encamped on the right bank of the Helmand. The enemy crossed the river and attacked, but were defeated with heavy loss by the combined efforts of the artillery and infantry. Realizing that the situation was serious and having no confidence in his mounted troops, Captain Woodburn was content with his success against superior numbers and did not attempt a pursuit. Later, Captain Griffin, at the head of a powerful column, attacked the Durranis, who held a strong position in walled gardens and small forts. They opened a heavy fire on the advancing troops but were defeated and finally broken up by a cavalry charge. Nott was invariably successful in his operations and should have been appointed to succeed Cotton, as the Commander-in-Chief wished.

The Views of the Secret Committee.—It is of considerable importance at this juncture to note that, at the end of 1840, the Secret Committee had written to Auckland that they could see nothing in the continued support of Shah Shuja, who, it was clear, had not secured the good-

justifiable complacency: "The country is perfectly quiet from Dan to Beersheba".

Macnaghten had been appointed Governor of Bombay and was about to make over charge to Burnes in October, when news was received that the Eastern Ghilzai tribes had risen en masse and had severed communications with India via Jalalabad. Instead of evacuating the country, as the Secret Committee had recommended, Auckland, with supreme lack of insight, had decided on the fatal policy of half measures and stopped payment of allowances on which the vital communications of the Kabul force depended. Many other allowances were also discontinued which, naturally, created feelings of intense resentment among the Chiefs and even in the Shah himself.

The March of Sale to Jalalabad.—Sale's brigade, which was under orders to return to India, was instructed to reopen the route closed by the Ghilzais.² Starting on

1 Letter to Mr. Robertson quoted by Kaye, op. cit. vol. ii, p. 130.

² In view of its importance, I am reproducing an interesting "Route from Cabool to Peshawer" from *The March and Operations of the Army of the Indus in the Expedition to Afghanistan*, by Major Hough. In my chapter on "The Third Afghan War" I give a sketch map of the Khyber — as it was then termed — which might also be consulted in connexion with this and the following chapters:

October 20, he halted at Tezin for some days, where Captain MacGregor, the political officer, who considered that the rising was due to "the harsh and unjust" action of the British, agreed to the restoration of the coveted allowances to the tribesmen. Sale, influenced by MacGregor, neglected to carry out the orders given him to seize the Tezin fort. He equally violated the vital principle that, in Asia, no concession should be made to an unbeaten enemy.

Although accompanied by the Ghilzai Chiefs, the tribesmen, who were entirely out of control, attacked the column beyond Jagdalak. From the heights and all salient points a heavy fire was poured on the British. The light troops, however, gradually drove the tribesmen from their points of vantage and the advance guard found the main outlet clear. However, the Ghilzais, thirsting for loot, made a concentrated attack on the rear-guard, which suffered very heavy losses.

Sale reached Gandamak on October 29, where he found a force known as Burne's jezailchis. He halted at this village until November 11, and then marched through a hostile country to Jalalabad, which he occupied on November 13.

The retreat from Gandamak to Jalalabad speedily

been instructed by Sale to hold the Gandamak fort, was almost immediately attacked by the Afridis under his command and, perforce leaving his baggage and two guns in the hands of the mutineers, he followed Sale to Jalalabad.

The Refusal of Sale to return to Kabul.—While halting at Gandamak, Sale had been ordered to march back to Kabul. Instead of acting on his instructions he called a Council of War, the members of which pronounced against compliance. As Durand points out, even had he halted at Gandamak, his brigade would have threatened the passes and would have "necessarily paralysed a portion of the Ghilzai strength . . . whilst at the same time ensuring to Elphinstone the comparative safe and easy withdrawal of the force from Kabul. . . . When the issue of the rebellion was as yet uncertain, and energy might have quelled it, he withdrew from the struggle and remained shut up within distant walls, there to court and abide investment, at the leisure of an unembarrassed and triumphant enemy." There is little doubt that Durand was justified in his scathing remarks. His opinion is supported by Keene who wrote: "It is the opinion of the best military critics that if he [Sale] had returned to Kabul, or if he had only remained encamped at Gandamak.

Durand had urged the necessity for constructing barracks in the Bala Hissar and, to some extent, these were constructed, and were occupied by British troops during the first winter. But Macnaghten had, later, with no proper regard for the safety of the British garrison, handed over the barracks to Shah Shuja for the accommodation of his harem. Sturt, who had succeeded Durand, and Roberts, father of the great soldier bearing that name, had insisted on the supreme importance of occupying the Bala Hissar, but had been met with Macnaghten's definite refusal.

General W. K. Elphinstone.—Sir Willoughby Cotton, who was responsible for selecting the site of the cantonment, left Kabul in the winter of 1840 and handed over charge at Jalalabad to General Elphinstone with the unfortunate observation: "You will have nothing to do here. All is peace." Indeed, so far did this belief prevail that Macnaghten permitted officers to arrange for their wives and families to proceed to Afghanistan.

In April 1841 Elphinstone travelled with the Envoy to Kabul. He is described by George Lawrence, who was a member of the party, as being "altogether without Indian experience. He was evidently in very weak health, suffering acutely from chronic rheumatic gout, so much

threat! He also produced a forged order from Shuja to kill all infidels. Neither Burnes, who occupied a house in the city, nor Macnaghten was aware of the existence of any serious plot at this period.

Suddenly, on November 2, the storm broke, and Sir Alexander Burnes, his brother Captain Burnes and Captain William Broadfoot were killed and cut to pieces, as were the men of his escort. The mob then sacked the treasury, containing £17,000, which, with the prevailing ineptitude,

was kept in a neighbouring house.

Shah Shuja, hearing of the disturbance, despatched a regiment of his Hindustani troops under Campbell (who had re-entered his service), but, entangled in the narrow streets, it was beaten back. Meanwhile Brigadier Shelton at the head of a British force of infantry, with guns, reached the Bala Hissar and covered Campbell's retreat. Apart from this he failed to take the decided action that the situation demanded.

The news of the murders and of the rich loot that had been secured spread far and wide, and thousands of armed Afghans hastened in from every direction. A weak British force was sent out to attack Kabul, but fortunately failed to enter the city, where it would have been cut up. Throughout indecision prevailed and

he was deserted by Elphinstone and was compelled to evacuate the fort. This completed the second act of the tragedy.

The Fatal Indecision of Elphinstone and Shelton.—The position was now considered to be so serious that a retreat to India was seriously discussed by the military leaders. It seems incredible that Shelton, the only senior officer who was in a position to influence Elphinstone, should have been strongly in favour of this fatal step. Indeed Pottinger, in a letter written to MacGregor, wrote that "we were prevented from going into the Bala Hissar entirely by the obstinacy of Brigadier Shelton".1

The Disasters at Charikar and Shekabad.—Among the outlying posts was one at Charikar garrisoned by a Gurkha regiment with Eldred Pottinger as political officer. The treacherous chiefs under the leadership of the Nijrao Chief, known as Mir Masjidi, at a meeting cut down Pottinger's assistant Rattray, and the Charikar post, which had no water-supply under its control, was invested. Finally, after desparate fighting, the post was evacuated by the garrison, which was overcome by lack of water, and only Pottinger and Haughton, both badly wounded, reached the cantonment on November 15.

reaching Ghazni, and Macnaghten heard, on December 10, that the hoped-for reinforcement would not reach Kabul.

Movements of the Kabul Force.—Shelton, on November 9, was instructed to leave the Bala Hissar and return to the cantonment, which order he carried out without encountering any opposition. Macnaghten had directed Sale to return to Kabul from Gandamak, but that officer, as we have seen, had marched on to Jalalabad. Meanwhile the Afghans, noting the inactivity of the British, began to fire into the cantonment from surrounding positions. Shelton was ordered to capture a fort but the attack was countermanded. Finally it was made and the fort was taken, but not without heavy losses.

Again, an Afghan force, which was shelling the cantonment from the Bemaru hills, was attacked. But Afghan cavalry charged through the British, who fell back on their reserve. Finally, the British again charged and captured the position

and captured the position.

Macnaghten's Negotiations with the Chiefs.—If the Envoy had been entirely misled as to the feelings of the Afghans and had preached peace where there was no peace, at this crisis he proved himself a man of mettle. Elphinstone and Shelton, as we have seen, were strongly



The Murder of Macnaghten.—Macnaghten was delaying the execution of the treaty, hoping to save the situation by creating dissension among the avaricious Chiefs. In pursuance of this scheme, on December 23, he, with members of his staff, met Akbar Khan and other Chiefs, without adequate precautions for their safety being taken. Their capture had been decided upon by the Afghans, and Macnaghten, Mackenzie,2 Trevor and Lawrence were all suddenly seized. The Envoy, while struggling, was shot by Akbar and was then cut to pieces by the fanatical Afghans. Lawrence and Mackenzie were each forced to mount behind a Chief and escaped with their lives, while Trevor, who was also mounted behind a Chief, was hacked to pieces when the horse he was riding stumbled. The curtain thus fell on the third act of the tragedy.

The Attitude of Akbar Khan.—Akbar Khan was undoubtedly the leader of the Afghan Chiefs at this period. It must be remembered that he considered that the Envoy had attempted to deceive him, an opinion which was also held by Pottinger, although not accepted by Lawrence, and he was intensely suspicious of the British. He also, as was but natural, feared that if the column reached Jalalabad intact, the combined forces would be strong

restrain the Ghilzais ". Akbar also displayed other good qualities. He obviously liked the British officers, with whom he was brought into contact, admiring the courage with which, when sent to Jalalabad on missions, they loyally returned to captivity, sometimes with messages calculated to enrage him. He saved the lives of all the women and children and of British officers to a number exceeding forty. He presumably considered them to be valuable hostages but, even so, he was hospitable when in a position to be so, and never allowed his prisoners to be ill-treated. Again, when defeated and wounded at the sally of the Jalalabad garrison, he did not, as he was urged to do by the more fanatical chiefs, even contemplate the massacre of his hostages and prisoners. He used the pertinent argument that, if the hostages were killed, vengeance would be taken by the British Government on Dost Muhammad and his family.2 Finally, it should be remembered that killing men in Afghanistan at that period was not considered a serious matter. Even, in 1899, when I founded the Seistan Consulate, recent killings among the rulers were excused with the remark: "Oh! killing a man in Seistan has no more importance than drinking a glass of water!"

Further Demands by the Chiefs.—On December 24

practicable. On January 1, 1842, the humiliating treaty was sent in, sealed by eighteen Afghan Chiefs.¹

The Retreat.—On January 6, 1842, after two months of humiliating indecision unexampled in British military history, the force, consisting of 4500 fighting men with 12,000 followers, marched off from Kabul (which is situated at an elevation of nearly 6000 feet) for Jalalabad, distant 130 miles. The men were dispirited and were becoming demoralized; rations, transport and forage were lacking, while there was snow on the ground. The followers were panic-stricken. During the first march only five miles were covered and the rear-guard, which had been attacked, did not reach the camping ground until 2 A.M.

On the second day another short march was made. Shelton urged that the dangerous Khurd Kabul Pass should be traversed immediately before the Ghilzais had assembled in full force, but Elphinstone, in view of promises of supplies of food and firewood and the exhaustion of the force, decided to halt, intending to march through the pass at night. This plan he was, later, persuaded to abandon.

For the tragedy that followed I quote Vincent Eyre's vivid account: "The rapid effects of two nights'

with whom were several ladies . . . who galloped forward at the head of all running the gauntlet of the enemy's bullets. . . . Lady Sale received a slight wound in the arm. . . . Onward moved the crowd into the thickest of the fire, and fearful was the slaughter that prevailed. An universal panic speedily prevailed, and thousands, seeking refuge in flight, hurried forward to the front, abandoning baggage, arms, ammunition, women and children, regardless for the moment of everything but their own lives."

Heroic acts were performed, but the disaster cost the lives of three thousand men. The survivors, who had ascended to a still colder climate, died in hundreds during the night, while, to intensify their misery, snow fell for several hours.

To push on was the only hope left, but gullible Elphinstone gave the order to halt in view of a message from Akbar Khan that he would provide supplies and escort. During this halt, at the suggestion of Akbar, the women and children, together with the wounded officers, were handed over to his charge. The state of the women, some of whom were pregnant, was deplorable, and the offer was accepted, although doubts were expressed as to the wisdom of the action.¹

On the morning of Ianuary to this foolish halt had

Captain Skinner, who had arranged for the women to be handed over to the Sirdar, he expressed his regret at the attacks made on the column, due, he stated, to his inability to restrain the Ghilzais. He then offered to save the Europeans on condition that they abandoned the natives. To his credit Elphinstone refused and in the passage down the defile to the Tezin Valley further losses were sustained, but the British remnant fought on heroically.

From Tezin to Jagdalak was a distance of twenty-two miles and by a night march it was hoped to reach that last obstacle before it was occupied by the tribesmen. But ill-fortune dogged the footsteps of the force. At Seh Baba — only seven miles distant — attacks began, the mob of panic-stricken camp-followers almost paralysing the efforts of the few remaining soldiers. At Kattar-Sang — twelve miles from Tezin — constant attacks were made, but Shelton, with his handful of brave men of the 44th regiment, protected the rear. At 3 P.M. Jagdalak was reached where a position was taken up in some ruins. Here, apparently hoping to make terms for the survivors, Elphinstone, Shelton and Johnson visited Akbar and were detained as hostages for the evacuation of Jalalabad.

On January 12 the brave remnant marched on to the Jagdalak Pass, which rises to an elevation of 6420 feet.

tion of Gandamak were beckoned to and, at the invitation of their chiefs, Major Charles Griffiths, who had distinguished himself throughout the retreat, descended the hill to parley. It was agreed that the party should receive terms, but, before this information reached the men on the hill, an Afghan attempted to snatch a musket from a soldier, who shot him. The Afghans thereupon killed the British, who fought to the death.

During the Second Afghan War, Major Waller, a grandson of Griffiths, collecting the bones and relics, built a cairn over them, on what is known as "Fortyfourth Hill".

Another small party had pushed on ahead, six of whom arrived at Fatehabad, sixteen miles from Jalalabad, but Dr. Brydon alone of this pitiful remnant struggled into Jalalabad to announce the disaster.² Thus fell the curtain on the fourth act of the tragedy.

Summary.—Looking back on the First Afghan War, a century later, it would appear that too serious a view of the disastrous retreat from Kabul was taken, not only in India but also in Great Britain. It was a disaster that was discreditable not only to Auckland and to the military and political authorities at Kabul, but in a lesser degree to Sale, who, in the first place, failed to capture Tezin and

of accidents, our forces at Kabul had become completely demoralized, there never was an occasion on which the Afghans could stand for an hour against British soldiers or Indian Sepoys "." Yet again, Afghanistan was not evacuated. Resolute Nott firmly maintained his position in the Kandahar area by hard fighting, while Sale at Jalalabad, as we shall see, entirely defeated Akbar Khan's utmost efforts.

¹ England and Russia in the East, pp. 184-185.

CHAPTER XXXII

RETRIBUTION

Follow after — we are waiting, by the trails that we lost,
For the sounds of many footsteps, for the tread of a host.
Follow after — follow after — for the harvest is sown:
By the bones about the wayside, ye shall come to your own.
KIPLING.

Lord Auckland's Indecision.—The news of the disaster, which proved to Auckland that he had been entirely misled, was a terrible blow and, at first, he gave way to despair, as is shown by his message to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls: "I am coming fast to the opinion that our furthest point of support in advance must be Ferozepore, and that we must bear the disgrace and disadvantage of retiring to this frontier with as little of loss as may now be assured". His state of mind was such that he merely wished to despatch an insufficient force in the shape of a single brigade, with orders to march

bile, the Italian Governor of the Peshawar district, provided four rickety guns, manned by Sikh artillerymen, and promised that his Sikhs, who regarded the warlike guardians of the rugged Khaibar with deep apprehension, would proceed as far as Ak Masjid.

On January 15 half the brigade marched on Ak Masjid without encountering opposition, but, by a most unfortunate error, their supply column never arrived. Wild attempted to follow on January 20, but the Sikhs mutinied and he was defeated and wounded. As a result, Ak Masjid was perforce evacuated and the brigade fell back on Jamrud.

The Arrival of General George Pollock at Peshawar.—General Pollock, who had been commissioned to relieve Jalalabad, reached Peshawar in February. There he found a disheartened force prostrate with malaria and realized that until the arrival of the British troops, for which he pressed, it was out of the question to advance, in spite of the appeals he received from Sale. He consequently remained at Peshawar, raising the moral of the Indian troops by constant visits to their hospital, and making carefully thought-out plans for his advance.

Lord Ellenborough appointed Governor-General.—In October 1841, upon the fall of the Whig Ministry and

by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make it appear to them, to our own subjects and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position but because we are satisfied that the King we have set up has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed."

The Siege of Jalalabad.—When Brydon announced the disaster in person on January 13, George Broadfoot, the engineer officer, pointed out to Sale that, unless he was prepared to hold Jalalabad to the last, he should evacuate the city immediately and fight his way through the Khaibar to Peshawar.

Sale decided to remain at Jalalabad and Broadfoot set to work to restore the ruined defences, while foraging parties were sent out to secure supplies of wood and grass. Caravans from Peshawar had opportunely brought three months' supply of wheat. To lessen the hostile population, all the Afghans in the city, including 200 men of a Jezailchi regiment, were expelled.

Early in January a letter from Akbar to a neighbour-

MacGregor declared that in his opinion and also in that of Sale the British Government could not relieve the Jalalabad garrison. He went on to say that Shuja desired their departure from Afghanistan and that it was their duty to treat with him for the evacuation of the country. The terms proposed were that the British were to give four hostages in proof of their sincerity; and that Shuja should send a force to escort them to Peshawar with their arms, guns, etc., intact. Other provisions included the supply of transport and foodstuffs, the withdrawal of Akbar from the scene, and finally, that Afghan hostages should be handed over to the British.

So far from this precious document being nominally a reply to Shuja, it was virtually an attempt to treat with Akbar, and Broadfoot, on reading it, flung it from him in disgust. A scene of intense excitement followed. The majority were in favour of the proposal and Broadfoot could only secure an adjournment of the Council. On the following day the subject was again hotly debated and the terms of the proposed capitulation were carried with the exception that it was decided that no hostages should be given.

The document was despatched to the Shah and, in due course, the answer came that to prove their sincerity

manifesto of January 31,1 the defences were speedily rebuilt.

On April 6, urged on by Captain Henry Havelock, Sale somewhat unwillingly attacked the Afghans at daybreak. The artillery directed a heavy fire on their centre, while the infantry broke through it. The Afghans fired from a battery screened by a garden wall, but the British would not be denied; the guns which had been lost by the Kabul force were recaptured; the camp was burned; and the defeat of Akbar, who was wounded, was complete.

The Position at Kandahar.—To turn to the position in the south, Nott held his own during the winter. Money was very scarce and reinforcements with fresh supplies under General England were eagerly awaited. On February 21 a letter from Elphinstone and Pottinger, which had been written some two months previously, was received, ordering the evacuation of Kandahar and Kalat-i-Ghilzai. Nott and Rawlinson did not consider this letter in any way binding, but the astute Durrani Chiefs, fully aware of the situation, demanded the evacuation of the British force, on the ground that Shah Shuja no longer required their services. Failing their withdrawal, they threatened the British with the fate of the

copy of an official letter, dated January 28, in which the continued occupation of Kandahar was enjoined. On March 3 Rawlinson took the step of expelling the Afghan inhabitants, to the number of 5000, from the city.

The Durranis nearly capture Kandahar.—On March 7 Nott attacked the Durranis, who retreated and then doubled back on Kandahar. They attacked with fanatical fury and, when the Herat Gate was burned, their success seemed probable. However, a solid rampart of sacks of grain was formed and held, in spite of repeated charges by Ghazis, careless of life. Finally, the attack was repelled with the loss of some 600 Ghazis. Nott, later in the month, again attacked and defeated the Durranis.

The Fall of Ghazni.—The Durrani Chiefs, who were much dejected by these defeats, recovered their courage upon hearing of the capture of Ghazni. The townspeople had admitted the attacking force and the garrison, 400 strong, was shut up in the citadel. With half rations and with practically no forage or water, Colonel Palmer made a treaty with the enemy by which the British were to be conducted in safety to Peshawar. Treachery was, however, intended, as indeed might have been expected, and the force was surrounded and, after surrender, was massacred. The fall of Ghazni on March 6 was con-

at Hykulzai, this time with complete success. Entering the Khojak Pass, its heights were crowned by the Kandahar troops and the united brigades on May 10 entered Kandahar. There news of the relief of Jalalabad by General Pollock was celebrated by firing a royal salute.

Ellenborough's statesmanlike declaration of March 15, sad to say, was followed by a complete volte-face, owing to the check received by England and, on April 19, Nott was instructed to withdraw the garrison of Kalat-i-Ghilzai and to evacuate Kandahar. He was then to take up a position at Quetta "until the season may enable you to retire upon Sukkur". Much against his own judgment, Nott decided to carry out the first part of his instructions, but he was unable to march back to India without collecting a considerable amount of fresh transport — a matter of months for so large a force.

The Defence of Kalat-i-Ghilzai.—On May 19 a brigade was despatched to evacuate the garrison of Kalat-i-Ghilzai. Information as to this movement, which naturally encouraged them, had reached the Ghilzais, who determined to storm the fort before the arrival of the relieving column. At the false dawn, on May 21, 4000 men provided with scaling ladders made a desperate

murder of Burnes, the rebel leaders invited Shuja to continue to rule, stipulating, however, that he should give his daughters in marriage to the leaders. This condition Shuja at first agreed to, but later refused to carry out.

The influence of Akbar Khan was enormously increased by the destruction of the British force, albeit the older Chiefs were jealous of him. Although Shuja wrote to Sale demanding the evacuation of Jalalabad, his position was really a very weak one. Accordingly he ostensibly accepted the proposal of Nawab Zaman Khan Muhammadzai (who had been appointed King by the conspirators, after Shuja's refusal to give his daughters to the Chiefs) to become his Vizier.

At this period Zaman Khan was guarding the British prisoners, whom he refused to hand over to the Shah. Meanwhile Akbar was pressing Shuja to prove his sincerity by joining him before Jalalabad with his troops and artillery, and this, after much hesitation, Shuja decided to do. On April 5 he left the Bala Hissar with a small escort in order to join his army, which was encamped close by. On the way he was murdered by Shuja-ud-Dola, son of Zaman Khan.

Thus fell Shah Shuja. There is much divergence of opinion as to his fidelity to the British. There is no doubt

The Difficulties of General Pollock.—Among the chief difficulties of Pollock was the doubtful attitude of the Sikhs. They had, as we have seen, mutinied under Wild, but the arrival of large reinforcements of British troops with artillery, the tact of the general himself and the influence of Captain Mackeson had restored their moral, as had appeals to their honour to wipe out the disgrace which the Khalsa had suffered from the mutiny. The Afridis, in return for money payments, had agreed to hold the Khaibar, but upon the appearance of Akbar with 800 men at Ak Masjid, they pleaded their inability to perform their agreement.¹

The Forcing of the Khaibar Pass.—Pollock was a great organizer and left nothing to chance. Before dawn on April 5, the army marched into the pass and the troops immediately scaled its precipitous heights. The Afridis, who were surprised by the movement, offered little opposition at first and, thanks to skilled leadership and their own gallantry, the British were able to drive the enemy before them.

When this difficult feat had been achieved, the centre column advanced to the barrier that had been erected in the pass, which was destroyed, its defenders being scattered by shrappel, and the huge convoy, which in-

Pollock wrote to a friend: "There were many desertions among the Indian troops before we advanced. Now they are in the highest spirits, and have a thorough contempt for the enemy. . . . The Sikhs are encamped near us and are much more respectful and civil since our operations of yesterday." The British casualties were slight, while those of the tribesmen were very heavy.

The Relief of Jalalabad.—Pollock's repulse of the Afridi tribesmen, coming after the signal defeat of Akbar, swept away all serious opposition. He halted on April 6 and, by April 8, he had marched to Lundi Kotal, some ten miles farther on, and then proceeded to Dakka, twelve miles from the pass. On April 18 Jalalabad was reached, where the garrison warmly welcomed the relieving force?

lieving force.2

The Instructions of Ellenborough.—In spite of the success of Sale and of Pollock, Ellenborough's mercurial spirit was daunted by the surrender of Palmer at Ghazni and the check suffered by England. He accordingly abandoned his declared policy and gave orders in direct opposition to it. He seems to have forgotten the prisoners whom he was in honour bound to release. He also now doubted the expediency of undertaking operations merely for the re-establishment of our military reputation.

such a blow upon them as to make them long remember

your parting effort."

The Reply of General Pollock.—On May 13 Pollock gave an admirable reply to these unworthy instructions. To quote from it: "With regard to our withdrawal at the present moment, I fear that it would have the very worst effect — it would be construed into a defeat, and our character as a powerful nation would be entirely lost in this part of the world".

Later on he writes: "But the advance on Kabul would require that General Nott should act in concert and advance also. I therefore cannot help regretting that he should be directed to retire, which, without some demonstration of our power, he will find some difficulty in doing." Pollock then declared that he could not retire to Peshawar without additional transport, and this delay, as we shall see, gave temperamental Ellenborough time to change his mind once again.

It is of considerable importance to learn that Pollock, on receiving these instructions, wrote to Nott requesting him on no account to retire, as directed by his superiors, until he should hear from him again. He realized that he endangered his commission by this act, but he felt that co-operation, combined with delay would result in

During the summer months Pollock was not inactive. In June he despatched a force to the Shinwari Valley, where a captured gun, treasure and plunder had been collected. By way of punishment for their guilt, of which ample proofs were forthcoming, the villages in the valley were burned and the crops were carried off.

On July 4 Ellenborough wrote direct to the two generals, stating that his opinions had undergone no change since his declaration that the withdrawal of the British troops from Afghanistan was the main object of Government. But he laid down that if Nott wished to retire to India via Ghazni, Kabul and Jalalabad, he might be assisted in this retirement by Pollock's advance to Kabul. The letters are given by Low. That to Nott included the following: "If you should be enabled by a coup de main to get possession of Ghazni and Kabul you will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proof of the power of the British army, without impeaching its humanity. You will bring away from the tomb of Mahmud of Ghazni his club which hangs over it, and you will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of Somnath. These will be the just trophies of your success."

Kaye's opinion of this document runs: "It is either

by the Sirdars, rode in to claim British protection, only too happy to have escaped with his life.

On September 8 the British force in two columns (with General McCaskill marching one day behind) entered the Jagdalak Pass, which was very strongly held by Ghilzai tribesmen. But the British, fired by the spirit of retribution, attacked with a determination that nothing could withstand. The victory was complete. The force then marched on to Tezin, where, owing to the fatigued condition of the transport, a day's halt was ordered.

Meanwhile Akbar, who realized the seriousness of his position, attempted to delay the British advance by a letter which never reached Pollock. He had, at first, decided to hold the Khurd Kabul Pass, but, encouraged by Pollock's halt which he attributed to fear, he moved

on to Tezin.

The Battle of Tezin.—On September 13 Akbar made his supreme effort. The valley was surrounded by high hills, each of which was held in force. The action opened by the Afghan cavalry being attacked and cut up by the 3rd Dragoons. The British infantry then climbed the heights. Realizing that their muskets were outranged by the jezails, they everywhere charged with bayonets fixed. Desperate were the efforts made by the Afghans

decided to retire a portion of the army via Ghazni and Kabul.

On August 9 Nott commenced his march on Kabul with a strong column which included two batteries of artillery, and the 40th and 41st foot, with five Bengal battalions and some cavalry. England at the same time retired to India with the Bombay regiments and the Shah's

army.

The Battle of Ghoaine, August 30.—During the first marches the British were undisturbed, but information was received that Shams-ud-Din Khan, the Governor of Ghazni, with some 500 horsemen and 2 guns, was in the neighbourhood. On August 28 the force had started to advance from Mukur, when the rear-guard was attacked, but the irregular cavalry cut up and dispersed the assailants. Upon reaching the camping-ground a haze prevented effectual reconnoitring and, upon receipt of a false report that the grass-cutters had been attacked, some cavalry galloped out and dispersed a body of footmen. A force of Afghan horse appearing on a ridge was then charged, but our horsemen fell into an ambush and were received by a hot flanking fire causing heavy losses. They were then, in turn, charged and defeated by the Afghan horse. Hearing of this repulse, Nott marched

Nott's Advance on Ghazni.—On September 5 Nott's army was before Ghazni. Shams-ud-Din was holding the surrounding heights, which Nott proceeded to clear and then camped. The famous Ghazni gun, the Zubbur Jang, was, however, fired from the fortress and fourteen balls fell in the camp, which was accordingly moved out of range. Pollock ordered the construction of breaching batteries, but they were not required, since Shams-ud-Din fled to Kabul and the defenders of the fortress evacuated it by night.

Nott enters Ghazni.—In the morning the British flag was hoisted from the tower of the citadel; a royal salute was fired from the captured Afghan guns and the fortress was destroyed in retribution for the treacherous massacre of the British garrison. Finally, Pollock carried out Ellenborough's instructions by loading up the gates of the shrine of Mahmud of Ghazni and then continued his march.

Nott reaches the Kabul Valley.—On September 4, when camping some twenty-five miles south of Kabul, Nott received information of Pollock's victory at Tezin and of his intention to reach the capital on September 15. The Kandahar force was opposed by a strong body of Afghans who, under Shams-ud-Din and Sultan Ian, had thrown up

starting on the tragic retreat, by chance she opened Campbell's *Poems* at "Hohenlinden", "one verse of which", she writes, "actually haunted me day and night":

Few, few shall part where many meet, The snow shall be their winding sheet; And every turf beneath their feet Shall be a soldier's sepulchre.

In the previous chapter the handing over of the women and children is mentioned. With the exception of Lady Macnaghten they had lost everything except the clothes they wore, and, for the last four days, had tasted nothing but some dry biscuits and some sherry or brandy. Lawrence, however, writes: "During the whole of these trying marches, I felt truly proud of my countrymen and women; all bore up so nobly and heroically against hunger, cold, fatigue, and other privations of no ordinary kind, as to call forth the admiration even of our Afghan guards".

The March to the Panjshir Valley.—The captives remained for the night in the Khurd Kabul fort and on the following day proceeded to Tezin. Lady Sale, who had been twice wounded in the Khurd Kabul Pass, writes: "The road was covered with awfully mangled bodies, all

fortified village of Budiabad, where reasonably comfortable quarters were provided. On February 11, the earthquake that had levelled the walls of Jalalabad wrought havoc also at Budiabad, but fortunately no lives were lost.

On April 11, after a false start and a return, the captives finally left Budiabad, passing on the way Akbar Khan, who carried his wounded hand in a sling. "He spoke in a free and soldierly manner of Sale's victory and his own defeat, praising the gallant bearing of our men, with Sale conspicuous on his white charger at their head."

On April 19 the party reached the Tezin fort, which had suffered badly from the earthquake, and here the fourth child was born since leaving Kabul. The captives then moved to Goudah, some twelve miles from Tezin, and at this camp, on April 23, General Elphinstone died.

Lady Sale's diary, under date of May 11, breathes her indomitable spirit: "The citizens [of Kabul] are ruined by the perfect stagnation of trade. . . . Now is the time to strike the blow, but I much dread dilly-dallying just because a handful of us are in Akbar's power. What are our lives when compared with the honour of our country?" From this camp, on May 23, the captives travelled to the Haft Kotul; "and here", Lady Sale writes, "we came upon a sad scene of decaying bodies". They then

which the General stated that he had a force of 20,000 men at Jalalabad and that Nott's division was 15,000 strong. He added that 25,000 men were assembling at Ferozepore, and that 10,000 men were on their way from England. He concluded: "All will make an overwhelming army and it will be a fearful day if such an army advance for the release of our prisoners and the delivery of our guns". While the captives were at Shewaki, Colonel Palmer and his officers, nine in all, arrived in a pitiable condition from Ghazni and joined the rest of the prisoners.

On August 25 Akbar decided to despatch the party to Bamian under a strong escort, so determined was he to prevent their rescue by the advancing armies. Reports of Nott's march on Ghazni had alarmed him. Indeed, before the arrival of the prisoners at Bamian, the fall of that fortress was announced. The crossing of the high passes was very trying, especially for the sick, but finally the Bamian Valley was reached, when the prisoners, forgetting their troubles, visited and sketched the wonderful Buddhist remains.

On September 11, Saleh Muhammad, the officer in command of the escort, received Akbar's orders, to move the prisoners to still more distant Khulm. At this juncture

seconded by Lawrence, immediately issued a proclamation to the neighbouring Hazaras to tender their allegiance, with the result that various Chiefs joined the British. The representative of Akbar fled and a known friend of the British took his place as Governor. Meanwhile money, which was very scarce, was obtained from a passing caravan.

The Happy Ending to the Captivity.—On September 16 the party, fearing that they might be attacked at any moment, started on their march back to Kabul. To some extent the arrival of Sir Richmond Shakespear at the head of a force of Kizilbash cavalry, allayed their anxiety. But there were strong bodies of enemy in the Kuhistan, and Shakespear urged the captives to make long marches, until they were met by Sale, whose brigade was holding the pass. To quote his heroic wife for the last time: "When we arrived where the infantry were posted they cheered all the captives as they passed them, and the men of the 13th pressed forward to welcome us individually. . . . On our arrival at the camp at Siah Sang we were greeted with a salute of twenty-one guns."

The Reoccupation of Kabul, and its Punishment.—On September 16 Pollock marched in triumph through Kabul to the Bala Hissar, where he hoisted the British

to plunder. Both camps rushed into the city, and the consequence has been the almost total destruction of the town."

These excesses are to be deplored, but when we consider that the soldiers and the camp-followers had been eye-witnesses of the massacres perpetrated alike on soldiers and non-combatants, the fact that the guilty city lay at their mercy and the rumour that it was to be plundered, feelings of vengeance, which cannot be severely blamed, would naturally be aroused.

The Last Expedition.—In order to discourage an attack on his troops in the Khurd Kabul Pass, Pollock, who had heard that Amanulla Khan had collected a strong force at Istalif in the Kuhistan district and that Akbar Khan, after sending his family across the Hindu Kush into Turkistan, was waiting on events in the same neighbourhood, decided to take action. By his orders McCaskill attacked this "maiden" fortress, with complete success. Nothing could check the gallantry of the troops, who stormed through village and vineyard with such a rush that the defenders of Istalif were seized with panic, and the hillside beyond was covered with men and white-veiled women fleeing from the town. McCaskill, with true British gallantry, allowed no pursuit, but two

consideration. Halting at Jalalabad, Pollock destroyed its fortifications, as he also did at Ak Masjid. He then marched down the Khaibar to Peshawar, where the army was welcomed with princely hospitality by Avitabile. Finally it marched across the Punjab to Ferozepore.

The Victory Celebrations.—The victorious army was greeted by Ellenborough, and crossing the Sutlej by a temporary bridge, it marched between 250 caparisoned elephants, and was welcomed with booming of guns, military music and heartfelt rejoicings. Festivities followed, which culminated in a grand military display. Ellenborough dubbed Sale's brigade the "Illustrious Garrison". He might with at least equal justice have termed Nott's command "The Ever-Victorious Army".

Lord Ellenborough's Treatment of the Hostages and Prisoners.—It is important, after dealing with the honours bestowed on the victors, to refer to the decisions of the Viceroy in the case of the hostages and prisoners. I will give as an example the treatment meted out to Pottinger, whose eminent services throughout the war were conspicuous. In January 1843, Pottinger appeared before a court-martial at which the President declared: "I consider that Major Pottinger omitted nothing so far as lay in his power, to maintain the honour of British arms and

officers for services rendered by them prior to the disaster to be given to them. Such behaviour dishonoured Ellenborough and is fortunately rare among British officials holding high positions.

Lord Ellenborough's Proclamation of October 1.—The news of the complete success of the British arms induced Ellenborough to issue a grandiloquent proclamation which was dated October 1, as was the unfortunate document of Lord Auckland, in 1838. It was of no particular importance, but I cannot refrain from reproducing an extract from his proclamation of November 10, which Wellington aptly termed a "Song of Triumph". It runs: "Our victorious army bears the gates of the temple of Somnath in triumph from Afghanistan, and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahmud looks upon the ruins of Ghazni. The insult of eight hundred years is at last avenged. The gates of the temple of Somnath, so long the memorial of your humiliation, are become the proudest record of your national glory, the proof of your superiority in arms over the nations beyond the Indus." No such proclamation has ever been issued by a British Governor-General. It was certainly an outrage to Moslems and little less to Hindus, while on the high authority of Rawlinson, the gates brought back to India were not the gates of

the British Raj in the greatest disaster its arms had suffered in Asia. Yet in the final act of the drama, British columns, crowned with the laurels of victory, converged on Kabul and exacted due, but not vindictive, retribution. There is a Persian proverb which runs: "History is the mirror of the Past and the lesson of the Present". The bitter lesson of Kabul should never be forgotten.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE SECOND REIGN OF AMIR DOST MUHAMMAD

Is Dost Muhammad dead that there is no justice?—An Afghan proverb.

The Return of Dost Muhammad to Afghanistan.—One result of the victorious campaign which is described in the last chapter was the realization that the retention of Dost Muhammad as a state prisoner was no longer justified or expedient. Ellenborough accordingly issued a proclamation setting forth that "When the British army returning from Afghanistan shall have passed the Indus, all the Afghans now in the power of the British Government shall be permitted to return to their country".

In due course Dost Muhammad accepted the offer. He was escorted to Shikarpur and formally set at liberty. In the first instance, however, he proceeded to Lahore, where he was magnificently entertained by Shir Singh,

The Ambitions of Muhammad Akbar Khan.—Dost Muhammad had appointed Akbar to the post of Vizier, but soon realized that his influence as the leader against the detested English and his ambitions to re-establish the Afghan Empire in the plenitude of its ancient boundaries were likely to cause trouble. The Amir had learned much during his residence in India, but his wider views were unpopular among the fanatical and conservative Afghans, while the conquest of Sind by the British, in 1843, naturally accentuated the anti-British feeling, since it destroyed all hopes of reconquering this outlying province, which had formed part of the empire of Ahmad Shah.

The Murder of Shah Kamran, 1842.—To return to the position at Herat: after the departure of Todd from that city in March 1841, Yar Muhammad, freed from all restraint, confiscated, tortured and enslaved at will. He also planned to seize and plunder his master.

Shah Kamran, suspecting these designs, suddenly took possession of the citadel, hoping that the population would rise in his favour. In this he was disappointed and, after sustaining a siege of fifty days, he was forced to surrender. The infamous Vizier managed to secure the jewels which Shah Mahmud had taken from the

daughter of Yar Muhammad and arranged for Yar Muhammad's son to marry one of his cousins.

Kohandil Khan was exasperated by this new alliance, which placed him between two fires. He consequently raided the Herat province. However, Akbar Khan arrested this proceeding by rapidly advancing at the head of 800 cavalry. But, before this civil war had developed, he was suddenly recalled to Kabul by the Amir, whose orders he bitterly resented.

The Intrigues of Kabul and Herat with Persia.— Towards the end of 1846 Akbar and Yar Muhammad wrote a joint letter, carried by envoys, to Muhammad Shah, pointing out that the English were conquering the whole of the Indus Valley, and begging him to make an alliance with them against the common foe. The envoys were well received and the Shah sent jewelled swords and decorations to Dost Muhammad and to Akbar.

The Death of Akbar Khan.—The turbulent son of Dost Muhammad was still determined to attack Kohandil Khan, in alliance with Yar Muhammad. Dost Muhammad, who opposed this civil war, was threatened by Akbar and, quitting the Bala Hissar, took refuge with the Kizilbash troops. Akbar demanded that his father should be handed over to him, and would probably have

decease, claimed not only his property but also possession of his widows and the post of Vizier. Dost Muhammad finally quelled the rising which ensued and appointed his son Gholam Haidar to be his heir-apparent and Vizier. A second rising of the Ghilzais was also crushed.

Dost Muhammad and the Sikhs, 1845-1849.—In the winter of 1845 Akbar had despatched 500 horsemen to assist the Sikhs, but, on February 10, 1846, the British won the battle of Sobraon and entered Lahore as conquerors.¹

The Sikhs for many years had offered to restore Peshawar to the Afghans if Dost Muhammad would aid them against the British. In 1848, when they embarked on the Second Sikh war, he was compelled to yield to the popular demand. He took possession of the plain of Peshawar and advanced to Attock, which was held by Colonel Herbert, who was ultimately obliged to surrender.

The Amir, content with the recovery of Peshawar, showed no disposition to continue to support the Sikhs, but he was forced by his Chiefs to send a body of cavalry some five thousand strong, which took part in the battle of Gujarat fought on February 21, 1849. The Afghans made a charge and were met by British cavalry, which not only defeated them, but pursued them into the

Herat. In August 1855 this firebrand died and the Amir, at the request of Rahmdil Khan, who had quarrelled with the deceased man's son, marched in person to Kandahar. In spite of much opposition by the people, who were stirred up by the mullas to engage in Jihad against the so-called ally of the British, he annexed Kandahar to his kingdom.

The Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1853.—We must, once again, deal with the position at Herat. Yar Muhammad had died in 1851, and was succeeded by his half-witted son Said Muhammad who, with a view to strengthening his position, commenced negotiations with Persia. This action displeased the British Government who negotiated a treaty with Persia, by the terms of which that power "engaged not to send troops on any account to the territory of Herat, excepting when troops from without attacked the place"."

The Shah and his Vizier disliked this treaty which they had been obliged to sign. The latter vented his spite on the British Minister over a trifling matter and owing to this offensive attitude of the Vizier, the Minister broke off relations, and at the end of 1855 quitted Tehran.

The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1855.—The threatening

would resent his unwarrantable action, but not having received any communication from London for some months after the rupture of relations, he somewhat optimistically thought that no action would be taken. Consequently, in the spring of 1856, he ordered a Persian army to march on Herat, where it was welcomed by Muhammad Yusuf, a Sadozai Sirdar who had put Said Muhammad to death, to avenge the blood of Kamran, and had taken his place. Later there was a rising against the Persians, whose tyrannical behaviour was resented, but, in October 1856, the Persian possession of Herat was finally established.

The Second Treaty with Dost Muhammad.—The British took prompt action to meet this situation and, in January 1857, by the terms of a second treaty, granted Dost Muhammad a subsidy of £10,000 per mensem during the continuation of hostilities, on the understanding that the money was to be spent on his army under the supervision of British officers; large numbers of muskets and quantities of ammunition were also supplied. Actually, however, hostilities were ended before the Amir was able to take any action.

The Anglo-Persian War of 1857.—The British who were only anxious to bring just sufficient pressure on the

of Afghanistan, and never to demand from the chiefs of Herat, or of the countries of Afghanistan, any marks of obedience, such as the issue of coinage or "khutba", or tribute.

His Majesty further engages to abstain hereafter from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan. His Majesty promises to recognize the independence of Herat and of the whole of Afghanistan, and never to attempt to interfere with the independence of those States.

In case of differences arising between the Government of Persia and the countries of Herat and Afghanistan the Persian Government engages to refer them for adjustment to the friendly offices of the British Government, and not to take up arms unless those friendly offices fail of effect.

The New Ruler of Herat.—The Persian authorities, upon receiving information about the treaty, handed over Muhammad Yusuf to the relations of Said Muhammad, who put him to death. He was replaced by a Barakzai Sirdar, Sultan Ahmad Khan, a refugee son-in-law and nephew of Dost Muhammad, who agreed that the khutba should be read in the Shah's name. Consequently Persia continued to rule Herat through this Sirdar, who visited Tehran and received a robe of honour from the Shah. It is difficult to understand why the British Government did not insist that the provinces should be handed over to their ally Dost Muhammad.

De 161 de la 171 de 161

disloyal brother Kohandil Khan. But he was not content to allow Ahmad Khan to recognize the suzerainty of Persia. Accordingly he marched on Herat, carried the city by storm and died nine days later. Thus passed off the stage a truly great Amir, who must have died happy in the knowledge that he had reunited all the provinces of Afghanistan.

CHAPTER XXXIV

SHIR ALI ESTABLISHES HIMSELF AS AMIR

The Afghans youth have reddened their hands, As a falcon dyes its talons in the blood of its quarry. They have made their white swords red with blood, As a bed of tulips blooming in summer.

From an Afghan poem.

The Result of the Annexation of the Punjab.—A new phase in Afghan history opened with the overthrow of the Sikh armies by the British and the subsequent annexation of the Punjab. Up to 1846 the policy of the British Government had mainly been concerned with the creation in Afghanistan, in Persia, and in Central Asia to a lesser degree, of a favourable political situation that would help to protect India from invasion by distant foes. But, between 1846 and 1849, the British assumed control of the provinces conquered by Ranjit Singh, which marched with the loosely defined boundaries of

Sir Henry Lawrence as Warden of the Marches.— During the period 1846-1853 Henry Lawrence set a notable example of the true lines for border administration. He recruited the famous Corps of Guides from both sides of the frontier and constructed the road from Peshawar to Kohat through what is still independent tribal country. His views are aptly summarised in a letter to Lord Stanley: "It is not to be expected that such a frontier can ever be what is called quiet, but it is quite in our power to prevent it being dangerous. . . . With a carte blanche I could guarantee, at a less expense than at present, to pacify the frontier within three years, that is, to make it as quiet as is consistent with the character of such a people."

General John Jacob, the Warden of the Sind Frontier.— Another great frontier officer was Jacob. He had, like Henry Lawrence further north, gained a strong position on the Sind frontier. He had also realized the supreme strategical importance of Quetta. He wrote: "From Quetta, we could operate on the flank and rear of an army attempting to proceed towards the Kyber Pass; so that, with a British force at Quetta, the other road would be shut".2

The Close Border Policy of Lord Lawrence.—In spite of

during the Mutiny. As Dalhousie observed, the views of Lawrence were based on the fallacy that the Afghans were too foolish to recognize their own interests.

The Indian Mutiny.—During the very anxious period of the Indian Mutiny, Dost Muhammad, thanks to the treaties given in the last chapter, and perhaps still more to his knowledge of the vast resources at the disposal of Great Britain, had remained our friend. So much so was this the case that John Lawrence, who feared for the position of the small besieging force at Delhi, instructed Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar, to consult with Brigadier Sydney Cotton and John Nicholson, the Deputy-Commissioner, as to the advisability of handing over Peshawar to the Amir. The answer was worthy of its writers: "We are unanimously of the opinion that, with God's help, we can and will hold Peshawar, let the worst come to the worst; and that it would be a fatal policy to abandon it, and retire beyond the Indus ".1

The Sons of Dost Muhammad.—To understand the constant struggle for power between the numerous surviving sons of Dost Muhammad, it is desirable to give a list of the most important among them, with some details as to the posts they were holding at this juncture. The brackets denote sons by the same mother.

the Viceroy that he had appointed Shir Ali to be his successor. His reasons for the selection of Shir Ali in preference to his eldest son Afzal may well have been that the mother of Afzal was not a member of the royal tribe. Dost Muhammad, as stated above, had suffered much from a similar disability and preferred to choose a son with the highest claims by birth. In any case, as we have seen, Afzal had not behaved well when commanding a force outside Ghazni in 1839.

Shir Ali Khan announces his Accession to the Viceroy.— Shir Ali, immediately on his father's death, announced his accession to Lord Elgin, who, hearing rumours that his brothers might contest the throne with him, delayed his formal acknowledgment of the new Amir. In view of the friendly relations that had latterly existed with Dost Muhammad, this delay, which constituted a definite rebuff, was unfortunate. Lord Elgin died in the autumn of 1863 and it was not until six months after the receipt of Shir Ali's letter that Sir William Denison, who was acting Governor-General, gave a cold official reply.

The Amir, upon receipt of the acknowledgment, asked that his son Muhammad Ali might be officially considered to be his heir. He also asked for a gift of 6000 muskets. These requests were received by Law-

summoned to his presence, had fled across the Oxus. He thereupon imprisoned Afzal, and appointed Fatteh Muhammad Khan, son of the deceased Akbar Khan, to the governorship of the province. Having thus settled matters in Afghan Turkistan, he returned victorious to Kabul.

The Battle of Kujbaz, June 1865.—In the spring of 1865, Shir Ali's own brothers, Muhammad Amin and Muhammad Sharif rebelled. The two armies met in the vicinity of Kalat-i-Ghilzai and the engagement resulted in the defeat of the rebels. During the battle, Muhammad Ali, the heir-apparent, engaged in single combat with his uncle Muhammad Amin in which both were wounded with sword cuts. The uncle then killed his nephew with a pistol shot and was himself despatched by Muhammad Ali's soldiers, both men falling within a few paces of one another. Muhammad Amin's corpse was brought before Shir Ali, who exclaimed: "Throw away the body of this dog, and bid my son come and congratulate me on the victory". Shortly afterwards, his attendants, not daring to tell him that his son had also been killed, silently brought in the corpse. "Who is this other dog?" exclaimed the Amir, but, when he learned the truth, he rent his garments and cast dust upon his

Abdur Rahman occupies Kabul on February 24, 1866.— The rebel Sirdar had won over more than one chief, who had been estranged from Shir Ali. He had also been joined by Azim Khan, who had recruited some soldiers. Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, a younger son of Shir Ali, had done his best to hold Kabul with an inadequate force of unpaid troops, but, finally, he was forced to take refuge in the Bala Hissar, and Abdur Rahman occupied Kabul city without serious opposition. A few days later, Muhammad Ibrahim, having received an assurance of safety, handed over the Bala Hissar to Azim Khan.

The Battle of Sheikhabad, May 9, 1866.—This very serious news from Kabul finally aroused the Amir from his stupor. Marching north with a force of 9000 infantry, 5000 cavalry and 25 guns, he found the enemy strongly entrenched at Sheikhabad, some thirty miles south of Kabul, and attacked with the utmost determination. At the fourth assault he was apparently winning the battle when, at this critical juncture, some Kandahar levies deserted to the enemy. Shir Ali, thereupon, followed by some 500 horsemen, fled from the field. The Governor of Ghazni, deciding to side with the victors, shut the city gates in the face of Shir Ali and released Afzal Khan. The liberated Sirdar speedily joined Azim Khan's camp.

shown in a letter which stated that pity was felt for Shir Ali Khan although, as the Viceroy was careful to point out, he had not been aided with arms or money. Lawrence then went on to state that he would acknowledge Afzal as Amir of Kabul and Kandahar if he, in return, would recognize as binding the two treaties made with Dost Muhammad.

The Mission of Yakub Khan to the Shah, July 1867.— This short-sighted policy of the Viceroy had the result that Shir Ali, despairing of aid from the British, despatched his son Yakub Khan to solicit help from the Shah. Proceeding to Meshed the envoy had an audience of Nasirud-Din, but nothing followed except an exchange of gifts. The Shah was naturally afraid of arousing British susceptibilities.

Another Defeat of Shir Ali Khan, September 1867.— Shir Ali, realizing the treachery of his Kandahar subjects, made his way to Turkistan where he raised an army under Faiz Muhammad, Governor of the province. He advanced on the capital from the north but was defeated by the skilful tactics of Abdur Rahman at Kila Alladad, situated to the north of Charikar.

The Death of Afzal Khan, October 7, 1867.—Upon his return to Kabul, Abdur Rahman found that his

the losses of the latter had been so severe that Abdur Rahman abandoned all ideas of attacking Herat.

Shir Ali returns to Herat and advances on Kandahar.— Shir Ali in defeat was at his best. He fell back on Turkistan and, in January 1868, taking with him 6000 troops, 6 guns and a large sum of money provided by the widow of Faiz Muhammad, he marched back to Herat. He was obviously encouraged by the death of Afzal Khan, more especially as he realized the unpopularity of Azim Khan with the Chiefs and inhabitants of Kabul, and his strained relations with Abdur Rahman. Indeed the hatred inspired by Azim, who was both cruel and miserly, raised the country against him and, in the absence of Abdur Rahman, the position at the capital went from bad to worse.

Shir Ali, before hearing of the result of the siege of Maimana, had despatched a force under his son Yakub Khan. This force defeated Azim's sons, who shared the unpopularity of their father, and Yakub Khan reoccupied Kandahar.

The Fall of Azim Khan.—Azim Khan sought assistance from Abdur Rahman, but in vain; the Chiefs deserted him; Ayub Khan and Abdulla Khan, the younger sons of Shir Ali, were released by their father's

and 3000 muskets from Lawrence with the promise of further assistance.

Abdur Rahman's account of the engagement 1 shows that, against his own judgment, he was forced by Azim Khan to attack Zanakhan, "where there are six or seven forts", and thus attempt to prevent Shir Ali, who was encamped in the neighbourhood, from obtaining supplies. This movement necessitated dividing the force "and marching all day and over snow towards night". Actually, since the fort was not surrendered, the attacking force spent the night sitting in the snow, and suffering severely from the cold.

Realizing that Shir Ali would fight in the morning, Abdur Rahman begged Azim Khan to send reinforcements without delay, only to receive the reply that he would start directly the weather became warmer. As was anticipated, Shir Ali attacked at dawn, captured the artillery and completely routed the rebels. Abdur Rahman, unable to rally his men, fled towards Zurmat, and joined Azim, who had deserted his troops. Abdur Rahman concludes his account of the disaster: "A few days before, I had possessed in my treasury 800,000 gold coins of Bukhara, 20,000 English sovereigns, 20,000 drams of gold, eleven lakhs of rupees, Kabuli,

aid in case of external attack. His second wish was that the British Government should not acknowledge "any friend in the whole of Afghanistan save the Amir and his descendants".

Mayo, however, was only permitted to write that "considering that the bonds of friendship have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it [the British Government] will view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war, and it will further endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of Your Highness. . . ." The gifts made to Shir Ali on this occasion included 6 lakhs of rupees, 6500 muskets, four 18-pounder siege guns, two 8-inch howitzers and a mountain battery of six 3-pounder guns.

The Amir had received no guarantee against external attack, but his reception had been friendly; he had also been given money, arms and ammunition, with an understanding that he would receive further support from time to time. It is interesting to note that the Afridi tribesmen looted some of the Amir's stores, which were ransomed by a payment of 3000 rupees.

Internal Reforms.—Upon his return from India, Shir



instead of by orders on villages. Efforts were also made to keep the men with the colours, while manuals of instruction were prepared in *pushtu* for all arms. Uniforms, too, were being gradually supplied.

The Viceroy gave assistance to the Amir's efforts by the gift of 1200 two-grooved Brunswick rifles, 1200 three-grooved carbines, and 1000 smooth-bore pistols. Meanwhile Armstrong guns were being manufactured at Kabul with some success. In March 1871, it was reported that the regular troops had received eleven months' pay for the past year, but were grumbling because one month's pay had been deducted on account of the cost of their uniforms! Of less importance was the organization of a postal service to Peshawar, for which stamps were struck, the improvement of roads and the cleaning of the Kabul bazaars.

A Persian Mission to Kabul, September 1869.—In the summer of 1869, a Persian envoy reached Herat whose ostensible object was to congratulate the Amir on his victories and to convey friendly assurances. Actually his real object was to learn what had passed at Amballa and to ascertain the Amir's views with respect to Persia and more especially with regard to Seistan. The envoy, during his stay at Kabul, presented a friendly letter from

Prince, who is described as being eighteen years of age, small and quiet. He had apparently made the remark that, had he known of his host's good relations with the British Government, he would not have sought his protection.

Shir Ali was inclined to take advantage of the situation and wrote to the Commissioner of Peshawar that, in view of the injuries suffered by Afghanistan, owing to the encouragement given by the Amir of Bukhara to raids by Afghan refugees, and in view of the certainty of Russia advancing to Charjui and Kirki, he proposed to occupy these places. The reply was that the British Government, while deeming him fully entitled to resist foreign aggression to the utmost, could not approve of the acts of aggression which the Amir suggested. It was also pointed out that the Amir of Bukhara was allied to Russia, which Power was on friendly terms with Great Britain.

Prince Abdul Malik had strongly urged Shir Ali to attack Bukhara, but upon meeting with a definite refusal, he left Kabul and, on November 1, recrossed the Oxus.

The Raid of Ishak Khan, July 1869.—At this period Ishak Khan, Azim Khan's son, who had recruited some Turkoman, crossed the Oxus and attacked Akchah. The local Jezailchis set fire to the magazine in that town and then, together with the Turkistan cavalry, deserted

goes and another comes. I consider the wants of all, and treat them as guests for a few days, till their fortunes improve; at least, such is my hope. My friendship is the same for all of them."

The Rebellion of Yakub Khan.—Shir Ali was pressed, time and again, by Yakub to be acknowledged as heirapparent. The Amir gave evasive replies, since his real intention was that his youngest son Abdulla Jan should be his successor. Yakub Khan was aware of this—indeed it was clear to everyone—and, in September 1870, he suddenly left the capital and wrote to Shir Ali: "My life being oppressed, I took to flight. For the sake of God and the Prophet do not trouble me. I am desperate; if you come you will receive no profit from me."

The Attempt on Kandahar.—The rebel Prince then collected his adherents and, taking his younger brother Ayub Khan with him, rode off to Kandahar. He found the gates of Ghazni closed against him and also failed to gain the support of the garrison of Kalat-i-Ghilzai. At Kandahar he occupied the adjacent Kandahar-i-Nadiri, collected some troops and levied some revenue. However, he again failed to win over the garrison and consequently fled westwards. He attacked the fort of

to him. He then advanced on Herat, being joined by bodies of the local troops, and, on May 6, with the connivance of its defenders, Herat was taken with trifling losses.

Yakub Khan surrenders to Shir Ali, July 1871.—Much intriguing followed this undoubted success. But intermediaries finally succeeded in inducing Yakub, whose position was none too strong at Herat, to return to Kabul. There, in order to test his loyalty, Shir Ali sent his son the following message: "I have formed the wish to retire, and have withdrawn myself from worldly affairs, and am, by my own will and intention, entrusting the reins of government to you". Yakub replied: "As I have become penitent for my faults, I have entirely abandoned the idea of government, and have merely waited on Your Highness to obtain forgiveness for my past offences. Should Your Highness kill me or place me in confinement, I shall consider it a glory in the world to come."

Yakub Khan reappointed Governor of Herat, September 1871.—In September the Amir replied to the Viceroy's letter, in which Mayo strongly urged reconciliation with Yakub, that, in view of his deep humility and penitence, he had forgiven him. He then reappointed him Governor

CHAPTER XXXV

THE ADVANCE OF RUSSIA ACROSS CENTRAL ASIA

It would be manifestly futile to base the safety of the North-West Frontier of India upon any understanding, stipulation, convention or treaty with the Imperial Government. I do not mean to imply that the Emperor and his ministers would wilfully violate their engagements; but the authority of the Russian executive is so slight, the control it exercises over its distant agents and military chiefs is so unsteady, and its policy is so designedly tentative while the forces which stimulate the aggressive instincts of the nation are so constant, that little reliance could be ultimately placed upon mere verbal guarantees.—LORD DUFFERIN to Lord Salisbury, 1880.

The more powerful Russia becomes in Central Asia, the weaker England becomes in India, and consequently the more amenable in Europe.—Skobeloff. From Merv, last home of the free-lance, the clansmen are scattering far, And the Turkman horses are harnessed to the guns of the Russian Czar.

LYALL.

The Position of Russia in Central Asia.—The advance of Russia across Central Asia may be considered to have begun in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. At this period her boundary in Asia ran from the mouth of the Ural River to Orenburg and thence to Omsk and

provided an incentive to the Russian frontier officials, if not to the Government, to undertake an important advance towards India. Accordingly, in November 1839, the Governor, Count Perovski, in command of 3000 infantry, 2000 Cossacks, and a powerful artillery, started from Orenburg on a march of 900 miles across the desert. He carried supplies on an enormous column of baggage camels. But the lack of forage and the cold, which killed off his camels by hundreds, forced the column to retreat before even reaching the Ust-Urt plateau, situated midway between the Caspian and the Aral Seas. The column, which suffered heavy losses, returned to Orenburg in June 1840.

This expedition, although it ended in disaster, alarmed Major Todd, Great Britain's representative at Herat. Under his instructions Captain James Abbot, followed later by Captain Richmond Shakespear, crossed the desert 700 miles wide to Khiva where they explained to the Khan the extreme danger of flouting Russia. Not content with this, the latter officer induced him to release all his Russian slaves, and personally conducted them, numbering four hundred men, women and children, to Orenburg, a truly remarkable feat.¹

It had been decided to despatch a second expedition

The Russians occupy the Sea of Aral, 1844.—The failure of the Khiva expedition made Russia realize the importance of occupying the great Kirghiz desert which spread from the Ural Mountains to the Sea of Aral. In 1844 her explorers reached this inland sea and, in 1847, occupied the mouth of the Sir Daria by the erection of a fort termed Aralsk. In due course a flotilla was launched, which materially assisted her further advance.

The Decay of the Khanates.—At this period the Khanates, which Russia was about to annex, had fallen from their former greatness. Arminius Vambéry, who made his celebrated journey to Central Asia in 1863, describes the Khan of Khiva as "being in appearance so frightfully dissolute and as presenting in every feature of his countenance the real picture of an enervated imbecile and savage tyrant".1 Of Bukhara he writes: "The wretchedness of the streets and houses far exceeded that of the meanest habitations in Persia, and gave but an ignoble idea of Bukhara the Noble". To misgovernment, corruption, bigotry, constant wars and the insecurity of the caravan routes must be added the decrease in the volume of the rivers on which the life of the crops depended. Under these conditions the absorption of the Khanates in the Russian Empire was effected with

from the hostility of Khokand and the veiled hostility of Khiva, the whole area between the Orenburg line to the Sea of Aral was thrown into confusion by a Kirghiz bandit who for five years defied the Russian efforts to capture him. During this period the Crimean War also stopped all progress.

Russian Advance Eastwards.—The Russian advance to the eastwards had been steady and had resulted in bringing under control the Kirghiz of the Great Horde around Lake Balkash. In 1854 Fort Vernoe was founded in this area and garrisoned by 5000 military colonists.

The Creation of the Province of Turkistan, 1867.—When the main advance was resumed, Tashkent was stormed in 1865. In the following year, and again in 1868, the Amir of Bukhara was defeated, the spoils of victory, including Samarkand, while Bukhara now became a "subsidiary ally" of Russia.

These conquests constituted the province of Turkistan, whose administration was purely military, all reports being sent to the War Office at St. Petersburg. In 1876 Khokand was occupied and completed the annexation of the Khanates.

The Russian Occupation of Krasnovodsk.—In 1869 Russia established herself at desolate Krasnovodsk, now generation ago, believed that he could defy that Power with impunity. He was warned, time and again, but in vain. Russia during this period had sent out powerful reconnaissance forces from three sides towards Khiva and finally, columns from Ak Masjid (renamed Fort Perovski), Tashkent and Orenburg converged on Khiva.

On June 10 the capital was stormed and the Khan perforce signed a treaty with General Kaufmann by the terms of which "he renounced all direct and friendly relations existing with neighbouring rulers". Furthermore, the lands on the right bank of the Oxus passed into the possession of Russia, a fort being constructed on them. It was also stipulated that Russia possessed the sole right of navigation on the Oxus and that Russian merchandise was to pass free of customs. Finally, a heavy war indemnity was imposed.

Anglo-Russian Relations.—The relations of Great Britain and Russia were, generally speaking, distinctly friendly at this period. Assurances were given by Prince Gortchakoff that there was no intention of annexing Khiva and they were apparently genuine. Actually, the unwise behaviour of the Khan of Khiva, together with the ambition of the Russian frontier officers, forced the hand of the Russian Government. In view of the Tsar's assurance,

forming the northern boundary of this Afghan Province throughout its entire length". The Oxus continued to be the boundary as far as the ferry of Khwaja Salar on the road between Balkh and Bukhara, at which point that river turned north-west towards the Sea of Aral. Further west it was agreed that a line should be drawn from Khwaja Salar towards the Persian frontier to include Andkhui and Maimana in Afghanistan, but it was stipulated by the Russian Government that "the old city of Merv and adjacent Turkoman districts" should be excluded from its possessions.

A despatch of Prince Gortchakoff of January 31, 1873, which was couched in most friendly terms, concluded this Agreement. Its results were two-fold. Great Britain gained for Afghanistan northern boundaries that were definitely fixed in one section by the Oxus, whereas west of the great bend of that river, the boundary was approximately, but not definitely, laid down. Of further great importance was the avowal by Russia, which was repeated on more than one occasion, that Afghanistan lay wholly outside her sphere of influence.²

Persian Campaigns against the Turkoman, 1852–1861.

—The Turkoman question was one of great importance to Persia, whose province of Khurasan was incessantly

The Proclamation and Campaigns of General Lomakin.— In 1874, General Lomakin, the newly appointed Governor of Krasnovodsk, issued a proclamation to the Yamuts, who occupied both banks of the Atrek, and to other Turkoman tribes who inhabited the country as far as Merv and the Oxus, inviting them to send delegates to meet him. Three years later, after a series of reconnaissances, he led an expedition against Kizil Arvat and received the submission of the Khans.

The Russo-Turkish Campaign, 1877–1878.—In April 1877 Russia had declared war on Turkey and in 1878, when the Russian army had reached the walls of Constantinople, the British Government had interposed with her fleet, and had subsequently, at Berlin, insisted upon the modifications adverse to Russian interests that were contained in the Treaty of San Stephano.

Russia's Counterstroke in Asia.—The answer of Russia, as described in Chapter XXXVII, was the march of Russian troops towards Afghanistan and the despatch of a Mission to Kabul charged with the task of making an alliance with Shir Ali, who was merely a pawn in the game and was thrown aside without scruple when it was lost. It is to be noted that Bismarck was working industriously to avert a coalition of Russia, France and England by

—In the following year Skobeloff who had been appointed to avenge this disaster, made a reconnaissance in force and then retired to the Caspian where he completed his preparations. In December he reappeared on the scene with a force of 7000 men and 60 guns. The fortress consisted of a quadrilateral enclosure with walls 35 feet thick at the base and 25 feet thick at the top. On this wide top were constructed an inner and outer parapet with loopholes and a large number of traverses, designed to protect the defenders. The Tekke made desperate sorties, but the bombardment by heavy artillery and the explosions of mines, followed by a storming party captured the stronghold. The pursuit of the fugitives became a massacre. Personally, when I visited the fortress some years later, I marvelled at the courage with which, in face of terrible losses, this walled enclosure was held.

Thus fell the last great stronghold of Central Asia. The survivors of the Tekke Turkoman were cowed and their kinsmen of Merv were easily persuaded to submit by Alikhanoff, a Moslem of Daghestan, whom I met later at Tiflis. In 1884 Merv thus became a part of the Russian Empire, as did the Sariks of Yulatan to the south. This campaign made the Tsar the Master of Central Asia.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE FIRST SEISTAN MISSION, 1872

And thou hast trod the sands of Seistan, And seen the River of Helmand, and the Lake of Zireh.

But I

Have never known my grandsire's furrowed face,
Nor seen his lofty house in Seistan,
Nor slaked my thirst at the clear Helmand stream.

MATTHEW ARNOLD, Sohrab and Rustum.

A Geographical Outline.—Before dealing with the intricate problems relating to Seistan, a brief account of this interesting area, which is divided between Afghanistan and Persia, is, I think, desirable.¹

Seistan is a large basin some seven thousand square miles in area, which receives all the drainage of a vast tract of country. The Helmand is the principal river, but the Khash Rud, Farah Rud and Harut Rud, together with torrents from the western mountains, all drain into this

Helmand changed its course. The population has perforce followed the river, on which its very existence depended, and it would appear that the Zarangiana, visited by Alexander the Great, covers the area now marked by the remains of Ramrod in the Tarakun area, where I noted ruins of important cities. It is also definitely established that Zaranj, the capital destroyed by Tamerlane, can be identified with the ruins of Zahidan in the present delta. Other and older sites abound. Chief among them are the ruins of Sarotar on the right bank of the Helmand, which extend for some sixty miles northwards in an unbroken line, proving the existence of a Seistan which was infinitely more prosperous and contained a much larger population than the 200,000 inhabitants of today.

In the Sarotar ruins Parthian and Sasanian coins are found with those of the Caliphs. To the west of the hamun rises the flat-topped Kuh-i-Khwaja, the only hill of the delta. On its southern slopes are the massive ruins of Kakhaha, a strongly fortified site, around which many legends connected with Rustam centre. Stein visited this ancient site in 1915, and discovered frescoes of the Sasanian period of great importance; one of them, as was befitting, represents Rustam holding his famous mace.

seventh century, and for some centuries after this change of masters it remained prosperous and civilized. In the tenth century Yakubi describes the capital Zaranj as being four leagues in circumference. It was strongly fortified with an inner and an outer wall. The latter had thirteen gates opening across a great moat filled with water. Reference is also made to the riches and learning of the inhabitants. In 1362 Timur, at that time a fugitive, raided the province at the head of 1000 horsemen, but was wounded in the foot and retreated, as narrated in Chapter XVII.

Returning to Seistan in 1383, Tamerlane captured Zaranj, which offered a desperate resistance. The inhabitants were massacred or enslaved and Zahidan, as it is now termed, was left desolate.

The present inhabitants of Seistan are mainly Baluchis, although a few members of the ancient Keiani are left, while the Saiads or fowlers who live along the edges of the hamun claim to be the original inhabitants. Probably by taking refuge in the reed-beds on their tutins or rafts they escaped the fury of the invaders.

Nadir Shah invades Seistan.—To resume our survey, Nadir Shah is believed to have captured Kakhaha after a siege of seven years. Upon the death of this, the last of suavity that "Her Majesty's Government being informed that the title to the territory of Seistan is disputed between Persia and Afghanistan, must decline to interfere in the matter, and must leave it to both parties to make good

their possession by force of arms ".

The Persian Government continued steadily to pursue its policy of increasing Persian authority and influence until Shir Ali, who had finally succeeded in establishing himself upon the throne at Kabul, threatened to declare war. Upon this, the British Government, in 1870, proposed arbitration under the Treaty of Paris which provided that the Shah should "refer for adjustment to the friendly offices of England any differences that might occur between Persia and Herat or Afghanistan". This proposal was duly accepted by the Persian Government.

The Appointment of the British Mission.—Major-General Sir Frederic Goldsmid had already constructed the telegraph line along the coasts of British and Persian Makran — a great feat. Moreover, he had not only delimited but had secured the ratification of the Makran boundary. He was now appointed to arbitrate on Persian and Afghan claims in Seistan. The British Mission, which included Majors Beresford Lovett and Euan Smith, landed at Bandar Abbas and was joined in Seistan

The Reception of the Mission in Seistan.—The Mission reached Nasratabad (then termed Nasirabad) in February 1872, and was met by an istikhbal or "Reception Party" sent out by the Amir of Kain. It was headed by two Sirdars whose men were "armed with every conceivable species of musket, rifle, spear, sword, shield, and known and unknown weapon of defence". No one was sent by Mir Alum Khan to make the usual "health inquiries", and other evidences of unfriendly feelings were not lacking. No camping-ground was arranged for, and the Mission was housed in some mud hovels, while the Commissioner was not permitted to hoist his flag, as he had invariably done throughout the Makran Boundary Commission and while on the march to Seistan.1

The Tour of the Commissioners.—In view of the delay of the Afghan Commissioner to appear on the scene, Goldsmid insisted on touring the province, and, leaving the wretched quarters "which so closely resembled an imprisonment", he started off with the Persian Commissioner who, through the Amir of Kain's representative, was practically able to dictate the direction of the daily marches. They visited the big dam at Kuhak and then marched up the Helmand to Bandar-i-Kamal Khan; they also visited Nad Ali. Generally speaking, in spite

The Final Breach with the Persian Commissioner.— Threatening letters referring to the suite of the Afghan Commissioner completed the breach with the Persian Commissioner, and Goldsmid, after consultation with Pollock, wrote to Masum Khan that, in view of the actions and behaviour of the Persian representatives, he had decided to leave Seistan and to make his report at Tehran. Summing up the position he wrote: "One inevitable conclusion forced upon the mind was that the Persian Government had most signally and culpably failed in the commonest courtesy, not taking even the most ordinary precautions to ensure that the dignity and safety of a Mission it had itself solicited, should be suitably upheld and regarded". It is a great pity that Goldsmid was not provided with an escort of Indian troops.

The Award.—Goldsmid, in his arbitral award, divided the area into "Seistan Proper" and "Outer Seistan". The first was bounded on the north and west by the hamun, and on the east by the main branch of the Helmand. "Outer Seistan" was the narrow district on the right bank of the Helmand which stretched from north to south for over one hundred miles. "Seistan Proper" was awarded to Persia and "Outer Seistan"

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE GENESIS OF THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

I have deputed my agent, Major-General Stolietoff, an officer high in the favour of the Emperor. He will inform you of all that is hidden in my mind. I hope that you will pay great attention to what he says, and believe him as you would myself. . . . The advantage of a close alliance with the Russian Government will be permanently evident.—KAUFMANN to Shir Ali, June 1878. Parl. Papers, 1881, xcviii ("Central Asia", No. 1).

General Kaufmann's Correspondence with Shir Ali.— By way of an introduction to this chapter, I will give some account of the correspondence of Kaufmann with the Amir. The opening letter of a series, which led to his overthrow, was dated April 11, 1870 and referred to the arrival at Tashkent of Abdur Rahman. In it Kaufmann wrote that he had answered his request to be admitted to that city by stating that "the Emperor of Russia graciously affords hospitality to everybody... but that he must not in the least reckon on my interferan appeal to the British to bestow more serious attention to the maintenance of the boundaries of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Kaufmann continued his correspondence while "positive assurances" were being given to the British Foreign Office that the "Imperial Cabinet continues to consider Afghanistan as entirely beyond its sphere of action". It is possible that the British Foreign Office, at this period, failed to realize that Russian Turkistan was administered by the practically independent Russian War Office.

To continue this correspondence, in the winter of 1873 Kaufmann wrote to the Amir a long letter describing the fall of Khiva, and Shir Ali, replying in January 1874, congratulated the Governor-General upon his great military success; at the same time he wrote a separate letter in which he announced that Abdulla Jan had been

nominated his heir-apparent.

Kaufmann's next letter was dated several months later. In it he wrote that he had been absent in Russia and that he considered the recent alliance between the Emperor of Russia and the Queen of England "would be an omen for the people of those countries which, under the protection of the Emperor of Russia and the Queen of England, live in great peace and comfort". It is to

General Goldsmid, given in the previous chapter, Sayyid Nur Muhammad, the representative of the Amir on that Commission, reached Simla as the envoy of the Amir to discuss these matters.

He agreed that the settlement as to the northern frontier was, generally speaking, satisfactory to His Highness, but he realized that no definite frontier had been delimitated west of the great bend of the Oxus and that the frontier Chiefs would probably lend themselves to Russian intrigues.

As to Goldsmid's award in Seistan, the Amir's dissatisfaction was as strong as that of the Shah. It must be recollected that Nur Muhammad was the Afghan representative on the Boundary Commission, and having failed to gain territory at Persia's expense, would naturally attack the British award. What he wanted, was an award in favour of Afghanistan per fas aut nefas.

But the Amir's chief concern was to know exactly where he stood with the British in connexion with the constant advance of Russia. Were they his allies and, if so, would they support him against Russian invasion by troops, by arms and by money? This was naturally the vital question for Shir Ali.

Lord Northbrook's Proposed Guarantee to Shir Ali,

might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance.' I propose to inform Kabul Envoy of sense of this paragraph."

The Reply of the Secretary of State for India.—On July 1 Argyll replied that "he did not object to the general sense of the paragraph which you quote as a communication to Russia from the Foreign Office, but great caution is necessary in assuring Amir of material assistance which may raise undue and unfounded expectation". On July 20 Northbrook again cabled: "Amir of Kabul alarmed at Russian progress; dissatisfied with general assurances, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose to assure him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms and troops, if necessary to repel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by telegraph quickly."

Argyll's reply of July 24 ran: "Cabinet think that you should inform Amir that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it. But you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external

became thoroughly disgusted, and at once made overtures to the Russians, with whom constant intercourse had since been kept up.1

The Nomination of Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir-Apparent.—In November 1873 Shir Ali's favourite son Abdulla Jan was appointed heir-apparent. The Viceroy, the Shah, the Amir of Bukhara and General Kaufmann (as we have seen) were duly informed. The Shah, whose dignity was outraged by the latter being merely forwarded through the Persian Governor of Seistan, vouchsafed no

reply to it.

The Imprisonment of Yakub Khan and the Flight of Ayub Khan.—The nomination of Abdulla Jan was most unwelcome to Yakub. At first he appeared likely to rebel but funds were lacking and, after many pourparlers, he visited Kabul under a safe-conduct - and was imprisoned. Immediately after his eldest son's arrest, the Amir wrote to warn Ayub Khan to remain loyal. Reports reached Kabul which tended to show that Herat was being prepared for a siege and that Persian support was probable. However, in the event, the rebellion collapsed and Ayub fled across the Persian border. The Viceroy attempted to effect a reconciliation between the Amir and Yakub Khan but, without success. Indeed Shir Ali

his instructions, and Northbrook in his reply stated that, if the Amir were asked to allow a British Resident at Herat, he would certainly once again raise the question whether the British Government would unconditionally promise to protect Afghanistan against external attack. Northbrook also pointed out that, even if an Agent were accepted, he would be surrounded by spies under the pretext of guarding him and that persons visiting him would be watched and removed. Shortly afterwards, nominally for personal reasons, Northbrook resigned. The last words he addressed to Salisbury ran: "By taking the initiative, I feel certain that you are throwing away your best card, and running the risk of embarrassment for the future, both political and financial".2

Disraeli's Policy in Asia.—To give some idea of the policy of the Conservative Cabinet, I quote from a letter written by the Prime Minister to Queen Victoria, dated June 22, 1877. It described the measures that were proposed to be taken in Asia against Russia, in case she seized Constantinople and war were declared against her. It runs: "It is Lord Beaconsfield's present opinion that in such a case Russia must be attacked from Asia, that troops should be sent to the Persian Gulf, and that the Empress of India should order her armies to clear

send a Mission to His Highness, to announce his own accession to the office of Viceroy and the assumption by the Queen of the title of Empress of India. This demand caused Shir Ali considerable apprehension. He considered that the British were alarmed by the Russian advance towards Merv and therefore wished to obtain his consent for the establishment of a British Mission at Herat. If he accepted, he feared that he would be accused of taking a step hostile to Russia. He also feared that the reception of a British envoy might lead to a Russian envoy suddenly entering Afghanistan. Finally he feared for the safety of the Mission in fanatical Kabul — and not without good reason. Consequently, in his reply of May 22, he suggested that all questions affecting the two countries had been discussed in 1873 with his envoy and that, if necessary, a similar procedure should be adopted in the present case.

In July, Lytton, who was irritated at what was, in effect, a polite refusal to his proposal, wrote a second letter to Shir Ali, repeating his wishes and assuring him that he had been actuated by a cordial desire for closer relations. He added: "It will for this reason cause the Viceroy sincere regret if Your Highness, by hastily rejecting the hand of friendship now frankly held out to

he declared that if the reception of his envoy, as he hoped, led to a more cordial understanding, he would be happy to meet the Amir at Peshawar in the autumn.

Three experienced Members of his Council, to wit Sir William Muir, Sir Henry Norman and Sir Arthur Hobhouse, dissented from the views of Lord Lytton and the majority of their colleagues. They considered that Shir Ali was justified in declining to receive a British Mission and that the Viceroy's letter was almost equivalent to a threat of war.

There is no question as to the threat contained in Lytton's letter. He was aware of the refusal of the Gladstone Cabinet to accept the statesmanlike proposals of Northbrook in 1873 and would surely have been better advised to have informed Shir Ali that the British Government had definitely decided to defend him against external aggression with troops, arms and money. Such a statement conveyed in a cordial letter would almost certainly have created a friendly atmosphere and would have made Shir Ali our staunch friend and ally. Furthermore it would have saved Afghanistan from the horrors of a second war within little more than a generation after the first, and Great Britain from a vast expenditure of life and treasure.

alliance with Great Britain, and his deep disappointment at the refusal of the British to accept his wishes.

The Reply of Lord Lytton.—The Viceroy stated that he was willing to enter into the alliance as suggested; that, in the event of unprovoked external aggression, assistance would be afforded to the Amir in men, money and arms; that Abdulla Jan would be recognized as heir-apparent to the Amir and that a yearly subsidy would be granted. Lytton, however, laid down that the conditions attached to these concessions were that the Amir held no external relations with Russia, referring the agents of that Power to the British; that British agents should reside at Herat, or elsewhere on the frontier; that a mixed Anglo-Afghan Commission should demarcate the Amir's frontier; and finally, that the establishment of á permanent envoy at Kabul would be waived, on condition that the Amir deputed a permanent envoy to India and agreed to receive special missions whenever requested.

The Viceroy, unfortunately as it proved, clearly explained that unless the Amir gave his consent to the establishment of a British agent on the frontier, as a basis of negotiation, the above offers were cancelled. Experienced Pelly regretted this conditional stipulation,

Northbrook, realizing the importance of following up this opening, despatched Sandeman on a second mission in April 1876. Upon Lytton taking over the Viceroyalty, somewhat different instructions were sent to Sandeman, but the latter, on June 16, telegraphed the terms of a settlement which was proposed by the Khan and accepted by the Sirdars. Finally, on December 8, the Treaty of Jacobabad was executed. The Viceroy received the Khan and the Sirdars at a public durbar and general rejoicings celebrated the happy conclusion of Sandeman's mission. By the terms of the treaty, Quetta became an important British cantonment, while the Bolan Pass for the first time became safe for the passage of caravans, without payment of blackmail. It must, however, be mentioned that the occupation of Quetta was naturally viewed with dislike and suspicion by Shir Ali and his Councillors.

The Position in Europe.—In 1875 a rebellion in Bosnia and Herzegovina led two years later to the Russo-Turkish War. Disraeli's policy was, as we have seen, strongly anti-Russian, so much so that war with Russia appeared to be a probability.

The Mission of General Stolietoff to Kabul, July 1878.—
The bitter hostility existing in Europe between the two

him of the signature of the Treaty of Berlin and instructing him to refrain from making any definite arrangements with the Amir. Stolietoff, however, realizing the almost independent position of the Governor-General, produced a draft of a treaty with Russia offering assistance to the Amir against an external enemy and recognition of Abdulla Jan as heir-apparent.

The exact terms of the treaty are perhaps doubtful but, on August 23, the Amir wrote to Kaufmann that Stolietoff had written down his wishes to strengthen friendly relations between Russia and would shortly return with his reply.² This letter proved the case against the Amir.

The Assurance of M. de Giers.—It is of considerable importance to note that, on July 2, 1878, Lord Loftus inquired of M. de Giers whether any Russian official had been instructed by St. Petersburg or by Kaufmann to proceed on a mission to Kabul. De Giers, in his reply, categorically denied that any Mission had been sent or was intended to be sent to Kabul either by the Imperial Government or by Kaufmann.³ De Giers was probably being deceived by the Russian War Office, since his character would be seriously affected by his denying facts that were soon known to the world.

The Intervention of Lord Salisbury.—Since no reply was received from Kabul, on September 8, Lytton proposed the immediate despatch of Chamberlain with an escort of 1000 men to Kabul. Three days later Salisbury requested Cranbrook, the Secretary of State for India, to await the receipt of a letter from de Giers which was on its way to London. But when Cranbrook's instructions in this sense reached India, frontier officers were already arranging with Khaibar tribesmen for the passage of the Mission and Lytton was assured that postponement of the Mission would incur the contempt of the tribesmen. He therefore allowed another week for the receipt of de Giers' letter and, failing this, on September 20, without any further reference to London, ordered Chamberlain to advance.

Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission stopped by Afghan Troops.—The Mission was, however, met by a strong hostile force at Ak Masjid, and it perforce returned to Peshawar, fortunate to escape being cut up.

The Decision of the British Cabinet.—Towards the end of October there were stormy meetings of the Cabinet. Lytton's policy was attacked by Salisbury, who feared that trouble with Russia over Afghan matters might seriously hinder the execution of the Treaty of Berlin.

conditions and, bearing in mind the bitter grief of the Amir at the sudden death of his favourite son, more patience and more tact should have been displayed by the Viceroy.

Lord Salisbury's Letter.—By way of conclusion to this chapter, I will quote a remarkable letter of Salisbury: "As for the embassy to Kabul, it appears to have been self-generated. Schouvaloff had heard nothing of it the whole time he was at Berlin—nor during the three weeks he afterwards spent at St. Petersburg. Only when he went to Wilbad he saw it in the newspapers. He immediately rushed to Gortchakoff and asked, 'Has there been any Mission to Kabul?'. Gortchakoff putting his hand on his brow and reflecting: 'Non, je ne le crois pas'." I

¹ To Lord Odo Russell, Nov. 27, 1878.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

The Emperor considers you as a brother, and you also, who are beyond the Oxus must display the same sense of friendship and brotherhood. . . . The Emperor's desire is that you should not admit the English into your country, and, like last year, treat them with deceit and deception until the present cold season passes away; then the will of the Almighty will be manifest to you—that is to say, the Russian Government will come to your assistance.—The Letter of GENERAL STOLIETOFF to the Vizier of Shir Ali, dated October 8, 1878.

And yet when I think of Shir Ali as he lies in his sepulchre low,
How he died betrayed, heart-broken, 'twixt infidel friend and foe,
Driven from his throne by the English, and scorned by the Russian, his guest,
I am well content with the vengeance, and I see God works for the best.

SIR ALFRED LYALL, The Amir's Soliloguy.

Three British Columns invade Afghanistan.—No answer to the ultimatum of the Viceroy was received from Kabul owing, as it was subsequently proved, to delay in transmission. Accordingly, upon the expiration of the time limit, three columns, whose objectives were Kandahar,

centre. There was no opposition to this column which occupied Kandahar on January 8, 1879.

The March up the Kurram Valley.—Roberts, whose transport service had been collected haphazard — there was no organized transport service in the Indian army at that period — was very anxious about its deficiencies. He also was aware that the mullas were tampering with the Moslem sepoys, who did not relish taking part in a war against the Amir. Accordingly, upon hearing that the Afghans were holding the Peiwar Kotal in great strength, he applied for reinforcements, which were somewhat reluctantly granted. The fact that the Turis of the Kurram were Shias guaranteed their loyal support, more especially as Roberts was authorized to promise them that the British occupation would be permanent.

The Battle of the Peiwar Kotal, December 2, 1878.— The Afghan troops who had retreated up the valley took up a strong position on the pine-clad pass. A main frontal attack was ruled out by the rugged nature of the ground and by the necessity of advancing in single file. The mountains on the enemy right also forbade an attack. Most fortunately a track leading to the Afghan left flank was discovered, and it was determined to send

dawned, I doubt whether any of us could have reached the first entrenchment." 1

The main body on the Peiwar Kotal was still holding its position but, at first, part of the flanking column lost its way and the situation became serious. Roberts also learned that the frontal attack on the Peiwar Kotal had been repulsed with somewhat heavy losses.

By a happy chance a route was discovered for a further turning movement, which threatened the Afghan rear. This caused their artillery fire to slacken, while their infantry broke and fled from the main position—and the battle was won. Actually, owing to the exhaustion of the troops, the Afghan position was not occupied until the following morning when its impregnability against a frontal attack was evident. Roberts and his splendid troops deserve immense credit for the victory at the Peiwar Kotal.

After halting for a few days to rest the force and to allow supplies and tents to be brought up, Roberts marched along the Kabul road to Ali Khel. From this camp he visited the Shutargardan Pass which rises to an elevation of 11,000 feet, and obtained a splendid view of the Logar Valley and beyond.

The Khaibar Column.—Sir Sam Browne advanced up

returned to their homes. He released Yakub from prison and appointed him Regent. Then, hoping for the promised Russian support, and leaving a letter addressed to the British in which he stated that he had decided to lay the whole question before the Tsar, he fled northwards to Balkh.

Treacherous Kaufmann, in response to the Amir's frantic appeals, merely advised him to endeavour to make peace with the British. He refused to send any troops to his support and would not permit the unfortunate Amir to visit St. Petersburg. On February 21, 1879, worn out with illness and the knowledge that he had been betrayed by Russia, Shir Ali died at Mazar-i-Sharif.

The Position of Yakub Khan.—Lytton wrote to the new Amir proposing that he should receive a mission at Kabul. Yakub took council with the Afghan officers who had accompanied Shir Ali in his flight as to his policy, and they advised him to abandon the British and trust to Russia. Hearing this, the British Agent, who was the bearer of Lytton's and Major Cavagnari's letters, fearing for the safety of a British mission at Kabul, suggested that Yakub should, instead, visit the British camp, which had now advanced to Gandamak. This was agreed to and the Amir proceeded to Gandamak

The Treaty of Gandamak, May 26, 1879.—Cavagnari disregarded this treacherous behaviour of Yakub and negotiated with him the Treaty of Gandamak. By its terms Great Britain definitely agreed to protect Afghanistan against external attack, while it was stipulated that there were to be no direct communications by that country with other Powers. The Amir was granted an annual subsidy of 6 lakhs of rupees. To continue: the British Government restored to the Amir Kandahar and Jalalabad, which towns were in the possession of British troops, but, with the agreement of His Highness, "the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi . . . shall be treated as assigned districts. . . . 2 The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khaibar and Michni Passes . . . and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory connected with these Passes."

By the Treaty of Gandamak the position of Quetta and its lines of communication with India were assured owing to the occupation of Pishin and Sibi. The occupation of the Kurram Valley, apart from its strategical importance, was partly due to its inhabitants, who, as Shia Moslems, were perpetually raided by their fanatical neighbours and were thus loval to the British, to whom

regiments from Herat, who had arrived early in August, had displayed mutinous tendencies and that a fracas had taken place between the Afghan troops and some men of his escort. On September 2 he telegraphed, "All well". On September 3 three of the six regiments asked for their pay. They were offered one month's pay but refused to take less than three months'. The troops then mutinied and, marching to the Residency, asked Cavagnari to pay them. Apparently he declined to intervene, and their fanaticism having been excited by the mullas, they attacked the Residency. The resistance, if hopeless, was most determined, repeated sallies being made, but finally the gallant band was massacred and the Residency was burned. The mission had been in Kabul only six weeks and five days when the tragedy occurred.

Apart from the loss of valuable British lives, the blow to British prestige and the collapse of the policy of securing a scientific frontier for the security of India made the situation extremely serious. To quote Lytton's letter to Beaconsfield: "The web of policy so carefully and patiently woven has been rudely shattered. We have now to weave a fresh and, I fear, a wider one from undoubtedly weaker materials." ²

The Kabul Field Force.—Of the three British forces

munication which would be closed in mid-winter, and to rely on the Khaibar route being opened by the time Kabul was taken. Roberts, on reaching the camp, writes that he was delighted with the spirit of the force, which was burning to avenge the massacre of their comrades.

The Attitude of Yakub towards the Massacre.—Upon his arrival at Ali Khel, two letters written by Yakub on September 3 and September 4 were handed to Roberts by the political agent. According to them, "the troops who had assembled for their pay suddenly broke out and stoned their officers and then all rushed to the Residency and stoned it, receiving in return a hail of bullets. . . . People from Sherpur and the country around and city people of all classes poured into the Bala Hissar and began destroying workshops, artillery park and magazine, and all the troops and people attacked the Residency."

The question of the Amir's complicity in the tragedy was subsequently considered, with the result that it was found that the massacre was not instigated by him, but that although he must be acquitted of complicity in the outrage, he could, by acting promptly, have prevented it. It is curious how this massacre resembled that of Burnes a generation earlier. In each case quick, decided action by the Amir would have been effective.

instructions, attempted by every means "to stop the advance of the force long enough for the whole country to rise and attack us", as Roberts put it. Neither of these envoys wished to remain, so they were dismissed.

The Advance on Kabul and the Arrival in Camp of the Amir.—As soon as supplies had been collected, Roberts resumed his march to Kabul. After crossing the Shuturgardan Pass, to his embarrassment he was met at Kushi by the Amir with a large following. Yakub himself now urged on Roberts the advisability of delay, but realizing that the Amir's wish was to gain time for the assembly of a strong force, Roberts marched steadily northwards. At this period General Bright was advancing up the Khaibar with a force of 16,000 men, while Sir Donald Stewart, having reoccupied Kandahar and Kalati-Ghilzai, was threatening Ghazni.

The Battle of Charasia.—Sirdar Nek Muhammad, an uncle of the Amir, at this period rode out to the camp and held a secret conference with the Amir, after which, having ascertained the exact strength of the British, he hastened back to Kabul, obviously to organize the Afghan army.

On October 6 reconnoitring parties reported that the range between Kabul and Charasia was being occupied

Roberts enters Kabul on October 12.—The British force arrived before Kabul on October 8. Darkness prevented an immediate attack but, during the night, the enemy fled, leaving all their artillery, consisting of 150 guns, behind them.

The Abdication of Yakub Khan.—On October 12 the victorious general made his public entry into the city, and Yakub Khan, accompanied by only two followers, walked to the camp and abdicated. He said that his life had been a miserable one; that he would rather be a grass-cutter in the English camp than Amir of Afghanistan. He begged for permission to live in the camp until he could be sent to India.

The Proclamation of Roberts.—On October 28 the victor issued a proclamation by the terms of which he referred to the voluntary abdication of Yakub as having left Afghanistan without a Government, and stated "that the British Government, after consultation with the principal Sirdars, tribal chiefs, and others representing the interests and wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people".

The Reverse in the Chardeh Valley.—Roberts decided to occupy a fortified cantonment at Sherpur, which Shir

by the assembled Afghans inevitable, and, at dawn on December 23, roused to religious fervour by a religious festival, they advanced in dense masses. Although faced by rifle and artillery the heroic tribesmen made attack after attack, only to suffer heavy losses. After the failure of these assaults a sortie by British cavalry and artillery completed their discomfiture. The Afghans, who can only carry food for a few days, had played into the hands of Roberts. They were beaten and speedily dispersed. Reinforcements strengthened his military position, but the political future of Afghanistan remained obscure. Who was to rule as Amir and would he rule over a disintegrated or a united country? The answer to this difficult problem was the reappearance of Sirdar Abdur Rahman in Afghan Turkistan.

CHAPTER XXXIX

ABDUR RAHMAN IS PROCLAIMED AMIR OF KABUL

To Allah alone are the gates of the hidden mysteries open; no man can know what is to happen in the future except Allah, the All-Knowing.—The Koran.

Thus is my banishment ended; it's twelve long years, well nigh, Since I fought the last of my lost fights, and saw my best men die; They hunted me over the passes, and up to the Oxus stream, We had just touched land on the far side as we saw their spearheads gleam.

Then came the dolorous exile, the life in a conquered land, Where the Frank had trodden on Islam; the alms at a stranger's hand; While here in the fort of my fathers, my bitterest foe held sway; He was ten years building his Kingdom, it all fell down in a day.

LYALL.

The Early Years of Abdur Rahman.—Abdur Rahman, "the Slave of the Merciful," destined to rank as the great Amir, who welded the loose congeries of turbulent tribes into a nation and ruled with a rod of steel over a united Afghanistan, had a chequered career, which is

CH. XXXIX ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 121

training resembled that of a medieval European of noble family. In other words, he spent most of his time in sport and warlike exercises, and could only read and write with difficulty.

When he was thirteen years of age, Afzal visited Kabul to pay his respects to Dost Muhammad and his youthful son was left to act as Governor in his place.

His Appointment to Tashkurgan.—Shortly afterwards, he was appointed Governor of Tashkurgan by his grandfather. This appointment he held for some two years, reducing the revenues in case of failure in the crops and, generally speaking, ruling with leniency. But his father, who visited the province, after inspecting the revenue accounts, refused these concessions and insisted on full payment of the taxes. The young Sirdar therefore resigned the governorship and returned to Takhtapul, where his father had built a palace and established his family. He now returned to his studies, but secured physical fitness by hunting for two days a week in the jungles of the Oxus, or fishing on the river of Balkh.

His Training under Campbell.—At this period he fell under the influence of Campbell, Shah Shuja's able general, who, as mentioned in Chapter XXIX, had been taken prisoner at Kandahar in 1834. Converted to

to run away to Herat. This design having been betrayed by his servants, he was thrown into prison with chains on his ankles and, in this unhappy position, he languished for one year.

Upon the death of Campbell, Afzal wished to appoint one of his trusted followers to the post. But to quote yet again, "he refused to accept it, saying to my father that his own son, who had been one year in prison, and therefore punished sufficiently for his faults, was the proper person to take the place of Shir Muhammad Khan. My father at first refused . . . but being urged to give me a trial, he finally consented to send for me. I came straight from prison to appear before my father . . . with chains around my ankles. My father addressed himself to all the military officers saying, 'I appoint this my lunatic son to be General over you'. To which they replied: 'God forbid that your son should be a lunatic: we know well that he is wise and sensible, you also will find this out, and will prove that it is disloyal people who give him a bad character '."

His Appointment as Commander-in-Chief.—In this manner, the earliest crisis in Abdur Rahman's life, which might well have been a story taken from the Arabian Nights, ended satisfactorily. Thanks to his energy and

XXXIX ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 123

Abdur Rahman marched on Ghori which was held by a strong force, while the Mir Atalik "showed himself with 40,000 sowars from the top of an adjacent hill, to encourage his soldiers in the fort". However, the Afghan troops, under cover of a heavy cannonade, stormed the outer fort and, following close on its escaping defenders, took possession of the bazar. Thereupon the main fort, which had only been provisioned for ten days, surrendered.

The Amir of Bukhara crosses the Oxus.—The Amir of Bukhara, at this period, decided to take a hand in the game in the interests of the Mir of Badakhshan, and crossed the Oxus with a large force. The situation was difficult, since it was possible that the Uzbegs of Afghan Turkistan, who were of the same nationality, would rebel, while there was also the possibility, if not the likelihood, of the Amir of Bukhara making a sudden attack on the Afghans. In the event, Abdur Rahman, while marching to the support of his uncle, heard artillery fire. This was taken to signify the revolt of the Uzbegs and caused great alarm among his soldiers; actually it was a feu de joie, fired by Azim Khan, to celebrate the flight of the Amir of Bukhara!

The Succession of Shir Ali Khan in 1863.—Upon the death of Dost Muhammad in 1863, Shir Ali, as we have

the Oxus into Afghan Turkistan, where he was welcomed by the troops. But the struggle with Shir Ali, as mentioned in Chapter XXXIV, ended in his final defeat in January 1869. After this disaster, accompanied by his uncle and some faithful followers, he started on a long weary journey round Afghanistan to Samarkand.

Among the most interesting of his experiences is the following: "The first night I entered the Wazir country, I had eaten nothing since my defeat, and I told my sowars that I was very hungry, and should much like a piece of meat. They had one piece of money between them, and with this they bought some mutton, butter and onions. . . . My men managed to procure an iron saucepan, and in this I cooked some of the meat, making also some gravy. I had been obliged to tie the saucepan to some sticks to hang it over the fire, and as I was going to take the cooked meat out of the saucepan, a dog, thinking the hanging string was the intestines of some animal, seized it in his mouth and ran off with the whole thing. . . . Three days before I had 1000 camels to carry my cooking utensils, and now one dog could run off with my cooking pans, together with the food." 1

While travelling along the Indian frontier Amir Azim received a letter from two English officers inviting him to

XXXIX ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 125

able hardships from lack of supplies, from the soaking rain and the bitter winds. Reaching Chagai with men and horses exhausted, they stayed there for twenty-five days and grazed their beasts. Resuming the journey, the Helmand was struck and, meeting a band of raiders from Persian Seistan, Abdur Rahman made friends with them and on reaching the delta province, the party was hospitably entertained by *Mir* Alum Khan of Kain, who was, as we have seen, discourteous to Sir Frederic Goldsmid and the officers of the Seistan mission.

Once in Persia, the hardships of the refugees were finished for the time being, and the Sirdars travelled to Meshed, the sacred city of Persia and the capital of Khurasan, where they were received with much honour.

The Shah invited Abdur Rahman to visit him at Tehran, but he asked to be allowed to proceed to Urganj or Khiva. This was permitted, and leaving Azim (who shortly afterwards died), in charge of his Meshed hosts, Abdur Rahman continued his wanderings to Darragaz. There his hospitable host arranged for his safety while crossing the Turkoman country, by holding as security one thousand camel loads belonging to Turkoman merchants.

Hissar, where he remained for a few days, making little comment on his reception which was cool.

Abdur Rahman and General Kaufmann, 1870.—The wanderer then travelled to Samarkand, now a Russian possession, where he was kindly received by the Russian authorities. In due course he paid a visit to the Governor-General at Tashkent. So far as his correspondence proves, Kaufmann behaved honestly on this occasion in his dealings with the Afghan Sirdar. Abdur Rahman tried hard to persuade him that it was absolutely necessary for the interests of Russia that he should be assisted to become Amir of Afghanistan. Kaufmann's reply was that he had been given hospitality in consideration of his destitute condition; that the relations of Russia with Great Britain were friendly and that he wished Shir Ali a prosperous reign.1

It was finally decided that Abdur Rahman should be provided with a house and garden at Samarkand, and there he lived, supported by an allowance from his hosts, from 1870 to 1880. He had settled down in the best centre for watching events in Afghanistan, and for eleven years he watched and intrigued with the Chiefs across the Oxus and with merchants who visited him. In concluding this account of the early years of Abdur Rahman's

XXXIX ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 127

Viceroy of Tashkent. The Russians would reply to the letters through the same medium."

The Sirdar was naturally excited by the tragedy at Kabul, which resulted in the flight and death of Shir Ali and the elimination of Yakub and Ayub. He decided to return to Afghanistan immediately, and began to make

preparations.

The Encouragement of Abdur Rahman by Russia.—It is interesting to note that the Sirdar was encouraged to return to Afghanistan at this juncture. He describes how, in the absence of Kaufmann at Orenburg, his secretary not only permitted but urged him to take advantage of the favourable opportunity. He was, by permission of Kaufmann, also given 200 breach-loading rifles with ammunition and some money. He writes: "The Russians pressed me most strongly to leave. They said I could not leave soon enough."

This probably constitutes an accurate account of what happened, and Lord Dufferin pointed out to M. de Giers that the Russian Government, while professing its desire to reassure Great Britain as to its pacific intentions in Central Asia, in the person of Abdur Rahman, had launched a new element of disturbance into Afghanistan

at a critical period.

his enemy, the city gates were closed against him. Moving on to Hissar, by a ruse, which he describes with glee, he secured six horses belonging to the "chiefs holding civil appointments in the city". He then crossed the Oxus and reached Rustak, a village of Badakhshan.

His reception in Badakhshan by Shahzadeh Hassan, son of Mir Shah — the latter was brother of Mir Jahandar Shah, his father-in-law — was hardly encouraging, since he was informed that the people of Badakhshan "had vowed that if a piece of their land was touched by the feet of an Afghan, they would throw that piece of land out of the country as well as myself, as being impure".

To continue: "The next morning putting my trust in Allah, I started to face the army of Shahzadeh Hassan. After a march of twelve miles, I saw the enemy, 12,000 strong with twelve flags in their midst, coming towards me. When we arrived about the distance of a mile apart, I saw to my astonishment that the enemy began to disperse gradually in different directions, as if under the influence of an evil spirit. I could not understand what had happened. In the meantime, a body of sowars belonging to the Mir of Badakhshan, the cousin of Shahzadeh Hassan was approaching from another direction,

the artillery, was surprised to see a suppliant, who had thrown himself at his feet. This was Muhammad Sarwar, who had deserted him at Samarkand. He was the bearer of a letter from Mr. (later Sir Lepel) Griffin, the Chief Political Officer at Kabul, which ran: "It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan and consequently this letter is sent to you by a confidential messenger, in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire to make to the British Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan". Muhammad Sarwar was instructed to inform his late master that the British were able to benefit him much more than the Russians, and that he would be wise to open up relations with them. He was also instructed to point out that the British had no intention of annexing the country and that their chief desire was to see a strong and friendly Amir firmly established at Kabul. The astute Sirdar read "the letter out loud and asked the chiefs to help him to compose an answer since he did not wish", he declared, "to do anything without first consulting them ". Their answers were hostile to the British and, accordingly, Abdur Rahman before them all drafted his reply, which was complimentary and vague, declaring that his only intenappearance at that city, remarked that he was considered to be a capable soldier and an exceptionally resolute man.

The Action of Mr. Lepel Griffin.—The Indian authorities considered that the Sirdar might possibly be a suitable ruler for Northern Afghanistan and, upon inquiry, ascertained from his mother, who was residing at Kandahar, that he might be disposed to negotiate with the British. At this juncture, authentic information reached Kabul on March 25 that Abdur Rahman had won over the troops in Afghan Turkistan and had been joined by the Chief of Badakhshan. Griffin immediately decided to take action and, on April 2, despatched Muhammad Sarwar with the letter given above.

The Letter of Abdur Rahman.—On April 21, the friendly but guarded reply of Abdur Rahman was received. It gave a sketch of recent events in Afghanistan, severely blaming Yakub Khan who "raised fools to power until two ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan which during the reign of my grandfather . . . was bright like the day". It ended up with the wish that "you will permanently establish the Afghans under the honorable protection of the two Powers". Muhammad Sarwar, however, reported that the Sirdar was anxious

early in April 1880, hostile tribesmen in large numbers were reported by the scouts to be advancing parallel to the British force at a distance of some miles from the right flank of the column. On April 14 the route passed through low hills which bordered it for some distance and then bent round eastwards across it. This position was seen to be strongly held by the enemy along a front of about two miles.

The Battle of Ahmad Khel, 1880.—The British force advanced and, upon the guns opening fire, successive waves of Ghazis swiftly charged downhill, stretching beyond either flank of the British, while a large body of horsemen threatened the left and rear. The Afghan cavalry charged, and at first, on the left flank, threw back the 19th Bengal Lancers, who had to charge uphill to meet them. Meanwhile the Afghan footmen pressed on with such fanatical valour, that neither the guns firing case nor the heavy fire of the infantry seemed able to stop their rush. The situation became critical. However, the arrival of further troops at the front and the steady fire of the guns and infantry, which moved down the Ghazis by hundreds, finally broke their charge. The defeated tribesmen moved along the hills to the west, where they came under the fire of the heavy battery and, after an

to change our ranges. After we had been firing for about five minutes, G/4 Field Battery galloped into action on our left, and the two escort companies who also arrived at this time, commenced firing very rapid volleys on the left of G/4. Altogether twelve field guns were making most excellent practice, and the two companies were laying many low before them, but their advance was in no way checked. . . . We were obliged to retire, but after taking up their new position, the two batteries soon cleared their front, and there was a ghastly pile of dead heaped on the ground we had just left." This account ends with the remark: "I only saw two Afghans ask for mercy, and one cannot help admiring their reckless bravery; and the way, and order, in which they advanced, deserved success ".1

The Afghan force, estimated at 15,000, consisted mainly of Ghilzais, but there was also a large contingent of Durranis from Zamindawar. They possessed but two guns. The loss of the enemy was more than one thousand killed. The British losses were negligible. Thus ended the engagement of Ahmad Khel, in which British superior armament and discipline overthrew the heroic Ghilzais and Durranis, whose bravery, as Hamilton declares, merits the highest praise.

XXXIX ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 133

Stewart by heliograph, which thus, for the first time, proved its military value.

Roberts despatches two Columns to meet Stewart.— Roberts was informed that the Logaris of Charasia were bitterly hostile to Abdur Rahman, and accordingly despatched a second column 1200 strong under Colonel Jenkins to prevent them from joining in an attack on Ross as was their undoubted intention. Jenkins, on reaching Charasia, reported that he was about to be attacked by the Logaris under Muhammad Hasan Khan in great force. Roberts thereupon immediately despatched Brigadier-General Macpherson to the assistance of Jenkins with another force of all arms of about the same strength, while Brigadier-General Hugh Gough with the Cavalry brigade took up a position half-way between Kabul and Charasia. The event proved the wisdom of these precautions. Macpherson, upon reaching the high ground beyond the Sang-i-Nawishta gorge, saw that Jenkins was being hard pressed by a force which had formed a semicircle round his column. He promptly attacked and scattered the Logaris.

Stewart's Arrival at Kabul.—Stewart finally reached Kabul on May 2, and there is no doubt that the arrival of his division and even more the crushing defeat of the

entirely beyond the sphere of her influence". As to the Kandahar question, he stated that the objects of the Second Afghan War were (a) to avenge the treacherous massacre of the British Mission at Kabul, and (b) to maintain the safeguards of the treaty of Gandamak by the provision of more substantial guarantees. These two objects had been attained; the first by the capture of Kabul and the punishment of the crime; and the second by the severance of the province of Kandahar. He added that Shir Ali Khan, the Wali of Kandahar, had been recognised by the British Government as the ruler of that province and would be maintained in this position.

His Invitation to Abdur Rahman.—With special reference to Abdur Rahman's letter, Lord Lytton considered that the natural repugnance expressed by the Sirdar to accept conditions which might make him appear ungrateful to Russia "whose salt he had eaten", did him credit. He also laid down that neither the districts ceded by the Treaty of Gandamak, nor any portion of the Kandahar province would ever be restored to the ruler of Kabul; and that the question of Herat had been taken over by Her Majesty's Government, with whose views the Government of India was not vet acquainted.

would only open the door to Russia. He was not, however, opposed to the cession of Afghan Seistan, which the Persian Government was also most anxious to secure. The Government of India expressed their opinion that these proposals would alienate the Kabul Government and give offence, so far as the question of Herat was concerned, to Russia.

The Foreign Office was, however, inclined to agree to the above cessions, provided that the British should insist upon the right of military occupation of Herat, in case of certain eventualities; that a number of British officers should also be employed in the garrison of Herat; and finally, that the question of opening the Karun River to navigation should be raised. In December 1879, the British Government, considering the disintegration of Afghanistan certain, agreed to the Herat province being ceded to Persia, subject to the above conditions. The Shah accepted and expressed gratification but, in February 1880, under Russian influence, His Majesty refused to accept Herat under any other conditions than of permanent occupation. As a result, this question, together with that of handing over Afghan Seistan to Persia, was dropped.

Had this policy been carried out, the Afghans would

juncture the views of the new Government reached India. It was pointed out that the sole result of two successful campaigns was the dismemberment of a state which it was in the interests of India to see strong, friendly and independent. It was decided that Lytton's policy of disintegration was to be replaced by one of reconstruction, which included the reversal of the scheme for separating the province of Kandahar from Kabul. It was also pointed out that the strategical value of Kandahar existed only in connexion with a system of frontier defence, much more extensive than any that was now required; that the Wali could not maintain his position without British financial and military assistance, and that finally the financial burden of retaining the province with its illdefined boundaries would be intolerable. To give the views, expressed by other authorities, Roberts had declared that our grasp on Kandahar should never be loosened, but Sir Garnet Wolseley considered that although we were bound to occupy Kandahar if Russia marched on Herat, no military advantage was secured by its present retention.

Sir Lepel Griffin receives Abdur Rahman.—To return to Abdur Rahman, Roberts and Griffin, in view of his proclamation in Badakhshan, entertained grave suspicions

XXXIX ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF KABUL 137

to be on cordial terms with the British Government."

These negotiations ended in a letter from the British proposing that a public announcement of his recognition as Amir of Kabul should be made by them. To this Abdur Rahman replied in a letter which ended: "I accept from you and from the Viceroy of India, the Amirship of Afghanistan".

Abdur Rahman is proclaimed Amir of Kabul.—At a durbar held at Kabul on July 22, 1880, Sirdar Abdur Rahman was formally acknowledged and recognized by the British Government as Amir of Kabul. On the following day the khutba was read in his name and the Chief Kazi reviewing the whole course of British relations with Afghanistan, eulogized their action in restoring a Moslem ruler to a country, of which they were in military possession.

The accession of Abdur Rahman, although, as we have seen, it was opposed by a powerful party was, generally speaking, hailed with enthusiasm, and helped materially to quiet the widespread unrest prevailing in the country. It also clearly demonstrated the sincerity of the British Government.

The Memorandum of Obligation, July 1880.—The new Amir was most anxious that the British Govern-

Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations". Financial assistance was, at first, given to the extent of 20 lakhs 1 of rupees.

The Evacuation of Afghanistan by the British Army.— Arrangements had been made for the British army to evacuate Afghanistan by the Khaibar Pass and the Kurram Valley when, on July 28, news reached Kabul of the crushing defeat by Ayub Khan of a British force at Maiwand. Before, however, dealing with this disaster, which was met by the despatch southward of a strong column under Roberts on August 8, it is to be noted that the Amir occupied Kabul on August 11, and that the British troops under Stewart marched back to India without a single shot being fired at them. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan was left to make good his position at Kabul.

The Mistaken Policy of Ayub Khan.—Looking back on the courageous initiative displayed by Abdur Rahman, who was only supported by a handful of followers, it is clear that Ayub Khan, who governed Herat with

CHAPTER XL

THE BATTLES OF MAIWAND AND KANDAHAR

I have it on the authority of a Colonel of Ayub Khan's army, who was present at the time, that a party of the 66th regiment, which he estimated at one hundred officers and men, made a most determined stand. They were surrounded by the whole of the Afghan army, and fought on until only eleven men were left, inflicting enormous losses. These eleven men charged out of the garden, and died, fighting to the death.—From the Report of GENERAL PRIMROSE, dated Oct. 1, 1880.

Ayub Khan's Intention to attack Kandahar.—Before dealing with the attack made on Kandahar by Ayub Khan in the summer of 1880, it is desirable to give some account of the circumstances which led up to it.¹

Early in 1879, when his brother Yakub Khan succeeded his father, Ayub was appointed Governor of Herat. He was an exile in Persia at this period, having taken refuge with the Shah some five years previously, when his brother had been imprisoned by Shir Ali. Established at Herat Ayub carried on constant intrigues

conquerors. The unjustifiable departure of Stewart's division from Kandahar in April exposed the military weakness of the British, and was probably the deciding factor for Ayub and his advisers.

The March of the Wali to Girishk.—Upon hearing of Ayub's departure from Herat, Shir Ali marched his army, which consisted of 2000 infantry, 1000 cavalry and 6 smooth-bore guns, to Girishk, situated on the right bank of the Helmand. There, realizing the danger of his force deserting to the enemy, he appealed for support to the Government of India, and this it was decided to afford him.

The Military Position at Kandahar.—The military position at Kandahar was unsatisfactory. Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, who assumed command in Southern Afghanistan after the departure of Stewart, had long lines of communication which were constantly being attacked. He also had a detachment, 1000 strong, at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, which should have reinforced Kandahar. So difficult was the position in Baluchistan that the only reinforcement which reached Kandahar was a single Bombay regiment. The total of the force at this city was under 5000 men.

The news of the advance of Avub Khan spread like

city and strike at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and at Ghazni. The effect of such inaction would, consequently, have been damaging to the political and military situation. The Government of India practically decided that Ayub must be attacked.


The Army of the Wali deserts to Ayub Khan.—The troops of the Wali, who had been mutinous for some time, deserted in a body to the enemy on July 11, taking with them their guns and ammunition. The cavalry alone remained loyal until it had escorted the Governor and his treasure to the British camp, but the force then broke up and made off towards Kandahar. The British mounted troops pursued the main body of the mutineers and, in spite of the difficult terrain, captured their guns and a quantity of ammunition. The captured battery consisted of four 6-pdr. smooth-bore guns and two 12-pdr. howitzers. These guns were taken over by a detachment of the 66th regiment, which had been previously trained in gun drill. Unfortunately the supply of ammunition was small.

The British retire to Kushk-i-Nakhud.—This mutiny completely altered the military and political situation. The Helmand was now fordable everywhere; behind the British force was a desert twenty-five miles wide, while

wieldy baggage column which absorbed a guard of 200 infantry.

At 10 A.M., when the troops halted for an hour near a supply of water, it was reported by a spy that Ayub had already occupied Maiwand—evidently with his advanceguard. He had thus outmanœuvred Burrows and was marching across his front when the two forces met. Ayub now held the shortest route to Kandahar. Burrows therefore decided to attack him and gave the order to advance. The heat was very trying to all ranks and the men had not breakfasted before starting.

The Strength of the Two Forces.—Before describing the action, it is desirable to give some estimate of the army commanded by Ayub. His regular troops consisted of nine regiments aggregating 4000 men; his cavalry was 3000 strong, and his artillery consisted of four field batteries and one mule battery with a total of 30 guns. Six of these guns were rifled Armstrong guns of superior range and weight to any on the British side. But, as was always the case in Afghanistan, the warlike tribesmen, many of whom were Ghazis, provided a large number of superb fighting men. The total of Ayub's army was estimated at 25,000. Against this formidable force Burrows was only able to oppose some 2000 men and



MAIWAND: THE LAST STAND

Note.—The battle was actually fought in open country with mounts

British. The Afghan regular infantry was in the centre, but the still more formidable Ghazis working down the nullah under cover threatened the British right, while swarms of Afghan horsemen threatened the left rear and the baggage. The Indian cavalry was thus obliged to remain under artillery fire to check the Afghan horsemen, who pressed round both flanks.

To quote Lieutenant T. F. T. Fowle: "Their artillery was extremely well served; their guns took ours in flank as well as directly, and their fire was concentrated. We were completely outmatched, and although we continued to fire steadily, our guns seemed quite unable to silence theirs. Their six Armstrong guns threw heavier shell than ours. . . . They continued to advance, over-

lapping us on both flanks."

The Advance of the Afghans.—Taking advantage of their superior artillery, the Afghans, using the nullah referred to above, pushed up their guns to within 500 yards of the British line, while the regular infantry and masses of Ghazis planted their standards within 700 yards of the 66th. The smooth-bore guns, whose ammunition was exhausted, owing to the absence of ammunition carriages, were withdrawn, pending the arrival of a fresh supply.

impact upset the line of the 66th and the confused mass divided up into two separate bodies. The right section, which included the 66th, who kept in groups, retreated towards Khig, while the left section made for Mahmudabad. Burrows had ordered the cavalry to charge, but they had pulled up and retired.

The 66th at Bay.—The 66th, which had retreated on Khig, held fast until there remained but a group 100 strong. This band fell back to a walled garden to the south of Khig. There a second stand was made under heavy artillery fire. Finally the last eleven survivors charged out of the garden and, standing back to back,

fought to the death.

On fame's eternal camping-ground their silent tents are spread, And glory guards with solemn round the bivouac of the dead.1

The Account given by Major Lynch.—Before quitting the subject of this battle, I would mention that I have been especially privileged to discuss it with Major Hyacinth Lynch, the last surviving officer of the gallant 66th. I now quote from his vivid description: "The enemy's Cavalry got ready to charge us early in the fight and very formidable they looked, well mounted. We prepared for Cavalry in the usual way and, when they

Ghazis advancing with flags and their long knives glistening in the afternoon sun. While lying on the ground and feeling very bad, the last of the 4 Guns E/B R.H.A. passed near me, retiring. Captain Slade saw me, halted the gun and had me placed on the near axletree seat. I remember that the gun was so hot from firing that I could not touch it with my boots."

The Retreat.—The fire of the British horse artillery during the last phase of the battle inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Two guns were captured, but the other four came into action repeatedly to cover the retreat of the survivors of the disaster.

Fortunately the pursuit was not pressed hard, the Afghans turning their attention to the congenial task of looting the baggage train. To quote from Slade: "All over the wide expanse of the desert are to be seen men in twos and threes retreating.... The guns and carriages are crowded with helpless wounded officers and men suffering the tortures of the damned.... At last the river is reached; it is II A.M. and thirty-two miles from the battlefield."

Here Burrows reorganized his force which sighted a relief column advancing towards the retreating brigade, whose losses were practically one-half of its strength. the most of his force, which had no reserve, and in the retreat his gallantry and determination were noteworthy.

The disaster certainly brought out the heroism displayed by the 66th regiment. It reminds us vividly of Leonidas and his Spartans at Thermopylae, who charged the myriads of Persia and fought to the death:

> Go, stranger, and to Lacedaemon tell That here, obeying her behests, we fell.

The Siege of Kandahar.—As a result of the Maiwand disaster, the cantonment situated a mile to the west of the city was hastily evacuated. The garrison, some 3000 strong, now occupied the city which, with its thick walls of rammed clay and its gates covered by bastions, was speedily made impregnable to any attack by Ayub Khan, more especially after the expulsion of the entire Pathan population, some 15,000 in number. Outside buildings that could give cover were gradually demolished, trees were felled, and a wire entanglement was constructed round the walls.

Ayub Khan marches to Kandahar.—On August 5 the vanguard of Ayub's army reached the outskirts of Kandahar and, two days later, the entire force was concentrated in a position near Old Kandahar to the west.

the news of the Maiwand disaster it was decided to despatch a powerful column from Kabul under the command of Roberts and, on August 8, it started off southwards. The fact that Stewart had recently followed the same route and had inflicted a severe defeat on the Ghilzais lessened the chances of opposition, while the strong support of the Amir, who wrote letters to all the chiefs and sent his officials ahead to collect supplies, was of the greatest value.

The march was uneventful. At Ghazni the Governor presented the keys of the city to Roberts. On August 17 he received a letter from Colonel Tanner, who was commanding at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, dated August 12. In it he reported that the Kandahar garrison on August 8 had two months' rations and fifteen days' forage in hand. Arriving at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, where supplies in abundance had been laid in, the force rested for a day. Roberts decided to add its garrison of 1000 men with 2 guns to his force.

Upon reaching Tirandaz, thirty-one miles from Kalati-Ghilzai, on August 26, information was received from Kandahar that Ayub had retired to the Baba Wali Kotal, where he was entrenching. On August 28 the column reached Robat, some nineteen miles from Kandahar.

A Reconnaissance.—On the day of his arrival at Kandahar, Roberts sent out a reconnaissance towards the high ground to the north-west, immediately above the villages of Gundigan and Murghan. There the infantry and guns were halted, while the cavalry, avoiding the numerous walled gardens, penetrated to the village of Pir Paimal situated at the north-west corner of the Baba Wali range. As soon as the fire of the enemy had been drawn, the cavalry retired. But the Afghans immediately advanced in considerable numbers and pressed the retiring force, so much so that the whole of the 3rd Brigade fell in to support it.

The Decision to attack the Afghan Left.—Roberts had satisfied himself that any attempt to carry the rugged Baba Wali Kotal by assault would involve heavy losses, and he thereupon decided to threaten that position and to concentrate his real attack on the Afghan left, which occupied the village and walled gardens of Pir Paimal. His force consisted of 3800 British and 11,000 Indian troops with 36 guns. The total of the Afghan force was probably less. The 3rd Infantry Brigade, which was to make the demonstration against the Baba Wali range, formed up on the right behind the low hills which covered the British camp, while the 1st and 2nd Brigades,

To quote Roberts: "During the early part of the advance the Afghans collected in great strength on the low hills beneath the Baba Wali Kotal, evidently preparing for a rush on our guns; their leaders could be seen urging them on, and a portion of them came down the hill, but the main body apparently refused to follow, and remained on the crest until the position was turned, when they at once retreated".

The capture of Pir Paimal opened the way to the strongly entrenched main position and here I quote from Major (afterwards Field-Marshal Sir George) White: "The enemy occupied a position in front of their camp; a long ditch afforded a good natural entrenchment; on the enemy's left of this ditch his position was prolonged by a commanding knoll, which enfiladed a ditch running up to the position. . . . Behind the ditch was a small square enclosure in which there were a considerable number of the enemy. Two of their guns were just to the left of it. . . . I worked the men up to a charge which they executed in fine style. About five or six men were killed crossing the open, but I had the satisfaction of seizing the guns and Ayab's last position." 2 On the extreme left, another charge by the 3rd Sikhs broke up a band of Afghans, who had gathered round three guns.

the great strength of the force under the command of Roberts, the fact that the Afghan losses at Maiwand had been severe and that only one-third of the tribesmen were armed with firearms, the victory was, humanly speaking, certain. Ayub Khan must have realized that he could not possibly defeat a force that was four times more powerful than that which he had beaten at Maiwand after suffering heavy losses among his own men, and we may justly pay a tribute to the courage of the Afghans who made such a determined stand against the warhardened British troops led by Roberts.

The March of Major-General Phayre.—A brief account of the column which marched to the relief of Kandahar via Quetta is now called for. The news of the Maiwand disaster threw the whole country from Sibi to Chaman into a state of hostile turmoil. Phayre, who was in command of the Southern Afghan Field Force, organized a strong column and advanced in the face of constant attacks on his lines of communication; he also suffered from transport difficulties. Finally, when about a long march from the beleaguered city, he heard of the victory gained by Roberts and was instructed to station his troops wherever water and supplies were procurable. Although his force was disappointed in their hopes of relieving

CHAPTER XLI

ABDUR RAHMAN IS ACKNOWLEDGED AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

My Lords, the Key of India is not Herat or Kandahar. The Key of India is London.—DISRAELI.

The Position of Abdur Rahman as Amir of Kabul.— Thanks to his invaluable autobiography, we can learn much as to how the Amir viewed the position of affairs after the departure of the British. He writes: "On my succeeding to the throne, and after the departure of the English from Kabul, I placed my foot in the stirrup of progress and administration. . . . The country exhibiting a rebellious spirit, I appointed private detectives and spies to report to me all that went on among the people, thus finding out with abundant proofs those who were loyal and friendly. . . . The ringleaders and worst offenders were the fanatical mullas and headstrong chiefs.

The First Letter of Lord Ripon to the Amir.—On September 10, 1880, Lord Ripon wrote to the Amir to inform him of the victory of Lord Roberts at Kandahar and to congratulate him on the success with which he was consolidating his position at Kabul. This letter was the first to be written by the Viceroy to the Amir. It was reported that the Amir was intensely gratified at receiving it, and had said that "so long as no letter came to him from the Viceroy, it was to be surmised that there was a screen of estrangement isolating him from his Excellency". This recognition of his standing as an important ruler strengthened his position considerably, and he immediately wrote to Tashkent and instructed his family to rejoin him at Kabul.

Negotiations for placing the Province of Kandahar under the Amir.—The mutiny of the Wali's troops at Girishk constituted a suitable peg on which to hang the change of policy prescribed by the Gladstone Government in June 1880. The Foreign Secretary, Mr. (later Sir Alfred) Lyall, visited Kandahar and reported that since the Wali had not been asked to resume the Government of the country after the defeat of Ayub, it was clear that the situation had to be considered anew. The Wali finally accepted the offer of a liberal pension with gratitude and,

gate." After much correspondence in which he pressed for more money and more munitions, in March 1881, Abdur Rahman practically intimated to the Viceroy his acceptance of the province. Later, he received the additional gift of three batteries of artillery and of a number of rifles, together with a temporary grant of

50,000 rupees per mensem.

The Position of Ayub Khan.—After his severe defeat by Roberts, Ayub retired to Herat. In February 1881 two envoys were despatched by him to Kandahar. They represented that the Sirdar accepted the deposition of Yakub Khan, and considered himself his lawful successor, but that he would submit to the wishes of the British Government. No answer was given at first to the envoys, but on March 21 St. John informed them of the Amir's acceptance of Kandahar; and the envoys departed, with the advice to recommend Ayub to make terms with him.

Abdur Rahman occupies Kandahar.—In due course more than one hundred letters addressed by the Amir to Sirdars, to Government officials and to leading mullas and merchants, were received at Kandahar. Troops followed and, on April 21, 1881, at noon, the British flag was hauled down under a salute of thirty-one guns. The transfer of authority to the Government of the Amir was

ruler of the province. The Government of India, however, wisely awaited further developments.

The Amir defeats Ayub Khan, September 22, 1881.— The Amir acted with vigour and decision. Marching from Kabul at the head of his army, a battle was fought under the walls of Kandahar. To quote: "For two whole hours the fighting was very severe, and it was not known with whom was the victory. . . . My army was beginning to fall back a little on its right and left, but the main force in the centre was working well under the encouragement I gave it by my presence. At this moment, when I had pushed well forward, Ayub's forces began to show signs of weakness, and these four regiments of my own infantry, which had submitted to Ayub at the time of their former defeat at Girishk, changed their mind. It had been the usual custom of the trained soldiers before my reign began that the moment they saw one party stronger than the other, they left the weak and joined the strong. These four regiments therefore, seeing that the victory was turning in my direction, at once fired at that body of Ayub's army, which was fighting hard with my forces."

Ayub Khan was utterly routed and, for the second time, lost his guns and camp equipage at Kandahar. To



Khan, to occupy it. This was effected without much difficulty, the Herat troops submitting when led out to fight his troops. Abdur Rahman thus became undisputed ruler of Afghanistan with the exception of the tiny Uzbeg state of Maimena, which was occupied later on.

The Final Settlement of Ayub Khan in India.—After his defeat, Ayub Khan, accompanied by several influential Sirdars and followers, reached Meshed in January 1882. He was granted an allowance by the Shah on condition that he should not live in any of the districts bordering Afghanistan. This did not suit his plans for fomenting troubles in that country, and for some years he continued to behave in an unreasonable manner, which caused both the British and Persian Governments much trouble. At the end of August 1887 he suddenly fled from Tehran, where he had been residing for some time, and made a bold but unsuccessful attempt to reach Herat. He was pursued by Afghan cavalry and, after remaining in close hiding, finally surrendered to the British Consul-General at Meshed. There, after much bargaining as to allowances, the entire party, aggregating 814 officers, soldiers, women, children and servants, were sent across Persia and reached Rawalpindi in the early summer of 1888. At that military centre I recollect seeing Ayub Khan and

and Peshin should be excluded from the Amir's authority, but Yakub Khan strongly opposed this resolve, with the result that, as mentioned in Chapter XXXVIII, it was agreed to treat the two districts as "assigned" districts. The Government of India had urged the Secretary of State to agree that the retention of Sibi and Peshin should be included among the provisions of the Treaty of Gandamak. In 1880, however, the British Government decided against the retention of Peshin, but, in the following year, their relinquishment was ordered to be postponed. Finally, convinced by the strong arguments of the Government of India, in 1887 it was decided to incorporate the two districts within the Indian Empire. Today Sibi and Peshin are recognized as being of importance in the frontier defences of the Indian Empire.

The Results of the Second Afghan War.—The evacuation of Kandahar, followed by the overthrow of Ayub and its occupation by Abdur Rahman, closed a period and affords an opportunity for summarizing the results of the Second Afghan War.

The Khaibar Pass, that great highway from India to Kabul, had been taken over and the tribesmen enlisted as road guards. Unfortunately, however, in the opinion of many frontier officers, we did not retain Dakka and the

have to be occupied in case of an invasion of India from the north, within a few easy marches over a level plain.

A Tribute to Abdur Rahman.—Studying the question some fifty years after these dramatic events, it strikes me that Abdur Rahman should have been given more time and greater financial assistance to organize and equip his army before being pressed to take over Kandahar, more especially in view of the fact that Ayub had considerable influence and was a doughty warrior. Had Ayub Khan defeated his rival at Kandahar, Afghanistan would, once again, have been thrown into a state of anarchy. That he did not do so, represents the greatness of our debt to grim Abdur Rahman. Thanks to his services, Afghanistan was reunited into a kingdom under a resolute ruler who, if not always friendly to the British, at any rate realized that it would be folly to turn to Russia. The facts of the changed situation were recognized by the order or the Viceroy that Abdur Rahman should thenceforth be styled the "Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies".

CHAPTER XLII

THE PANJDEH CRISIS AND THE RUSSO-AFGHAN BOUNDARY COMMISSION

Whose was the provocation is a matter of the utmost consequence. We only know that the attack was a Russian attack. We know that the Afghans suffered in life, in spirit, and in repute. We know that a blow was struck at the credit and the authority of a sovereign — our protected ally — who had committed no offence. All I say is, we cannot in that state of affairs close this book and say "We will look into it no more". We must do our best to have right done in the matter.—GLADSTONE.

The Anxiety of the Amir about his Northern Frontier.— The relations of the Government of India with Abdur Rahman, whose demands for munitions and money seemed to be insatiable, became difficult from time to time. However, due allowances were made for him, and the appointment of an Afghan Envoy at Calcutta and of a British Agent at Kabul somewhat eased the situation.

The Amir had, to some extent, restored law and order in Afghanistan, but only by stationing his troops at

given in July 1880, against unprovoked foreign aggression, to which communication the Amir responded in an effusively grateful manner, stating that he had now obtained the assurances he desired. It is quite likely that he had not kept the letter addressed to him in July 1880!

The Grant of an Annual Subsidy.—In February 1883 the Amir marched to Jalalabad with a large force and asked his envoy to arrange an interview with the British authorities. He wished to negotiate a treaty, thus resuming a project, which he had taken up two years previously and had subsequently dropped. A misunderstanding, caused by his envoy carelessly omitting to forward the reply of the Viceroy to this request, created much sore feeling. However, the grant of twelve lakhs of rupees annually, which was made to Abdur Rahman for the payment of his troops and the defence of his frontier, effectually cured his resentment.

The Views of Lord Ripon.—Ripon realized that if the Amir was unable to maintain peace on his borders before the Russian and Afghan boundaries became conterminous, the position would be critical, and that such a situation might arise at any time. He considered that a treaty with Russia was preferable, and that the grant of a subsidy was only necessitated by the refusal of the British Govern-

any confidence in the loyalty or integrity of his officials in the Herat province which, partly owing to its distance from Kabul, was less under his control and remained discontented. Moreover, during this period, the intrigues of Ayub Khan constituted an additional source of anxiety.

The Views of the Government of India.—Mr (later Sir Mortimer) Durand, who was Indian Foreign Secretary, summed up the situation in January 1884: "The only statesmanlike course is to endeavour to come to a really frank and friendly understanding with the Power which we have hitherto tried in vain in a half-hearted way to thwart and impede. I would, if possible, embody that understanding in a formal treaty, precisely defining the limits of Afghanistan . . . and recognizing the extension of Russian influence up to those limits."

Again, his diary of July 23 runs: "The Russian question has assumed an altogether new phase. We sent home a telegram and then despatches recommending the delimitation of the Afghan frontier, and the idea was well received. But in the meantime the Russians occupied Merv, then pushed up the valley of the Murghab and finally seized Sarakhs in defiance of Persian protest." I

Lack of Geographical Knowledge by the British.—At that time the British possessed no definite knowledge as

previous summer, but had been withdrawn in the winter. He advised the Amir that the Hari Rud constituted the Perso-Afghan boundary in this section and urged His Highness to occupy the district with troops. It is, of course, clear that the Amir, who knew Afghan Turkistan and Badakhshan intimately, was keen on advances in that area, while his ignorance of the Herat area led to his unfortunate display of apathy as to Persian encroachments in Badghis.

Appointment of British and Russian Commissioners.—In May 1884 it was agreed between the two Powers that Commissioners should be appointed, rechercher les éléments, to quote the French text, of a frontier line satisfactory to both Powers. General Sir Peter Lumsden and General Zelenoi were appointed Commissioners, while Colonel (later Sir West) Ridgeway led that portion of the British Commission which was appointed by India, to ensure that its views should receive full weight. The survey party and escort were necessarily supplied by India.¹

The March of the Indian Section of the Commission.— The march of the Indian section of the Commission, consisting of 1600 men, 1600 camels and some 300 horses across a mainly desert route, hundreds of miles in length, that the negotiations would have to be postponed until the spring.

The Policy of Russia in Central Asia supported by Germany.—Before dealing with events which led to the Panjdeh crisis, it seems desirable to study how the position in Central Asia was affected by events in Europe. Lord Granville was much exercised by the advance of Russia, and to quote his biographer: "These events in Central Asia coincided with the failure of the expedition to relieve General Gordon, and the interruption of the cordial relations which had existed between Great Britain and Germany. After the death of General Gordon, the Government narrowly escaped defeat on a motion of censure in the House of Commons. The majority fell to twelve." To quote again: "It was certain in Lord Granville's opinion that, as long as the Liberal Government was in power, one question after another in every quarter of the world would be stirred up to the detriment of the country by Prince Bismarck. Although at the time all the facts were not fully known even at the Foreign Office, the situation had been correctly appreciated by Lord Granville as a whole. It hinged on the secret treaty of neutrality which, in 1884, Prince Bismarck had concluded with Russia, without the knowledge and



THE PUL-I-KHISTI



but Alikhanoff sent a messenger to the Afghan leader, with a request for an interview. This request was refused, and Alikhanoff, after despatching a threatening letter, withdrew.

Lumsden visited Panjdeh and reported that Afghan control was complete and that taxes were being levied. Actually the Sarik Turkoman of this oasis had been independent of Afghanistan and there was justification for the Russian claim that they should, like the other sections of the tribe, be included in the Russian Empire. The Afghans had only recently appeared on the scene to stake out claims.

In February 1885 the Russians marched on the Panjdeh Oasis. They drove in the Afghan posts from the north of the oasis and established a post of Sarik Turkoman from Yulatan, at Kizil Tapa, a mound situated about one mile to the north-west of the Pul-i-Khisti or "Brick Bridge" which spanned the Kushk River half a mile above its junction with the Murghab. These Turkoman, as was evidently intended, intrigued with their fellow-tribesmen in the Panjdeh Oasis, and thus threatened the rear of the Afghan force, while it was probably hoped that they would provoke an incident with the Afghan pickets situated on the left bank of the

ville's cable that the two Governments had agreed that there should be no forward movement on either side from the positions then occupied. The Russians, however, after movements of a provocative nature, issued an ultimatum to the Afghan general, requiring that "every single man of your force shall return to within your former lines on the right bank of the River Kushk". The Afghan General declared that the Pul-i-Khisti was his "Bridge of Heaven", and that he would fight for it to the death.

The Russians defeat the Afghans.—The die was cast, and, early on March 30, the Russians attacked the Afghan force, which had been considerably strengthened, and drove it across the bridge and from the oasis. Their weapons were useless, as the priming was damp from the rain, and their losses were very heavy. There was no pursuit, but the Russians annexed the Panjdeh Oasis by proclamation and, needless to say, the British suffered severely in prestige.

The Visit of the Amir to India.—At that time the Amir was paying a visit to Lord Dufferin at Rawalpindi. The honours that were accorded to him, including a welcome by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, created a favourable atmosphere, although with true Afghan suspicion he

frank and even bluff, yet courteous manners; quite at his ease amid a crowd of foreigners; speaking pleasantly of the first railway journey he had ever undertaken; a man of some humour in jokes, with a face occasionally crossed by a look of implacable severity — the look of Louis XI or Henry VIII — that is now never seen in civilized life". Elsewhere he stated: "But for the accidental circumstances of the Amir being in my camp at Rawalpindi, and the fortunate fact of his being a prince of great capacity, experience, and calm judgment, the incident at Panjdeh alone, in the strained condition of the relations which then existed between Russia and ourselves, might of itself have proved the occasion of a long and miserable war."

The Settlement of the Panjdeh Crisis.—The feeling aroused in Great Britain was intense. Gladstone demanded a vote of £11,000,000, a great sum in those days, for war preparations, and it was declared that a Russian advance on Herat would constitute a casus belli. Fortunately Granville and de Giers agreed that negotiations should be continued in London and that the Panjdeh Oasis should, in the meanwhile, be neutralized. Thus ended the Panjdeh incident in which a Russian general, anxious to secure for Russia an oasis inhabited by Sarik Turkoman,

These proposals were accepted; Lumsden was recalled, while Ridgeway was left in charge of the Commission.

The Fortification of Herat.—The Amir had been repeatedly pressed to repair the fortifications of Herat, but it was not without difficulty that British officers were admitted to that city, thus amply confirming the Amir's views that they would resent British assistance. Ridgeway, after the completion of some defence works, reported that Herat could not stand a siege for more than a month or so and that, in case of war, he was strongly opposed to the Mission taking refuge in that city.

The Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission.—In September 1885 the definition of the frontier was settled by Lord Salisbury (who, in July 1885, had succeeded Mr. Gladstone as Prime Minister) and the Russian Ambassador. In November, Ridgeway met Colonel Kuhlberg, the Russian Commissioner, at Zulfikar Pass. There they erected the first two pillars which, twenty-five years later, I sighted from the Persian bank of the Hari Rud, glistening white in the rays of the setting sun.

The long delay while awaiting instructions from home had not been wasted by the British surveyors under Major (later Sir Thomas) Holdich, whose triangulation was readily accepted by the Russian Commissioner. From

Holdich: "A wild, white, silent wilderness of untrodden snow; a thin, blue line of jagged hills in the far distance; a deep, intensely deep, canopy of blue sky above, and the glare of the sunlight off the snowfields. Such was the daily record." 1

The Question of Khamiab and Khwaja Salar.—A serious dispute arose about Khamiab on the Oxus. It was mainly due to the acceptance in the Boundary Agreement between the two Governments of Khwaja Salar as a ferry on the Oxus which was to constitute the termination of the boundary. The ferry undoubtedly existed when Burnes mentioned it some fifty years before the Agreement was drawn up, but it had disappeared and been forgotten. Ridgeway identified it with Islam, situated some fourteen miles above Khamiab, a district inhabited by an Afghan population that had paid revenue to Afghanistan for a generation. Having examined the question locally he returned to England, instructions having been received to sign the maps and Protocol as far as Dukchi, a distance of 330 miles to the east of Zulfikar Pass, and to leave the dispute in question to be settled between the two Governments.

Ridgeway's Successful Settlement with Russia.—After reporting in London, Ridgeway was sent to St. Petersburg

on the Oxus, in the neighbourhood of Kushk. Finally, he was able to report that "The Amir has not lost a penny of revenue, a single subject, or an acre of land which was occupied or cultivated by any Afghan subject". He certainly merited the gratitude of Great Britain, of India, and of the Amir.

The Signature of the Final Protocols in July and August 1887.—The final Protocols dealing with the Russo-Afghan boundary from the Hari Rud to the Oxus were signed in 1887. This Agreement was strengthened by the frank declaration of the British Government that a movement on Herat would constitute a casus belli. De Giers stated that it was clear that Afghanistan lay within the sphere of British influence and observed with much emphasis, "C'est la parole de l'Empereur que vous avez, non seulement la mienne".

Contrary to general expectation at the period, this frontier, laid down some fifty years ago, has been respected, and its settlement on fair and honourable lines, in spite of the crisis which it occasioned, undoubtedly improved relations between the British and Russian Empires, while the Amir probably realized that his interests had been safeguarded, albeit he was most chary in making acknowledgements of services rendered to him. It remains to

CHAPTER XLIII

THE DURAND MISSION TO KABUL

Frontiers are the chief anxiety of nearly every Foreign Office in the civilized world, and are the subject of four out of five political treaties or contentions that are now concluded. . . . Frontier policy is of the first practical importance, and has a more profound effect upon the peace or warfare of nations than any other factor, political or economic.—LORD CURZON.

British Relations with the Amir under Lord Lansdowne.

The behaviour of the Amir was unsatisfactory from many points of view when Lord Lansdowne assumed office in December 1888. He had agreed to receive a British Mission and, in September, Sir Mortimer Durand was nominated to proceed to Kabul in charge of it. But His Highness, who had been seriously ill during the summer, was fully occupied with the rebellion of Ishak Khan and, after considerable procrastination, replied: "It is a thing which must take place, but at the proper time."

seems desirable at this point to summarize the attitude of the Amir in the most important questions which concerned him and the British Government. First of these was the fact that he treated the British Agent at Kabul almost as a prisoner and did not even permit his brothers to visit him. In fact, he was cut off from all intercourse. Even after the Amir's visit to India, there was no change in this attitude, the Agent being miserably lodged and practically forbidden to ride or walk on the public roads.

With regard to other matters, the Amir permitted the cemeteries at Kabul and Kandahar to be desecrated. Moreover, the proclamations he issued to his subjects displayed hostility alike to Russia and to Great Britain. Again, by inordinately heavy taxation and by numerous monopolies, he had ruined the trade of the country both with India and with Russia, while he had killed or banished practically every man of rank or influence in the country, and was especially hostile to anyone who had assisted the British in any manner. Moreover, the Amir had persisted in holding territory to the north of the Oxus in defiance of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873, while his foolish proclamations of hostility to Russia exposed himself and the British to the risk of serious complications.

The Claims of Abdur Rahman on Jandol and Chitral.—

district. Since the Amir placed his boundary at a point some twenty-five miles above Asmar, he would, if this claim were admitted, be within some thirty or forty miles of the capital of Chitral, while the independence of Chitral, Jandol and other districts of Bajaur would be seriously threatened. Apart from military pressure, by use of money, the dissensions of the various Khans would gradually, but inevitably, bring about the loss of the independence of Chitral and Bajaur; so short-sighted were their Chiefs.

The Intrigues of the Amir with the Afridis.—Continuing our survey southwards, the aggressive action of Abdur Rahman in his relations with the Afridis was particularly marked. Although, in 1883, he had written: "The Afridi country lies in British territory", his efforts to win over the mullas and influential men were unceasing. In view of the fact that Afridi levies guarded the Khaibar Pass and enlisted in large numbers in the Indian army, this attitude, and his open claim to be their King, constituted a serious position.

The Question of the Kurram Valley.—In 1880, when Kurram was evacuated by the British troops, the Turis, who belong to the Shia sect, and had rendered the British valuable service, were promised their independence,

to ask for his protection. Here again a British force had perforce been sent into the Gumal Pass to maintain order and to reassure the Mahsud headmen.

The Question of Chagai.—Abdur Rahman, as we have seen, spent some days in the district of Chagai after his flight from Afghanistan. It is situated 150 miles to the south of the Helmand, from which it is separated by a wide stretch of desert, termed the Lut, and was always considered to belong to the desert state of Kharan which state rendered allegiance to the Khan of Kalat. The Amir had occupied Chagai, in May 1886, and refused to vacate it.

The Grievances of the Amir.—It is only fair to state that, during this period, the British were steadily advancing, opening up the passes of the North-West Frontier and guarding them with local levies. But, chief among these grievances, was the fact that the Khojak range had been tunnelled and a railway station and fort built at New Chaman, which pointed at Kandahar. The Amir somewhat crudely termed this advance as "running an awl into his navel", while a shrewd British navvy was heard to remark: "Well, I don't think that 'ere 'ole was made thro' the 'ill to peep thro'." Moreover, at this period, there was a scheme in existence for the construc-

was indeed hardly likely that the Amir would care to receive the victor of the Paiwar Kotal and of Kandahar at the head of an army. Accordingly, while expressing his pleasure at the proposal, he said that he could not fix a date until the Hazara rebellion had been crushed. He also employed an attack of gout and all the arts of Oriental diplomacy to procrastinate, being aware that Roberts would soon leave India, upon completion of

his period of command.

Mr. (later Sir Salter) Pyne visits Simla.—The situation remained as unsatisfactory as possible, and the British having detained a large consignment of munitions, ordered trom Europe by the Amir, he decided to send Pyne, his trustworthy English engineer, to Simla. There Pyne 1 stated frankly that the Amir considered Durand to be his personal enemy and that the Viceroy had, owing to his Foreign Secretary's hostility, become unsympathetic. He also pointed out the rapid occupation by the British of various districts bordering on Afghanistan, whose inhabitants had formerly looked to Kabul.

Pyne was given full opportunities of making himself acquainted with recent events on the Afghan frontier, and in particular with the intrigues of various Afghan officials with frontier tribes, which had created trouble

splendid reception, "a salute of twenty-one guns being fired, bands playing 'God save the Queen' and fanfares of trumpets being sounded at every corner".

The Reception of the Mission.—Durand writes of the Amir: "He really seemed very well, much better than in 1885, though thinner. But the great change is in his manner. I looked in vain for my old acquaintance of 1885, with his burly figure and Henry the Eighth face and ready scowl. I suppose the scowl is ready still when wanted, but the Amir of today is a quiet gentlemanly man."

The Opening of Negotiations with the Amir.—After this visit of ceremony, Durand started negotiations in a garden-house where the Amir took good care to place the envoy facing the light, while he was equally careful to turn his own back to it. He also arranged for every spoken word to be written down by a secretary who was concealed. Durand found that his best plan was to forgo reasoned arguments and to bring the Amir by indirect means to the point, while avoiding anything that would irritate a despot. He realized that from time immemorial the Afghans, inhabiting a poor mountainous country, had lived by conquering or by raiding neigh-bouring countries, as indeed their history proves. No Amir had maintained his army entirely at the expense of

a wooden gallery built into the cliff. Durand emphasized the risk of the recurrence of such events and finally, the Amir said: "My people will not care, or know, whether I go backwards or forwards in Roshan or Shignan, but they care very much to know exactly how they stand on your side". Finally, Durand succeeded in inducing the Amir to agree to the evacuation of Roshan and Shignan in return for the districts not in his possession on the south side of the Oxus in this section.

The Amir's Attitude as regards Wakhan.—The Amir for a long time refused to hold Wakhan. To quote Durand: "He says he had a hand cut off at Somatash the other day, and he is not going to stretch out a long arm along the Hindu Kush to have that shorn off also".2

Negotiations about the North-West Frontier.—After many interviews, during which the Amir fought hard for his point of view, Durand was successful in persuading him to accept the following conditions. In return for retaining Asmar and the valley above it as far as Chanak, the Amir agreed not to interfere in any way with Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral. The British Government ceded the Birmal tract of the Wazir country to His Highness, who, on his part, relinquished his claim to the rest of the

British territory and the tribesmen as British subjects. At one time the area between the administered territory and the Durand Line was sometimes erroneously termed "Independent Territory", a dangerous expression to employ since our aim, both in the interests of the tribesmen and in our own, should be to establish some form of British control by the construction of roads and by other civilizing agencies.

The Mohmand Question.—It is only right to state that the question of the Indo-Afghan boundary in the Mohmand country was not satisfactorily settled. The Durand Agreement ran that this shall follow the line shown in the map attached to the Agreement. The Amir said: "I understand that this line gives me the Mohmands". Durand replied that the map was a small one and that when the large map was prepared, the matter would be clearer. Actually the Mohmand country had not been surveyed and the line that was drawn cut across the main subdivisions of the tribe. This situation was remedied in a modification subsequently offered to the Amir.

The Great Durbar at Kabul.—After the signature of the documents 1 the Amir held a durbar, which was

that the British were his sincere well-wishers. The importance of this decision was far-reaching and it was without doubt mainly due to it that his successor Habibulla remained loyal to the British during the last Great War.

Durand thus secured for the Indian Empire its most important achievement of external policy during the nineteenth century. He not only materially helped to end the long advance of Russia towards India, but removed a constant source of misunderstanding with that Empire. He thereby undoubtedly paved the way for the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, which materially facilitated the co-operation of the two Powers in the last Great War. From another point of view Durand, the great boundary-maker, was the great peace-maker and, although his valuable services were most inadequately rewarded, the fact that the boundary of the North-West Frontier of India is known as the "Durand Line", constitutes an honourable memorial to this great Englishman.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE PAMIR AND OTHER BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS

The plain is called Pamier, and you ride across it for twelve days together, finding nothing but a desert without habitations or other green thing, so that travellers are obliged to carry with them whatever they have need of. The region is so lofty and cold that you do not even see any birds flying. And I must notice also that because of this great cold, fire does not burn so brightly, nor give out so much heat as usual, nor does it cook food so effectually.—Marco Polo.

The poet, wandering on, through Arabie, And Persia, and the wild Carmanian waste, And o'er the aërial mountains which pour down Indus and Oxus from their icy caves, In joy and exultation held his way.

SHELLEY, Alastor.

In Chapter XLII I have dealt with the delimitation of the northern frontier of Afghanistan from Zulfikar Pass to the Oxus. In this chapter I describe, firstly, the labours of the Pamir Commission which completed the delimitation of the northern frontiers of the Amir in 1895.

Afghanistan, and Russia were not the only Powers concerned, since China, who held the Sarikol Valley to the east with a garrison at Tashkurgan, also laid shadowy claims to portions of the Pamirs. Finally it was most desirable in the interests alike of Afghanistan and of the Indian Empire not to leave any gap between the possessions of China and those of Afghanistan.

Colonel Yonoff arrests Captain Younghusband and Lieutenant Davidson.—In the summer of 1891 Colonel Yonoff with a squadron of Cossacks was despatched from Osh to the Pamirs, nominally "to shoot the Ovis Poli and to practise rifle-shooting!" In reality, Yonoff's mission was to expel any Chinese or Afghan detachments from the area and anticipate, by these forcible means, the proposed diplomatic settlement with Great Britain. In this connexion the Alichur Pamir had been the somewhat disputed boundary between the Afghans and Chinese long before the appearance of Russia on the scene. Indeed there was a stone, inscribed with a trilingual record in the Chinese, Manchu and Turki languages, on the shore of Yeshil Kul or the "Green Lake", which commemorated a victory of a Chinese general over Kalmuck Chiefs in 1759. The place was thenceforward

unwarrantable action of the Russians and threatened to withdraw entirely from Wakhan.

British Negotiations with Russia, 1893, 1894.—At long last apologies were made for Yonoff's unjustifiable actions, but it was clear that Russia was pursuing dilatory tactics in her negotiations while strengthening her position on the Pamirs. In August 1893 the Russian Government proposed to draw a line from the eastern point of Lake Victoria so as to leave Bozai Gumbaz to Russia, and to continue it along the slopes of the Muztagh to the north of the valley of the Wakhijir. Upon being consulted as to this proposal, the Government of India pointed out that such a diversion could not be of the slightest value to the Northern Power except for the purpose of threatening the passes of the Hindu Kush.

Later in the year more reasonable proposals were made but, in 1894, Russia suggested a line by which she would gain control of the routes running to Hunza, Wakhan and Sarikol. In this year Russian troops occupied Shignan, from which district the Amir prudently withdrew his troops.

The Final Settlement of the Pamir Question, in March 1895.—The final settlement laid down that the spheres of influence of the two Powers should be divided by a

to accept the above Agreement. It was obviously most important for him to retain the administration of the valley of Wakhan, which, as Durand shows, he was unwilling to do. Realizing that the British Government were anxious for him to hold this buffer district, he, first of all, bargained for the cost of a force of 400 sowars and 1000 levies, but finally accepted a special annual subsidy of 50,000 rupees.

The March of the British Commission to Lake Victoria.— Holdich, that truly great surveyor of boundaries, gives an interesting account of the very difficult country which represents the boundary of the Indian Empire at its north-east corner. From Gilgit, through the Yasin Valley to Darkot, there was only a narrow track. The Darkot Pass he describes as "a dangerous and wearisome climbing way, over broken moraine and fissured glacier till one arrives at the snowfields of the pass some 15,000 feet above sea-level, ere plunging or sliding down again to the Yarkhun river".

To continue: "The advantages we gained on the Darkot lasted us across the Yarkun River and the main chain of the Hindu Kush (which, as all the world knows, is not a difficult range to cross at this point) into the Wakhan Valley, and there for a space we were completely non-

Officer, who had served on the earlier boundary Commission. Two Afghan representatives attended, but were unprovided with any credentials, which the Amir stubbornly refused to supply.

The Commencement of the Demarcation.—On July 28, 1895, the first pillar was erected at the eastern end of the lake and, before the middle of August, the boundary line had been demarcated to the Orta Bel Pass.

It was decided by the Commissioners that Lake Sarikol 1 should henceforth be termed Lake Victoria, that the range to the south should be called the Emperor Nicolas II range, and that the peak nearest the range should be known as Le Pic de la Concorde.

Changes made in the Actual Demarcation.—Difficulties arose beyond the Orta Bel Pass, since its position, as also that given to the Beyik Pass on the map were about 6' south of their true positions. In these circumstances, Gerard recommended the acceptance of a line proposed by the Russians running southwards to the watershed of the Taghdumbash, which the Russians acknowledged to be the Chinese frontier. It remains to add that the river flowing westwards from Lake Victoria was officially accepted as a part of the northern boundary of Afghanistan, which was continued thence to Khamiab along the River

Gerard and Pavolo Schveikovski. In October the Amir duly took over the Cis-Oxus Darwaz and, at the same period, the Russians made over the evacuated districts of Trans-Oxus Roshan and Shignan to the Amir of Bukhara.

To quote Holdich, from the last pillar "the boundary projected into a place where no pillars or mark-stones could be raised to witness it, amidst the voiceless waste of a vast white wilderness 20,000 feet above the sea, absolutely inaccessible to man and within the ken of no living creature but the Pamir eagles — there the great empires actually meet. It is a fitting tri-junction. No god of Hindu mythology ever occupied a more stupendous throne." I

The political results of this Commission were favourable to Russia, since she had been permitted to annex the Pamirs (with the exception of the Taghdumbash Pamir, which was left to China) and had advanced her boundaries towards Afghanistan. From the British point of view, however, the delimitation of a definite boundary was of great importance, a boundary which, moreover, did not touch the Indian Empire at any point, thanks to the Amir's acceptance of the narrow district of Wakhan.

Valley and by a superb feat of arms captured Aornos, situated in a great bend of the Indus.¹

The Political Situation in the Kunar Valley.—To resume: the Amir had constructed a road up the right bank of the river to Asmar, which district marked the limits of Afghanistan. Some sixty miles farther up the river was Chitral.

Ghulam Haidar, under plea of the danger from hostile tribesmen of Jandol, would not consent to a complete survey of the country being executed. However, by dint of tact and perseverance, some of the hills were climbed with good results and the necessary data were secured.

The Siege of Chitral.—Early in January 1895 news was received of the murder of the Mehtar of Chitral. This caused an upheaval in that turbulent state, and led to Dr. (later Sir George) Robertson, the political agent at Gilgit, marching to Chitral with an escort. The situation was rendered difficult by the inopportune release from captivity at Kabul of Shir Afzul, a popular member of the ruling family, who, in alliance with Umra Khan of Jandol, besieged the British force, which suffered heavy losses in a sortie. The British, however, held the fort for some six weeks in spite of attempts at mining and at

relief of Chitral by Kelly, followed by the march of a British division under Sir Robert Low, who defeated the valiant Pathans at the Malakand Pass, occupied the Jandol Valley without resistance being offered, and crossed the Lowari Pass into the Chitral Valley, ended the power of Umra Khan and definitely settled the fate of these petty states.

The Claims of the Amir.—So far as the Hindu Kush range was concerned there was no need to demarcate it. From the neighbourhood of the Dora Pass, which leads from Afghan Turkistan to the upper tributaries of the Kunar River, the boundary turns southward and follows the crest of a gigantic range termed Shawal, which con-

stitutes the western limit of the Chitral Valley.

By the Udny Agreement of 1893 the Bashgol or Arnawai Valley, which formed part of Kafiristan, was laid down as belonging to the Chitral State. The Amir, however, claimed the whole of Kafiristan as Afghan territory and declared that the Arnawai of the Agreement was a stream which joined the Chitral River (as the Kunar River was known in this section) from the east.

He wished not only to convert the pagan Kafirs to Islam, but to establish a trade-route between Jalalabad

over the slippery limestone crags, and the crumbling schistose rocks that border the close little valley of the Darin. Up and down those ragged spurs, and through the undergrowth of thickets which were but a tangle of reeds and briars shadowed by wild fig-trees, olives, pomegranates, vines, apricots and oaks, we pushed our slow way for the livelong day, till evening brought us to the foot of the rocks on which was perched the village of Darin." Continuing the march, on the fourth day, "after a straight up and down climb of 5000 feet we reached the Bozasar peak, and this is what we saw. The whole world ringed with snow, line upon line, ridge upon ridge of snow-bound mountain-tops encircling the horizon in one vast sea of snow-billows . . . we could recognize the peaks fixed by the Indus triangulation, and could connect them together." I

This concluded the proceedings of the Commission, since the question of the boundary in the Mohmand country had been ruled out of court for the time being, and, after rendering these valuable services to exploration, Holdich received orders to join the still more important Pamir Commission.

The Settlement of the Mohmand Boundary, 1896.—It

Khan Tarzi as Afghan Commissioner, and Nasir-ul-Mulk, eldest son of the Mehtar of Chitral, met at Dokalim. They took the boundary almost due north to a point on the Arandu stream just above where it emerges from the hills, leaving the Dokalim lands in Afghan territory.

The Delimitation of the Kurram Valley, 1894.—The delimitation of the boundary from the slopes of the Safid Kuh southwards through Kurram was not especially difficult. The inhabitants of the higher slopes of the valley were, as previously mentioned, Turis who, as Shia Moslems, were considered to be heretics by their fanatical neighbours and were anxious for British protection. Consequently there was little or no obstruction in this section.

The Boundary of Waziristan, 1894-1895.—One of the most difficult areas to be dealt with was Waziristan. As a preliminary measure it was decided to form a military post at Wana, a barren plain situated north of the Gumal Pass at the south-west corner of Waziristan. Wana absolutely dominated the Ghilzais and commanded the chief route from Ghazni to India. It ranks as a key position.

In 1894 it was decided to occupy the plateau with a brigade. Survey operations were at once commenced

Much credit is due not only to the gallant and enterprising survey officers, but also to the political officers and to the officers and men of the escorts. Apart from the dangers of attack, the tasks involved considerable hardships of every kind, and some loss of life.

CHAPTER XLV

ABDUR RAHMAN TAMES HIS REBELLIOUS SUBJECTS

Where the word of a King is, there is power: and who may say unto him, "What doest thou?"—ECCLESIASTES viii, 4.

I look from a fort half-ruined, on Kabul spreading below, On the near hills crowned with cannon, and the far hills piled with snow; Fair are the vales well watered, and the vines on the upland swell, You might think you were reigning in Heaven — I know I am ruling Hell.

And far from the Suleiman heights come the sounds of the stirring tribes, Afridi, Hazara, and Ghilzai, they clamour for plunder or bribes; And Herat is but held by a thread; and the Uzbeg has raised Badakhshan; And the chief may sleep sound, in his grave, who would rule the unruly Afghan.

LYALL.

Abdur Rahman describes his Subjects.—In his autobiography Abdur Rahman writes: "Every mulla and chief of every tribe and village considered himself an independent king. . . . The tyranny and cruelty of these men was unbearable. One of their jokes was to cut off the heads of men and women and put them on red-hot punished with ruthless severity.

Abdur Rahman concludes the account of this campaign by quoting a Pushtu poem:

You may try gently for hundreds of years to make friends, But it is impossible to make scorpions, snakes, and Shinwaris into friends.

The Ghilzai Rebellion, 1886.—The Ghilzais, as we have seen in Chapter XXII, had captured Isfahan in 1722, and ruled Persia for some years. They were the most powerful tribe in Afghanistan, noted for their bravery, their fanaticism and their lawlessness, as recorded in previous chapters. They had also desired the return of Yakub Khan to the throne and were unfavourable to Abdur Rahman being proclaimed Amir. Abdur Rahman mentions that he had imprisoned some Ghilzai Chiefs, and in The Amir's Message Lyall describes the mistrust which he inspired:

The Ghilzaie Chief wrote answer — Our paths are narrow and steep, The sun burns fierce in the valleys, and the snow-fed streams run deep; The fords of the Kabul river are watched by the Afreedee; We harried his folk last springtide, and he keeps good memory. High stands thy Kabul citadel, where many have room and rest; The Amirs give welcome entry, but they speed not the parting guest.

Their Religious Leader.—Their religious leader was

Herat, mutinied and broke away to join the rebels. There was much hard fighting, but finally the Ghilzais were crushed and submitted.

The Rebellion of Ishak Khan, 1888.—Ishak Khan, son of Azim Khan, who accompanied Abdur Rahman in his wanderings, has already been mentioned more than once. Abdur Rahman appointed him Governor of Afghan Turkistan during the first year of his reign, and, relying on an oath sworn on the Koran, trusted him implicitly. To quote: "Having not the slightest idea of his disloyalty, I placed the best rifles and arms at his disposal, because he was on the frontier of Russia". Ishak Khan, however, decided to bid for the throne. He won over the mullas by posing as a very strict Moslem, while to attract his Turkoman subjects he became a disciple of one of the dervishes of the Nakhshband sect."

The Amir heard that Ishak was amassing funds from the revenue while continually drawing on Kabul for money, and was plotting against him. He instructed him therefore to visit Kabul, but he excused himself on the grounds of ill-health. In June 1888 Abdur Rahman became seriously ill and the rumour spread that he was dead, whereupon Ishak proclaimed himself Amir and coined money in his own name.

lost heart, and were ultimately defeated. In short, on September 29 a glorious victory was won by my General, Ghulam Haidar Khan." Surely this is one of the most dramatic stories of Eastern warfare! The punishments inflicted on the rebels, as might be expected, were extremely severe.

The Hazara Rebellion.—The last of these rebellions was that of the Hazaras, who, as already mentioned, inhabit the heart of Afghanistan, holding the mountainous country from Kabul, Ghazni and Kalat-i-Ghilzai westwards to the neighbourhood of Herat. They are a mixed race; the descendants of a military colony founded by the Mongols. They were notorious raiders and, as members of the Shia sect, hated the Afghans. In 1888 the Shaykh Ali tribesmen, who inhabited the district to the south-west of Balkh, revolted, but were pardoned. Two years later they again revolted. A punitive expedition was despatched: "They were defeated, some were killed, others submitted to my rule, the remainder being brought to Kabul as prisoners. I treated the prisoners very kindly and soon restored them to their homes."

Again, in the spring of 1891, the Hazaras living in the Ghazni area revolted. To quote the Amir once again: "The Hazaras had raided and plundered the neighbour-

started under their Chiefs for the Hazara country, which was invaded from every direction, and by the capture of the traitorous Muhammad Husayn Khan and other leaders the Amir crushed this, the last rebellion.

The Amir gazetted a Grand Cross of the Bath.—Abdur Rahman was gazetted a G.C.B., and on being presented with the insignia he referred to his friendly alliance with the British and declared: "I will wear the insignia on a battlefield in the presence of the Russians".

Shahzada Nasrulla Khan's Visit to England in 1895.— Abdur Rahman's main object in wishing to visit England himself, or to send his son as his representative, was to secure direct communication with the British Government. He wished to have an Ambassador in London and would possibly have accepted the appointment of a British Ambassador at Kabul. He contended that, as independent Amir of Afghanistan, an Ambassador was the proper intermediary, and that he was denied a privilege which was accorded to the Shah of Persia. He had written a letter to Lord Salisbury in 1892, the gist of which was that the Government of India did not treat him as a friend and made complaints against him, and that he desired direct communication with the English Government. To this Lord Salisbury wrote a friendly

unofficially at Windsor on May 27, and read a message from the Amir, expressing regret at being unable to visit Her Majesty in person and trusting that friendly relations between the two countries would be more firmly established by his son's visit. The Shahzada attended the Derby, a review at Aldershot, made a provincial tour, was present at Ascot and, on July 2, travelled in state to Windsor, where he presented Her Majesty with the letter of which he was the bearer from the Amir, and also with valuable presents.

The Request for the Appointment of an Ambassador in London.—On July 20 he was accorded a farewell audience. On this occasion he addressed the Queen from a paper written in Persian, which expressed the one request of the Amir, that there should be permanently appointed in London a trustworthy person or, in other words, an Ambassador. This letter was, almost certainly, taken from the book of instructions.

The Reply of the Secretary of State for India.—The reply of Lord George Hamilton was that, owing to the greater proximity of the Government of India, the better local information at the disposal of the Viceroy, and the exalted position of Her Majesty's representative, the present procedure was the more convenient one.

request being refused, even if he be an enemy. . . . But my son, who was the son of a sovereign and the guest of another illustrious sovereign, was returned with a dry but polite refusal to my request." It remains to add that Nasrulla Khan, who viewed every honour that was paid to him with suspicion, remained hostile to Great Britain to the end of his life.

The Subjugation of Kasiristan, 1895-1896.—The political situation of Kafiristan was indirectly settled by the following clause in the Durand Agreement: "The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand, that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgul Valley." The Amir, however, maintained that the Arnawai and Bashgul Rivers were not synonymous, the former draining into the Kunar from the east, the latter from the west. The Government of India, as we have seen, wisely conceded the point, and the Amir decided to annex this mountainous country. He mentioned that, among his reasons was the risk of Russia suddenly seizing the country, the military objection to leaving warlike raiding tribes unsubdued, and the benefits to commerce that the

converted to Islam, and their country renamed Nuristan or "The Land of Light".

Troubles on the North-West Frontier, 1897.—The defeat by the Sultan of the Greeks, the commitments of Great Britain in the Sudan, taken together with the ceaseless advance of the British, constituted the main factors underlying the tribal risings. British prestige for a while was low, and the Amir, who was undoubtedly influenced by these events, addressed an important assembly of mullas and declared that it was the duty of all true believers to kill the infidels and, at this time, he assumed the title of "Light of the Nation and Religion". He also published an "Almanac of Religion", which dealt with jihad.

Lord Curzon and Abdur Rahman.—Lord Curzon landed at Bombay on December 30, 1898. He had already travelled widely in Asia and, in 1894, he had made a remarkable journey to the Pamirs and proved that the River Panja, issuing from a glacier of the Wakhijir Pass, was the true Oxus. He had next visited the Amir at Kabul where he spent a fortnight, having constant interviews with his host, who in a conversation announced for the first time that it was his definite determination that he should be succeeded by Habibulla.²

he would constitute his ace of trumps and would aid him to escape from the Government of India, which he cordially disliked, by gaining direct communication with London. Somewhat naturally, to the Amir, the appointment could only present itself to his subtle mind as a prearranged plan and, since Curzon made no efforts to win him over by a display of tact and friendliness, their relations remained upoetic factors; throughout

relations remained unsatisfactory throughout.

The Progress effected by Abdur Rahman.—There is no doubt that during his ten years of exile Abdur Rahman observed keenly and learned much from Russian administration, which constituted a considerable improvement on the chaotic rule of the incapable Khans it replaced. He also learned much from the English. Perhaps his most important reform was that of justice. When he took over the government the price of a life was 400 (Kabuli) rupees. He instituted the law that a murderer is entirely at the mercy of the relatives of the murdered person. In case they chose to accept a money ransom, it was fixed at 7000 (Kabuli) rupees and, even then, the Government still retained the right of granting or withholding pardon. Again, by Afghan custom, if a woman lost her husband, his next-of-kin had the right of marrying her against her wish. The new law declared that the

seen, gained much experience in the rebellions that were so frequent and Abdur Rahman watched the behaviour of each unit, punishing with grim severity incompetence or cowardice. He was fond of quoting from Jami:

The mass of an army is not the only thing required,
Two hundred competent warriors are better than one hundred thousand
shouters.

Realizing that it was essential to have a munitions factory and powder mills, Abdur Rahman employed British engineers, chief among whom was Sir Salter Pyne. Under their supervision, a mint, tanning and dyeing, furnaces for smelting ore, and other factories gradually dotted the country round Kabul. The story runs that when a soap factory was opened some poorer Afghans ate the soap and thanked the angry Amir for providing them with a new and delicious sweetmeat!

The energy that was needed to induce the conservative Afghans to support these enlightened efforts was tremendous. They complained that the work could be better done by hand and that buying machines meant sending money out of the country. But the Amir, who was a good mechanic himself, quoted Sadi:

If a gentle-armed man fights with an iron-arm,

and scorpions, dealing with stiff-necked tribes, whose evil ways he rebuked in a manner that reminds one of the Jewish Prophets. His justice was grim and cruel, very cruel according to our standards. But, in dealing with his stubborn, treacherous subjects, his methods were the only methods that would have secured law and order. It was typical rough justice of the only kind that his people understood, while they also realised that he was a devout Moslem. Again, his system of espionage, owing to which no one was safe from arrest on a charge of treason, with every chance of a painful death or long imprisonment, created an atmosphere of fear or mistrust, but, yet, in Afghanistan of that period, it was probably inevitable.

Abdur Rahman realized that he must rule with a rod of iron, but he was far ahead of Dost Muhammad in his statesmanship. He realized also that his grandfather's policy of making his numerous sons rulers of the various provinces, each with his own force and revenue, involved a fratricidal struggle for power on his death. Indeed, nothing is clearer in the history of Afghanistan than the constant civil wars, occasioned in almost every case by revolts of brothers or sons of the ruling Amir. To obviate this evil Abdur Rahman kept all his sons at

In reading the Life of William the Conqueror, whose eldest son rebelled and whose half-brother Odo he was obliged to imprison, we realize the difficulties with which he was faced. To quote the Peterborough Chronicle of 1087: "Stark man he was and great awe men had of him. So harsh and cruel was he that none dared withstand his will. . . . If a man would live and hold his lands, need it were he followed the King's will."

It is generally considered that William was cruel, from policy rather than from character. In reading the lives of these two great warriors, both of whom were dominating personalities and possessed of genius, both of whom created a kingdom, and both of whom sought to establish law and order by means which appear cruel to us in the twentieth century, I would ask if there is not some similarity between William the Conqueror of England and Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan. However this may be, the British policy of proclaiming Abdur Rahman Amir of Kabul was justified by its fruits. It gave us thirty-nine years of a united Afghanistan which, if not always friendly to Great Britain, constituted a valuable asset in the Great War.

CHAPTER XLVI

THE McMAHON MISSIONS

The vagaries of the Helmand in Seistan, where it is the boundary between Persia and Afghanistan, have led to two Boundary Commissions in thirty years.—LORD CURZON on Frontiers.

O Seistan! May the clouds refuse their beneficent rain, may ruins and the desert cover thy soil! In winter, thou art a place of suffering and misfortune; in summer, a mass of serpents and insects. Allah created thee as a punishment to men, and has made thee a hell.—From an Arab poem.

Four Boundary Commissions.—In this chapter I have dealt with the two Missions carried out by Sir Henry McMahon. The first was the Indo-Afghan frontier. In the second he was appointed to arbitrate between Persia and Afghanistan on the questions that had arisen owing to a change in the course of the Helmand in the delta province of Seistan. I have also given a brief account of the delimitation of the western frontier of

to Chaman, a distance of 330 miles in length, it consisted of high rugged mountains, inhabited by warlike tribes generally on bad terms with one another, whereas the second section, 470 miles in length, ran through a water-less country, with sandy plains and naked hills which were almost void of inhabitants. Indeed, so little known was the area under consideration, that only three places could be noted with any precision, Domandi, the starting point, New Chaman, situated about half-way along the line, and the terminus at the Kuh-i-Malik Siah, "The Hill of the Black Chief," the word Malik probably denoting a pre-Islamic belief in a being, who ranked below a Pir or Saint.

The Nomadic or Semi-nomadic Inhabitants.—Apart from the physical difficulties and the danger of a sudden attack, which McMahon only just escaped at the hands of a strong raiding force of Wazir tribesmen, there was the necessarily vague manner in which the course of the line was defined in the Durand Agreement to be taken into consideration. To secure a satisfactory demarcation, it was necessary to ascertain the territorial limits of tribes, who might be wholly or semi-nomadic. Moreover the question of the boundary naturally aroused wild excitement among those concerned which, in the case of the

saving of his soul from the sin of perjury. The Koran must be a genuine Koran; it must be held on his bare head, with nothing intervening; and the soles of his feet must be both bare and clean, with no particle of his own tribal soil adhering thereto. Thus prepared the oathtaker steps out, and the course he follows becomes the boundary line of tribal territory."

The Arrival of the British Commission at Domandi.— McMahon reached Domandi on April 5, 1894. The Commission included a strong survey party with an escort of 150 men of the Punjab Frontier Force and a squadron of cavalry; including contingents of friendly tribesmen it amounted to 1000 men and 500 animals. On arrival at Domandi, there was no definite news of the appearance of Sirdar Gul Muhammad, the Afghan Commissioner, but this delay enabled McMahon, not only to extend his survey operations, but also to gain contact with the local tribesmen, and to institute inquiries.

The Gumal Pass.—The Gumal River cuts its way through the Sulaiman range and issues on to the Derajat plains of the Punjab. The Gumal Pass has, from ancient days, constituted a great trade-route between Afghanistan and India. The Ghilzai and Lohani tribes, commonly

marched by different routes to the British camp, which had been moved some distance up the Kundar to facilitate the extension of the survey. The Afghan party had practically no supplies and welcomed a gift of sheep and other provisions.

The Start of the Negotiations.—When negotiations commenced, it appeared that the Amir had ordered his Commissioner not to meet McMahon in person, but to communicate by letters or verbal messages through envoys. Moreover, the Commissioner did not possess a copy of the map of the Kabul Agreement, but had an entirely different map, on which the boundary was marked in a totally incorrect manner. To add to McMahon's difficulties, the Khalifa Mir Muhammad was on bad terms with the Afghan Commissioner.

The British Commissioner surveys the Boundary.—In spite of this almost impossible position, McMahon, while carrying on negotiations, steadily moved onwards along the boundary line, surveying all the time. Reaching the plains of Khurasan, lying at an altitude of some 6000 to 7000 feet above sea-level, the position began to improve. The Amir had apparently hoped to wear out the patience of the British Commissioner, with the object of inducing him to admit indiscriminate Afghan claims, but he had

Agreement map, and this marked a turning-point in the negotiations.

The Demarcation of the Boundary Commences.—It was now possible to commence the demarcation, in spite of constant objections raised by the Afghan representative. He feared the wrath of the Amir who evidently wished to jockey the British; forged documents were also occasionally produced. To add to the difficulties, the country was unexplored and had to be surveyed.

Fortunately the approach of winter, which would not only make the mountains impassable, but would cut off supply caravans, eased the situation and lessened the number of wearisome objections. Finally the boundary was demarcated; the pass over the Khwaja Amran range was crossed just in time; and the British Commissioner descended to the plains and reached New Chaman on Christmas Eve — nine months after starting work.

The Agreement and Maps signed for the First Section.— In spite of infinite trouble caused by the Afghan Commissioner, who wished to deprive New Chaman of the springs on which its water-supply depended, at the end of February 1895 the Afghan Commissioner signed the final agreement and the maps relating to this section of made by the Afghan Commissioner who, although personally willing to accept McMahon's proposals, dared not do so in view of the opposition of the headmen attached to his staff by the Amir. Consequently, in June, the British Mission broke up temporarily, to allow the Government of India to negotiate with the Amir.

The Reassembly of the Mission and Fresh Difficulties.— In January 1896 the work of the Commission recommenced and so did the difficulties. The Viceroy had conceded the district of Iltaz Karez to the Afghans and the Amir had agreed, in consideration of this concession, that the boundary should follow straight lines from point to point. However, to his Commissioner he had merely written that "he was to use his wits and be careful that he was not taken in."

The Boundary demarcated to Robat.—There was much discussion about an area known as Bahram Chah, but the Afghans had practically run out of supplies, except such as were furnished by the British and were anxious to complete the work: so finally, the boundary was demarcated up to Robat, where there was a supply of good water.

The March across the Desert.—From Robat it was decided that the two Commissioners should take small

rising to a height of 13,270 feet, was visible, and, on reaching the border, abundant supplies of good water were found, while some sheep were purchased. McMahon notes that for a space of nine weeks only three inhabitants of this desolate area had been seen!

The Cairn erected on Kuh-i-Malik Siah.—The Gaud-i-Zireh, a salt lake some twenty-five miles wide, which is mentioned in the motto, was next visited. The long two years' task was now practically completed and, on April 16, 1896, a massive stone cairn was built on the summit of the trijunction of the three states, amid general rejoicings. The two Commissioners met again at Robat and, in May 1896, the final agreements and maps, dealing with a boundary line measuring 470 miles, were completed and signed.

The Results.—The total length of the boundary which had been delimitated and demarcated between March 1894 and May 1896, amounted to 800 miles. The question of securing for the railhead at New Chaman, not only the valuable water-supply as negotiated by Durand, but also sufficient room for its future growth, was perhaps the most important military question to be settled. Of some importance, however, was the inclusion in British Baluchistan of Chagai, which, in spite of protests,

both Commissions who, in the face of hardships and risks, successfully completed a most important task.

The Seistan Arbitration Commission.—In January 1903, McMahon left Quetta at the head of a Mission, to act as British Commissioner and Arbitrator between Afghan and Persian claims in the delta province of Seistan. In Chapter XXXVI I have given an account of the Goldsmid Mission which constituted the Helmand as the boundary. It also laid down somewhat vaguely the Kuh-i-Malik Siah as "a fitting point" to the south, while "a line drawn from the Naizar or Reed Area to the Kuh Siah near Bandan constituted the north-west terminal point ". As already described, General Goldsmid was seriously hampered both by the local authorities and by the Persian Commissioner and was unable to obtain a thorough knowledge of the country. Such, then, was the state of affairs, which worked without serious local troubles, until in 1896 a new situation developed by the Helmand changing its course westwards and creating a new main channel known as the Rud-i-Parian.

The Situation in 1899.—When I founded the British Consulate in Seistan, in 1899, I speedily realized that the change in the course of the Helmand created an entirely

water there was the stillness of death.

Russian Intrigues.—It seems probable that no serious disputes would have arisen between the Afghans and Persians — there were none when I was in Seistan — but for the arrival on the scene, in 1900, of M. Miller, who, as Russian Consul, exerted his undoubted talents to create mischief between the two nations, hoping thereby to be appointed to settle their differences. Owing to the tension which was created through his intrigues, a Persian Commissioner, Yamin-i-Nizam, was appointed to settle boundary disputes with an Afghan Commissioner, Musa Khan of Herat. The latter made fruitless attempts to meet the Persian Commissioner, who treated him with gross discourtesy, and the Governor of Chakansur brought matters to a climax by occupying an important Persian village in Mian Kangi. This act caused the situation to become really serious, and the Persian Government, under the terms of Article 6 of the Treaty of 1857, called upon the British to intervene. Arbitration was then accepted by both the Afghan and Persian Governments, with the right of appeal to the British Foreign Minister.

The Composition of the British Mission.—The Mission comprised II British officers, with an escort of 200 infantry and 60 cavalry. Its total strength amounted to

on February 20 it camped at Khwabgah opposite the Band-i-Seistan. To mark the friendly feelings of the Amir a detachment of Afghan cavalry and infantry was ordered to form the personal escort of the British Commissioner, while the members of the Mission were treated as the guests of the Amir during their stay in Afghan territory.

Further Russian Intrigues.—As already stated, the disputes regarding the Seistan boundary and irrigation canals were mainly the result of mischievous instigation by the Russian Consul, M. Miller, who hoped by these means to secure Russian intervention. When, however, these disputes were referred to the British Government, every effort was made by Russia to persuade Persia to withdraw from the arbitration. The importance of the differences was minimized on the one hand while, on the other, the Persians were informed that the British undoubtedly intended to seize the fertile province; or, failing that, to cede a large part of it to Afghanistan. The Russians urged their right to be represented in the Mission, but this was denied by the British, and McMahon received instructions accordingly.

Failing in this direction, the Persian Commissioners, the Yamin-i-Nizam and the Karguzar, or Foreign Office

however, insisted on their accompanying him along the portion of the boundary that was disputed. They contended that the award map of Sir Frederic Goldsmid was no authority and that in the section south of Kuhak the boundary should run not in a straight line to Kuh-i-Malik Siah but should include the Tarakun tract. Northwards it followed the Helmand and the Sikhsar channel and thence northwards to the northern edge of the hámun and so to Siah Kuh.

The Afghan Claims.—The Afghan Commissioner, on the contrary, considered that the line shown on Goldsmid's award map constituted the sole authority on the subject. To summarize these views: the Persians based their claims on their own interpretation of the award and professed complete ignorance as to the map, while the Afghans knew nothing about the award and insisted upon strict adherence to the map.

The Decisions taken by McMahon.—McMahon had ordered a new survey of the area to be made on a large scale, and based on this, in spite of difficulties caused by the complete change in the landscape, he decided on a line which fulfilled the conditions laid down by Goldsmid. Starting northwards from Kuhak, no question as to the boundary arose until Mian Kangi was reached. There

frightened by the Russian Legation into the belief that British arbitration would result in large portions of Persian Seistan being ceded to Afghanistan, still contended that no boundary questions were involved. However, in June 1903, an opportune quarrel over the disputed lands on the frontier, in which some Afghans were wounded, gave McMahon the desired opportunity of intervening, and he issued an arbitrary order in the form of an intermediate award, laying down the boundary along the mounds mentioned above and calling upon both Commissioners to order their respective subjects to observe it.

The Acceptance of McMahon's Decision.—After much intrigue at Tehran, in which the Russian Legation took a leading part, the Persian Government, in November 1903, finally accepted McMahon's line unconditionally. The Afghan Commissioner, whose attitude throughout these tedious years deserves a special tribute, also agreed to it, but stated that the Amir might think it unbecoming to his dignity to show undue alacrity in expressing his approval. This supposition proved to be entirely correct, and it was not until September 1904 that the news of the acceptance of the award by His Highness reached McMahon. The demarcation was then carried out to

Mohiuddin, a gallant surveyor, who, penetrating into the unexplored Dasht-i-Margo with a small party, lost his life from thirst. One of his chain-men with supreme heroism wrapped the precious map round his body and, half unconscious, tottered off with his comrades. He alone was succoured by an Afghan. This expedition cost seven valuable lives.

To conclude: the strategical position of Seistan with reference to the security of the Indian Empire made it an object of a political attack by Russia at a period when, as is shown in Chapter XLIX, Anglo-Russian relations were undergoing a crisis. Thus the task that McMahon undertook was rendered doubly difficult, and its successful accomplishment proves the courage, tact and patience which he displayed, while he was loyally supported by his staff, his escort and the native followers.

The Frontier from Seistan to the Hashtadan Plain.— In 1935 General Fakhur-ud-Din Altái, a Turkish officer, was appointed arbitrator between the Persian and Afghan Governments, with a mission to settle the Perso-Afghan boundary on the undefined section from Siah Kuh, in the vicinity of Bandan, to a point where General MacLean, in 1891, demarcated the boundary of the Hashtadan

distance, but finally resumes a general north-north-west direction to latitude 34° 15'. There it bends due east to the previously demarcated point 39 on the Hashtadan Plain.

The Arbitral Award on the Hastadan Plain.—The question of the frontier in this area had caused much local ill-feeling, but an application for the good offices of the British Government resulted in an arbitral award given by Major-General C. S. MacLean in 1888 and, in 1891, the boundary was duly demarcated by that officer.

The Completion of the Boundaries of Afghanistan.— From the Hashtadan area the Perso-Afghan boundary strikes the Hari Rud at the point where it bends to the north, and this river continues to be the frontier to Zulfikar Pass, where our survey ends.

It is impossible to conclude the account of these Boundary Commissions, which were carried through under such difficulties and with some loss of life, without paying a tribute to the magnificent services of the British and Indian officials who endured so greatly and who, supported throughout by loyal staffs and followers, achieved so much for the benefit of Afghanistan.

CHAPTER XLVII

AMIR HABIBULLA KHAN NEGOTIATES A NEW TREATY

Afghanistan is the door of India, and the safety of India depends on keeping that door strong and shut.—KING HABIBULLA KHAN.

The Situation after the Death of Abdur Rahman.—When the Amir was at the point of death the princes and leading officials, who had been warned, assembled in the Bagh-i-Bala palace. During the night of October I, upon the announcement of his death, a high official took the late Ruler's kulla and, setting it on Habibulla's head, declared him Amir. The princes and officials approved the act, and, taking him by the hand, one by one proffered their allegiance to him. Habibulla then proceeded to the Ark, situated inside Kabul, which was strongly held by reliable troops, and contained the arsenal and treasury; in the morning, the corpse of the Amir was also brought to the same stronghold.

tinguished soldier, nor indeed any subject, to become powerful, and had concentrated all authority in the hands of Habibulla, averted this very real danger.

Sirdar Habibulla Khan proclaimed Amir.—On October 3, 1901, Sirdar Habibulla was proclaimed Amir of Afghanistan. The ceremony was both religious and civil. The religious ceremony was conducted by the chief mulla of the Juma Masjid, who, after praying, wound a lungi of white muslin round the head of the Sirdar. A Koran and relics of the Prophet were then presented to him, after which he was declared to be duly elected Amir of Afghanistan.

At the civil ceremony Sirdar Nasrulla Khan placed the late Amir's kulla on his brother's head; the late Amir's sword was also presented to him. Habibulla then made a speech in which he swore to keep Afghanistan intact, to repel foreign aggression and to promote reforms. He also promised to abolish the hated spy system. Habibulla, whose mother was the daughter of the Mir of Badakhshan, had been born at Samarkand and was thirty-two years of age at the time of his accession.

Habibulla announces his Accession to the Viceroy.—In India grave anxiety, based on alarming rumours in the bazaars, naturally prevailed but, on October 10, Curzon

Amir had not tended towards an improvement in Anglo-Afghan relations. This is clearly shown by the statement made later by Amir Habibulla at a durbar held on August 21, 1907. On this occasion His Highness, referring to Lord Minto's invitation to him to visit India in 1906, declared: "Before this, Lord Curzon also invited me to India, but his letter was not really a letter of invitation; it was a threat that the subsidy would be stopped if I did not obey the summons".

The Reply of Habibulla.—In his reply to the invitation of the Viceroy, Habibulla denied that there had been any misunderstanding between the Government of India and his father. He wrote: "My kind friend, I am fully convinced that there is not a single thing, either big or small, omitted from the terms of the Agreement, or which would now be deserving of description or record".

The non-acceptance by Habibulla of the Viceroy's invitation to meet him at Peshawar in the spring of 1902 was a grievous disappointment to Curzon. He had been most favourably impressed by the new Amir on the occasion of his visit to Kabul, and had described him as "a very charming personality who talked with a wisdom and sense far beyond his years". Also he had felt that, upon the death of the old Amir, he would be able to place

clusion of the ceremony, write a stern letter, in language that would compel a reply, upbraiding him for his disloyal and unfriendly attitude and requiring definite assurances from him. Curzon's attitude in demanding a new treaty before paying the subsidy and giving promises of protection was identical with that of Lytton which, as we know, led to the Second Afghan War. The British Government, on the other hand, took the view that the Amir would probably become more friendly if promises of the subsidy and of British protection were given first and other questions were raised later. In any case the Cabinet strongly objected to "any action likely to entail military operations".

The Letter of Habibulla.—Fortunately the danger of a breach with Afghanistan was averted by the receipt, on December 12, 1902, of a letter from the Amir, which renewed his protestations of friendship and contained his acceptance of British arbitration in Seistan, a question which has been dealt with in the previous chapter. Although this letter was not wholly satisfactory, it opened the way for a resumption of normal relations.

The Dane Mission to Kabul.—During the course of further negotiations and inquiries, it appeared that the unwillingness of the Amir to visit India was partly due

more liberal trade relations was to be discussed. There was also the question of the subsidy which had been withheld.

The Negotiations.—Furnished with a draft treaty which, in substance, repeated the old engagements, Dane entered Afghan territory on November 28, 1904, and, stopping to repair the cairn on Forty-fourth Hill, which had been erected by his cousin Major Waller, he reached Kabul a fortnight later. At the formal durbar held on December 14, and at the first business interview on the following day, the Amir, whose utterances were friendly, evinced anxiety to arrange for some scheme of military co-operation. Indeed, he went so far as to suggest a combined attack on Russia, which Power was, at that time, involved in war with Japan.

Dane had been instructed to advise the Amir that his troops were not sufficiently well organized or equipped to support a serious attack by a Russian army, and that if he desired assistance from Great Britain he must co-operate by the improvement of communications between India and Kabul, and by arranging for consultation with British military experts.

The reply of the Amir was that he fully realized that his army could not resist Russia unaided and that he

railway or road northwards to Hashtadan situated to the south-west of Herat, where a second cantonment would be constructed. "That", he emphatically declared, "would constitute a shield for Afghanistan."

In reporting this far-reaching scheme, Dane urged that were cold water thrown on it, the negotiations in hand would suffer, and that the matter should receive consideration. Curzon, however, curtly replied that Dane was not authorised to discuss the scheme but that, if the Amir visited India, it would be dealt with by the

proper authorities.

Dane perforce discouraged the Amir's project of an attack on Russia, while he was not able to give any support to his military scheme, which, to some extent, was actually carried out by the British in the last Great War by the construction of a railway from Nushki, through British Baluchistan and crossing the Persian frontier to the south of Seistan. He also could not hold out any hopes of an increased subsidy, another advantage that the Amir and his Councillors had hoped to secure.

These discouraging statements caused a marked change in the atmosphere. The Amir and his Councillors, who were mortified at their military scheme being entirely ignored, became resentful and suspicious.

military co-operation, on which they had evidently set their hearts. They also considered that Russia had been made powerless for many years to come by her defeats at the hands of Japan, and that Afghanistan was strong enough to deal with the Northern Power in case of hostilities. Furthermore, there was the feeling that Great Britain had yielded to Russia in insisting on the evacuation by Afghanistan of Roshan and Shignan, whereas, if left to themselves, the Afghans believed that they could have retained both provinces. Consequently, the attitude was assumed by the arrogant Sirdars, his councillors, that the alliance was much more necessary for the British than for themselves, and that they could therefore dictate the terms of any treaty they vouchsafed to negotiate. The situation was furthermore adversely affected by the Amir's serious illness, which lasted from January 12 to the beginning of March, with the unfortunate result that Sirdar Nasrulla Khan and Abdul Kuddus Khan, the First Councillor and the Kotwal of Kabul, who were both extremely fanatical and anti-British, dominated the negotiations during this period. Later, the return of Sirdar Inayatulla Khan, the eldest son of the Amir, from a visit to India where he had been shown much hospitality and friendliness, influenced Habibulla

treaties". Dane, a notable Persian scholar, replied: "This is only a mole on the fair face of the treaty", and quoted from Hafiz: "If this Shiraz beauty will accept my heart, for her Hindu-dark mole I will give Samarkand and Bukhara". This apt quotation eased the situation, but Abdul Kuddus exclaimed: "See, Your Majesty, Mr. Dane gives you Samarkand and Bukhara ". But Dane's prompt reply was: "Nay, the mole is on the face of the British treaty and for this the Amir abandons Samarkand and Bukhara". The treaty is still known as "The Treaty of the Mole". It must be remembered that the engagements made with Abdur Rahman referred to in Chapter XLIII were contained in letters written to various authorities. Some doubt was expressed by Sirdar Nasrulla Khan as to their authenticity. Consequently, after verification, these letters were attached to the treaty.

The Results of the Mission.—It cannot be claimed that this mission was successful in carrying out many important questions that would, it was hoped, be settled. However, the Amir agreed to demarcate the Mohmand boundary at an early date; he showed no hostility to the proposed railways in the Khaibar Pass and the Kurram Valley, while he somewhat improved the status and treat-

The Views of the Government of India.—Lord Curzon's Government in their despatch forwarding the report on the Dane mission wrote, in May 1905: "The one satisfaction to which we may look is that the Amir, having obtained his main objects and obtained them in his own way, appears to have been left by the British Mission in a favourable and friendly frame of mind. It is not denied that such an attitude is in itself more valuable than any paper stipulations, but for the value to be substantial, the attitude must be lasting. We have yet to apply it to the test of every-day experience."

The Secretary of State for India on the Mission.—In June 1905, Mr. Brodrick (later, the Earl of Midleton) declared that: "It was not the case that the negotiations had resulted in failure. As stated by Lord Lansdowne, the main objects of our negotiations with the Amir of Afghanistan were, first, to renew the agreements entered into with the late Amir, and, secondly, to have friendly negotiations with him, with regard to a number of subsidiary points. The first object was achieved by an Agreement that covered all the engagements entered into by the Amir Abdur Rahman. We also arrived at a thoroughly friendly understanding with the Amir on a number of subsidiary points." Lord Midleton, in his

fanatical, anti-foreign feelings of his advisers and his subjects, it was essential for the Amir to prove that he had won success in his negotiations with the British. This he undoubtedly did and thereby was inclined to be friendly, which attitude led to his important visit to India in 1907. Accepting this point of view, it would appear that the treaty Sir Louis Dane signed was a good treaty. Finally, Curzon's appeal to history warrants it as such. The immediate result was the visit of the Amir to India and the ultimate result was the loyal adherence of His Majesty to his treaty obligations under conditions of considerable difficulty and danger throughout the course of the Great War.

CHAPTER XLVIII

HIS MAJESTY HABIBULLA KHAN VISITS INDIA

In the name of Allah. Dated Jamrud, March 7, 1907. At the time of returning from my journey to India, and of re-entering Afghan territory.

My tour in India, which has lasted sixty-four days, has given me so much pleasure that I cannot find words to express it. Every kindness has been shown to me by the Government of India, His Excellency the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, and other Military officers and Civil authorities in India, and I have found them all friends.

I am able to declare that, during this short tour in India, I have made more true friends for the Government of Afghanistan and for myself than I could have made in twenty years had I not come from Afghanistan to India.—Autograph Message of HIS MAJESTY THE AMIR to Reuter.

Lord Minto's Invitation to the Amir.—During the early months of 1906, it had been reported from various sources that the Amir, if invited to pay a friendly visit to India, would probably accept. Lord Minto accordingly despatched a warm invitation in June 1906, outlining a programme, which would include some big game shooting. The Amir in his reply asked that it should be understood that his visit would be purely a friendly one and

The Amir's Staff and Escort.—Having decided to visit India, the Amir selected the Sirdars who were to accompany him, some of whom it was not prudent to leave in Afghanistan during his absence. The total of his party, which included his bodyguard, cavalry and infantry, aggregated some 1100 officers and men. During his absence he arranged for Sirdar Nasrulla Khan to assume full powers, while Sirdar Inayatulla Khan was placed in charge of the army, but under the supervision of Nasrulla Khan.

The Reception at Landi Khana, January 2, 1907.— The Amir was met upon his arrival at Landi Khana by Sir Henry McMahon, who as a member of the Durand Mission had made his acquaintance at Kabul in 1893, and who had been placed in charge of His Majesty during his visit to India. A salute of thirty-one guns was fired, but of far greater importance was a cable of welcome from the King-Emperor in which, for the first time, he was addressed as "His Majesty".

The Reception at Agra.—Lady Minto gives a brilliant description of the reception of the Amir at Agra, of the investiture of His Majesty with the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath and of the impression created on him by the review of 30,000 British troops.² At the banquet

XLVIII

the keenest interest in the inspection he made of the Moslem College. After examining the students minutely in religious ritual, and in obligations of fasting, in his speech, much to their surprise, he exhorted them to seek Western education.

The Visit to Gwalior.—Later, thanks to the courtesy of His Highness the Maharaja, a visit to Gwalior, with its beautiful palace and gardens, its well-drilled troops and its tiger shooting, was a complete success, more especially as, to his delight, the Amir shot a tiger.

Cawnpore, Delhi and Calcutta.—Cawnpore with its factories, and Delhi with its historical buildings were alike examined in considerable detail, while, at Calcutta, the mint, the museum, the zoological gardens, the hospitals and, perhaps above all, the shops delighted His Majesty, who was indefatigable. He also inspected the ordnance factories at Cossipore and Dum-Dum with the keenest interest, while he expressed his earnest wish to be able to manufacture cordite at Kabul. On another day he was taken round the docks, which deeply impressed an inhabitant of Afghanistan who had never seen a ship. To turn to another question, as was perhaps to be expected from the ruler of a nation clad in sheepskin, he severely criticized the fat bare calves of the Bengalis,

inquiries into everything. He fired a torpedo at a moving target with complete success; and lastly, he fired a submerged mine. At dusk he watched the illumination of the fleet.

Karachi and Lahore.—Leaving hospitable Bombay with deep regret, the voyage to Karachi, where all the ships were dressed with flags, was uneventful. After the official reception, the Amir steamed to the Manora entrance of the harbour where an old hulk was blown to atoms by a submarine mine. On the way to Lahore, he stopped to inspect the great bridge over the Indus at Attock. It is interesting to recall that his father, after inspecting it, wrote to Lord Dufferin suggesting various changes and improvements in its structure!

Habibulla was delighted with Lahore, which had once been in the possession of his dynasty. He also visited the Golden Temple at Amritsar, where he made friends with the Sikh priests. "I respect all religions", he said to McMahon, "but despise those who are lukewarm in their own faith." This unusual attitude of toleration to the religion of their hereditary enemies displeased the Afghan Sirdars, who also resented the Amir's open friendliness to British officials and their wives.

The Islamia College.—At Lahore the Amir carried out



less than 70,000 being stacked in a single room. He then left for Peshawar.

The Farewell.—The Amir awarded various decorations to the British officers who had served on his staff. He presented McMahon with the Order of the Sardari of the First Class as a token of high esteem, and, in reply to a question, stated that the order had been instituted by his father some years ago, but that hitherto it had not been awarded to anyone.

On the morning of March 7, the Amir accompanied by McMahon drove up the Khaibar Pass to Landi Kotal, where he accepted the invitation of the officers of the Khyber Rifles to lunch. He then mounted a horse and rode slowly along the winding mountain road that leads to the British frontier near Landi Khana. There he was met by a force of cavalry and large numbers of tribesmen, who gave him a vociferous welcome. Finally, after embracing McMahon, with tears streaming down his cheeks, he rode off down the valley to Kabul.

Summary.—The Amir, upon his arrival in India, displayed a strong vein of suspicion lest some slight to his own dignity and the honour of Afghanistan might be offered him, but these feelings were soon dissipated by the genuine warmth of his reception, and as the days

tion from his advisers, to accept Minto's invitation to India. At first, like his brother Nasrulla in London, he was suspicious, but gradually it dawned on him that he was being treated not only as a King but also as a friend. He was deeply impressed by the dignity of the Viceroy and the splendour of the official functions. Still more deeply was he impressed by the army, the fleet and the administration. But most of all was he impressed by the personality of Minto, of Kitchener and of many other officials whom he met, while he absolutely trusted and felt deep affection for McMahon. Realizing, as he repeatedly stated, that Russia was the enemy of Afghanistan, he made up his mind that he would, through thick and thin, be loyal to his engagements with Great Britain, provided that he was shown equal loyalty and confidence in return. History proves how well he kept his word.

Plot against the Amir.—It was noticed that, owing to the Amir's warm friendship with his English hosts, the members of his entourage considered themselves to have been neglected, which was certainly the case. They also disliked the pleasure he evinced in English society and the courtesy with which he treated Hindus and Sikhs. Above all, they resented the fact of his having been admitted into the brotherhood of freemasonry. Indeed,

CHAPTER XLIX

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION

Essential as a friendly Afghanistan may be to our position in India, equally essential, I submit, is a friendly Russia to our general international position, both as regards the actual situation, and also in respect to that in the not distant future. . . . We have secured an undertaking with France. That with Russia is in its very early infancy, and will require, for reasons which I need not explain, careful nurture and treatment. Any serious check to this infant growth may kill it before it has advanced in years, and its disappearance would doubtless eventually react on our relations with France. . . .—SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON to Sir Edward Grey, July 1908.

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 produced a détente, but not an entente.—G. P. Gooch.

The Anglo-Russian Convention.—In this work, when dealing with the very important question of the Anglo-Russian Convention, I have described it primarily as affecting the Anglo-Afghan relations, which is my main theme. While acknowledging the importance of the Convention on our relations with Persia and Tibet, I have dealt with these questions in a somewhat less detailed

Count Lamsdorff sought to justify Ignatieff's action and, in London, M. de Staal again raised the question. Lansdowne replied that His Majesty's Government while willing to consider the question in the most friendly spirit, would object to any change being made in the system hitherto observed without their previous consent, and would regard any attempt at such a change as a departure from the understanding between the two Governments and a contravention of the repeated assurances of the Russian Government that they considered Afghanistan to be entirely outside the sphere of their influence.

Habibulla Khan's Declaration.—In September 1902 Habibulla, at a durbar, read out another Russian communication urging the opening of trade-routes for Russian caravans from the railhead at Kushk to Kabul and Herat, and offering in return special trade privileges to Afghan traders. The Amir then announced that his policy was identical with that of his father and replied that all future communications should be addressed through the Government of India. The feeling in the durbar was hostile, and a Chief exclaimed: "Let this Turki dog, who carries messages for Infidels, be beaten on the head with shoes, until his hair falls off. This

by the despatch of British and Russian officers, but which the Russians wished to treat as a purely local affair, the Russian minute ended as follows: "Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères ne peut que réitérer sa ferme décision de suivre le procédé indiqué dans ses communications antérieures et se fait un devoir d'ajouter qu'après les explications franches qu'il était à même de donner à ce sujet, il considère la question dont il s'agit comme définitivement close".

Lansdowne informed Benckendorff that His Majesty's Government deeply resented the tone of the Russian communication and had written a long despatch to the British Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, which was intended as a defence of British conduct and, he was afraid he must add, an indictment of that of the Russian Government. A copy of this despatch, which had been withheld owing to conciliatory communications from Lamsdorff, was now handed to Benckendorff to read.

Anglo-Japanese Treaties, 1902 and 1905.—In 1902, Great Britain, renouncing definitely her policy of isolation, negotiated a treaty with Japan by the terms of which, "in the event of either party becoming involved in war with a third Power, the other Power was to remain neutral unless any other Power or Powers should join in

It was undoubtedly intended that there should be a perpetual means of exerting pressure on England by military movements on the Afghan frontier and it constituted a standing menace to India.¹

Against this point of view it is only fair to note that the Russian military authorities believed that, in case of hostilities breaking out between the two empires, the British would incite the Amir to cross the Oxus at the head of the Afghan army and raise the fanatical Moslem inhabitants against their Russian masters. They also held the view, which cannot be gainsaid, that while Great Britain could attack Russia by sea in more than one portion of her empire, her rival's only avenue of attack was that leading across Afghanistan to India.

The Resumption of Anglo-Russian Negotiations, 1905.— Upon the outbreak of war with Japan in 1904, it was agreed that negotiations could not be advantageously continued, but, in 1905, Lansdowne, in reply to a question by Benckendorff, informed him that British policy towards Afghanistan had not changed. He invited Benckendorff, in return for this declaration, to give an assurance that the Russian Government considered that their policy also was unchanged and that they continued to regard Afghanistan as lying wholly outside their sphere of influence. In obliged to join it, thus practically converting it into a Pan-European Alliance against England and Japan. His efforts to disrupt the Franco-Russian alliance and the Anglo-French understanding were also unceasing. It thus became clear to Great Britain that continued friction with Russia would only have played into the hands of the strong pro-German party at the Russian Court.

The Anglo-Russian Convention, 1907.—Hostilities between Russia and Japan were officially ended by the Peace Treaty that was signed on August 23, 1905. The defeat of Russia produced a readiness among the statesmen of the Northern Power to effect a settlement with Great Britain in Asia. The Agreement that was ultimately negotiated represented a comprehensive and final effort to deal with Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, the underlying idea being to embody in its principles and articles terms that would remove all possible causes of friction in the future. Generally speaking, the British invited concessions in Afghanistan and Tibet, while displaying readiness to make sacrifices in Persia.

The Correspondence between Lord Minto and Lord Morley.—Early in 1907 Morley informed Minto that negotiations for an Anglo-Russian Convention were on

The Viceroy informs the Amir.—Upon the conclusion of the Agreement, Minto, in his letter of September 10, informed the Amir that Articles I and II of the Convention reaffirm in the clearest manner respect for the sovereign rights of His Majesty, and the policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of the country; that the Russian Government recognize for the first time in a formal document that Afghanistan lies outside the sphere of Russian influence and engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of the British Government; that, by Article III, Great Britain concedes to Russia her permission for Russian and Afghan frontier officials, specially appointed, to settle purely local questions; and that, by Article IV, the principle of equal treatment for British and Russian commerce in Afghanistan is laid down.

The Reply of the Amir.—In his reply Habibulla forwarded the views of a Council of State which considered that the Convention destroyed the independence of Afghanistan and possessed no advantage. It also, in their opinion, gave the right to both Powers to construct railways in Afghanistan. The real trouble was, of course, mainly due to Morley's lack of tact in ignoring the Amir. As Minto pointed out, the Amir himself was favourable

was the strategical importance of Seistan. As mentioned in Chapter XXXVI, I had founded the British Consulate in that fertile province in 1899 and in the following year a Russian Consulate was also founded. From the start there was bitter rivalry, more especially on the Russian side, and upon the arrival of Sir Henry McMahon in 1903, to arbitrate between Persia and Afghanistan on the new situation created by the change in the course of the River Helmand, as described in a former chapter, the Russian representative displayed open antagonism to the British arbitrator, whose efforts to ensure a peaceful settlement were, however, ultimately successful. Partly owing to these strenuous intrigues of the Russian Consul against the British arbitrator, the military party in Russia considered that the surrender of Seistan, when the creation of the two spheres of commercial influence were discussed, demanded an important equivalent concession by the British.

In the Convention, as finally agreed upon, Great Britain and Russia bound themselves mutually to respect the integrity and independence of Persia. The two Powers then divided up the country into zones of commercial influence with a large neutral zone which separated the two areas in the south-west. The area assigned

the historical city of Shiraz: the Government of India urged the great importance of placing the head of the Persian Gulf and the lower Karun Valley within the British sphere, realizing that Germany might well peg out claims in it, as indeed she attempted to do. The whole question was, however, hurried through, without giving time for proper discussion, owing to the fact that there were strong pro-German forces, headed by some of the Russian Grand dukes, which were working to wreck the Convention. The enormous developments in oil in this area have alone proved the validity of the Government of India's contention and, as in the case of the Baghdad Railway, and of the status of Kuwait, the results of the Great War were distinctly beneficial to Great Britain.

We now come to the point of view of Persia. No nation, least of all one with such a glorious past as she could claim, likes to be slighted, and Persia felt bitterly on this point. Of even greater practical importance to her statesmen was the fact that the basis of their policy, which was the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia, had now disappeared. They considered — and rightly so in the case of Russia — that the creation of spheres of influence was but a stage on the road to annexation. As

mainly owing to the zenophobe character of both its rulers and its population. In 1885 Colman Macaulay, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, secured Chinese assent to lead a British Mission to Lhasa. He had, however, failed to secure the consent of the Tibetan Government, and the mission, after being stopped on the frontier, was subsequently withdrawn. Somewhat naturally, considering that the retirement of the mission constituted a proof of weakness, a Tibetan force invaded Sikkim and constructed a fort some eighteen miles inside the boundaries of that state. This position was attacked by the British in 1888 and the Tibetans, who suffered many casualties, were driven out of Sikkim.

In 1890 a Chinese representative met Sir Mortimer Durand on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier to discuss various questions. No progress with these negotiations was effected until the impracticable Chinese official was shown the great pit in which the Tibetans, who had been killed in the attack on their fort in 1888, had been buried. This action rendered the Celestial envoy more reasonable and, as a result, Great Britain and China ultimately signed a Convention, by the terms of which Sikkim was recognized to be a British protectorate, while a Boundary Commission was decided upon. Further negotiations

mission was hailed with delight by the Russian press, which declared that the Dalai Lama had turned to Russia as being "the only Power able to frustrate the intrigues of Great Britain". Among the gifts brought back to Lhasa by Dorjieff was a magnificent set of Russian episcopal robes for the Dalai Lama; there was also a consignment of Russian arms and ammunition.

The position for the British, at this juncture, had become serious. Not only had the Dalai Lama rebuffed the advances of the Viceroy, but he had sent a mission to Russia, their rival in Asia, while there were rumours of the conclusion of a secret agreement between Russia and China, which later proved to have been unfounded. However, the result of this mission was to upset the borderland states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.

Immediate action was imperative and, in 1903, Curzon instructed Colonel (later Sir Francis) Younghusband to march into Tibet with an armed escort. The Viceroy's proposal was that he should proceed to Lhasa, but the Cabinet, still involved in the South African War, would only permit him in the first instance to march to Kampa Dzong, situated a few miles across the frontier. Owing to Tibetan obstructiveness there was a delay of five months at this place before instructions were received

reduced the indemnity to one-third, to be paid in three annual instalments. The Chinese Government carried out these payments and the Chumbi Valley was evacuated in 1908. The Cabinet also, remembering the fate of Cavagnari at Kabul, vetoed the establishment of a British Agent at Lhasa.

The Younghusband mission excited unfavourable comment in Russia, but Lansdowne replied to the Russian Ambassador that, for a Power which had encroached in Manchuria, Turkistan and elsewhere, the protest was "beyond measure strange", and that the sole object of British action was to obtain satisfaction for Tibetan affronts.

The Chinese Government, awakened by British activity in Tibet, decided to restore their authority in that country and, in 1906, a Convention was concluded between Great Britain and China, by which the latter Power assumed responsibility for the preservation of the integrity of Tibet.¹

Such then was the position of affairs when the section of the Convention concerning Tibet was negotiated with Russia. It contained five short articles, which after acknowledging the "special interest of Great Britain in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations

departmental Committee instead of by the Foreign Minister. So far as Afghanistan was concerned it transpired during the negotiations that Russia was genuinely afraid that we might use Afghanistan as a spearhead for aggressive action in Central Asia. Evidently her defeat by Japan had upset her balance. However, Nicolson, perhaps our ablest diplomatist, finally carried through the negotiations to a successful issue. A proof of the importance of this Convention may be found in the Kaiser's minute on the despatch which informed him of its conclusion. It ran: "Yes, when taken all round, it is aimed at us". In this view the Kaiser was right, since the Anglo-Russian Convention, in spite of the sinister activities of Russian officials in Persia, who aimed at annexing their sphere of commercial influence, cleared the way for Russia to fight on the side of Great Britain in 1914.

Russo-Afghan Relations up to the Great War.—It is interesting to note the situation on the Russo-Afghan frontier during the years that followed the signature of the Anglo-Russian Convention. Among the questions raised by the Russian authorities were the depredations of locusts, who had no respect for frontiers. In dealing with this pest, they pressed for co-operation between the

the northern frontier in comparison with those on the Indo-Afghan frontier, while there was every reason to believe that the Amir was doing his best to bring the perpetrators to justice and to prevent the commission of such outrages.

The difficult question of irrigation in the case of rivers which flowed from Afghanistan into Russian territory was also brought forward. The answer given was that the Amir had reported a diminution in the precipitation of snow and rain in the Hazarajat and that no new irrigation channels had been dug. Actually, in 1905, both the Hari Rud and the Murghab Valley were carefully examined by a British officer, who noted a decrease of irrigation and cultivation in these Afghan areas. Moreover, it was explained that the custom in Afghanistan gives to owners on the upper reaches of a river a prior claim to the use of its water, and the fact that on the Russo-Afghan frontier there was a special arrangement for the Kushk and Kashan Rivers proved the existence of this custom in the case of Afghan rivers in general.1

During the years 1908–1909 some friction was caused by the flight from Afghanistan of thousands of the Jamshidi tribesmen. Some of these immigrants were

these raids continued to cause anxiety, more especially as numbers of modern rifles imported via Bandar Abbas were now in the hands of the tribesmen. To give an example: in the summer of 1907 the Zakka Khel Afridis visited Kabul, where Nasrulla Khan "not only increased their allowances, but also afforded them facilities for purchasing large numbers of rifles which had become available from the Persian Gulf source of supply".2

In the autumn of 1907 Minto, who, it must be remembered, was a professional soldier and had served in the Second Afghan War, reported to Morley that the position was becoming intolerable, what with raids on a large scale by Wazirs, and by gangs who were especially sent out to murder the Political Agent at Wana, three of whose predecessors had been murdered in fourteen

months. Morley's reply was unsympathetic.

Needless to say, the Zakka Khel raiders grew bolder and actually raided Peshawar city early in 1908 and thus forced the British Government to agree to a punitive expedition. Its sudden despatch surprised the Zakka Khels, who were rapidly brought to their knees after suffering heavy losses. It speaks volumes for the influence of Colonel (later Sir George) Roos-Keppel that although urging him to restrain his tribesmen, to which the latter replied that he had ordered his frontier officials to prevent his subjects from helping the Mohmands. There is reason to think that the Amir was doing his best, but no Afghan could resist the excitement of a fight with its chances of securing plunder. Finally, in May, the turbulent Mohmands, who were largely supported by Afghan levies, were attacked and duly punished, thanks in part to the new quick-firing 18-pounder gun.

An Anglo-Afghan Commission.—The best frontier officers deplored these expeditions, which inflicted heavy loss to life and property and left behind an enduring legacy of hate. They realized that the only method was to construct roads and hold strategical centres from which

the tribes could be dominated and civilized.

In 1910 an Anglo-Afghan Commission met to settle cases on the Tochi-Khost border. The Afghan representatives refused to take up cases against outlawed subjects of the Indian Government, who were being settled in Afghan territory some fifty miles distant from the frontier, which enabled them to continue their raids. In spite of this failure to deal with the chief cause of unrest, various agreements and reconciliations between frontier tribesmen were effected and, in numerous cases,

CHAPTER L

THE TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO THE AMIR DURING THE GREAT WAR

I will so long as the sublime God-granted Government of Afghanistan remains in security and peace, hereafter continue to abide the same way as I have hitherto been abiding by my friendly treaty and engagements with the illustrious British Government, and will not, please God, as far as lies in my power, give preference to the false ideas of ignorant and short-sighted persons, over the interests and welfare of the affairs of my State.—Letter of the AMIR to the Viceroy, dated March 23, 1915.

At the peace settlement, the most important of the national claims of Germany will be that for a German India.—Doctor Hans Delbrück, 1915, in The Heritage of Bismarck.

The Amir's Declaration of Neutrality.—Upon the outbreak of the World War the Amir announced the neutrality of Afghanistan in a durbar held at Kabul on August 24, 1914. Again, at another durbar held on October 3, he reaffirmed the policy of neutrality and contradicted wild rumours as to his hostile feelings towards

CH. L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 247

In it His Majesty expressed his gratification at the scrupulous and honourable manner in which the Amir had maintained the attitude of strict neutrality as guaranteed by him at the beginning of the war. It pointed out that this attitude was not only in accordance with the Amir's engagements but that, by it, he was serving the best interest of Afghanistan and of Islam.

The Sarhang of Dakka, who had been instructed to receive the letter, appeared at Landi Khana with an escort of Khassadars who wore new uniforms for the occasion and carried a large standard. The guard of honour, furnished by the Khyber Rifles, consisted of a British officer, two companies of infantry and 100 mounted infantry, and, after the exchange of courtesies, the ceremony of handing over the letter of the King-Emperor took place.

The reply of the Amir, which was written on January 6, 1916, ran as follows: "I am grateful that your Majesty is convinced of the neutrality of the God-granted Government of Afghanistan, for which Your Majesty has expressed your gratification and pleasure to me. In future also, provided that no injury or loss occurs to Afghanistan, the sublime, God-granted Government of Afghanistan

will remain neutral and will always view with satisfaction

 \mathbf{J} 1 \mathbf{J} \mathbf{J}

position in Persia, but the influence of Turkey on the minds of his subjects was a matter of supreme importance to him.

On the occasion of a durbar being held at Kabul on January 24, 1916, large crowds assembled outside the palace in the expectation that Jihad would be proclaimed. Actually the Amir deplored the existing chaos in Persia and, dwelling on the impossibility of forecasting the ultimate outcome of the war, he impressed upon his hearers the absolute necessity for unity and co-operation.

The Dawn of German Influence in the Middle East.—Before dealing with the German Mission to the Amir, which created a crisis of the first magnitude in Afghanistan and was a source of the gravest anxiety in India, I propose to outline the thoroughness with which Germany worked to gain influence in Turkey, Iraq and Persia, alike by political and commercial action.¹

The Visit of the German Emperor to Constantinople, 1889.

The first visit of the Kaiser to Constantinople initiated the grandiose Pan-German scheme, known in Germany as the Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad (B.B.B.), while the Kaiser spoke of "a Germanic wedge reaching from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf". The Deutsche Bank had already gained control of the railways of European

German Mission, that was making a preliminary inspection of the alignment of the railway, reached Kuwait. Its leader explained to Shaykh Mubarik, its ruler, the immense wealth that he would acquire if the terminus of the railway were to be placed in his territory and offered to lease an area of twenty square miles for this purpose. Mubarik, however, in 1899, had signed a secret Agreement with Great Britain by the terms of which he had engaged not to sell or lease land without her consent. The German proposal was consequently refused.

Germany declined to accept this rebuff as final and induced the Turkish Government to despatch a naval expedition to seize Kuwait, but the presence of a British cruiser defeated this scheme. Yet a third attempt was made. Behind Bubian Island, which bounds the bay of Kuwait to the north, are two deep inlets which run north to within some twenty miles of Basra. On one of these, Khor Abdulla, it was decided to build the terminus of the railway. Although the territory belonged to Kuwait, Turkish troops were posted on it and, in spite of all remonstrances, were kept there. However, in 1914 an Agreement with Germany was being negotiated by which there would have been two British members on the board of the Baghdad Railway, whose terminus would

fisheries. He was proceeding to do this when the British Government intervened and vetoed the scheme.

The next attempt was more serious. The Shaykh of Shargah, a Trucial Chief, who was bound by treaty not to enter into an agreement with any other power than Great Britain, granted a concession to work the red oxide deposits on the island of Abu Musa to three Arabs. Wonckhaus acquired the concession, which was thereupon cancelled by the Shaykh, who expelled the original concessionaries. This action raised a storm of protest in the Berlin press, but the German case was indefensible and was not followed up.

In 1906 the Hamburg-Amerika Line started a regular monthly service to the Persian Gulf, which speedily competed with the British. In 1907 not only were pilgrims booked free to Jeddah, but cargo was accepted at half the rates charged by the British. The line was evidently heavily subsidized by Germany.

The Potsdam Agreement, 1911.—To turn to Persia: in 1910, at the famous Potsdam meeting between the German and Russian Emperors, Sazonoff agreed to support the Baghdad railway, while Germany in return pledged herself to support Russian interests in Persia. The British objected to Sazonoff giving unlimited support

TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 251

struction of the Baghdad railway. She also agreed to obtain a concession for a line from Tehran to Khanikin to meet the German line from Sadija to Khanikin as soon as this branch line was constructed. Russia, moreover, agreed that if, two years after the completion of this latter line by Germany, she had not commenced the construction of the Tehran-Khanikin line, the German Government was at liberty to apply for the right to construct it. In the event nothing more was heard of these railway schemes, but Russia's policy, which certainly weakened the Entente created by the Anglo-Russian Convention, strengthened the influence of Germany in the Middle East.

Germany gains Influence in Persia.—A definite success of Germany in Persia was the foundation at the capital of a college staffed by German teachers, to which the Persian Government contributed an annual subsidy. The Deutsche Bank also opened an office at Tehran with branches at Tabriz and Bushire. Of greater importance was the fact that the German Legation had such close relations with the Persian "democrats" that, upon the crushing of the Majlis by the Shah in 1908, many of them settled at Berlin and during the Great War were the chief organizers of the German Mission to Persia and Afghanistan.

In addition to the "demonstry through Turksh

travelled widely in North-east Persia and was my guest at Meshed during the summer of 1913. Zugmayer, a German scientist, travelling at the same period, penetrated to British Baluchistan. In 1916 he was the leader of the Germans whom I captured at Shiraz.¹

To conclude this section: does it not constitute a striking example of German Weltpolitik? Looking back on that period of tension I recall a Persian proverb: 'History is the mirror of the past and the lesson of the present'. May we learn the lesson!

The Turko-German Mission to Afghanistan.—The originator of this scheme was Enver Pasha. It consisted in a proclamation of Jihad at Constantinople and at other Moslem centres. A Mission of Germans and Turks preaching the "Holy War" was to cross Persia to Afghanistan, furnished with credentials from the Caliph, and it was hoped that the appeal of the head of the Moslem religion, strengthened by promises of armed support and of money, would induce the Amir to lead his fanatical subjects to invade India in overwhelming numbers.

Upon the outbreak of the War, Indian seditionists, whose headquarters were in distant areas, such as Har Dyal from California and Barkutulla from Japan, assembled at Berlin, where they were organized into an Indian Political

TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 253

The Mission of Wassmuss.—Wassmuss was instructed to return to the area behind Bushire, where he was successful in organizing attacks which necessitated the garrisoning of that port by British troops. He also organized a combination of tribes who invested my force at Shiraz in 1918. He was the only German Agent who was in any way successful.

The Position at Tehran in 1915.—To resume: the German propaganda proclaiming the conversion of their monarch and nation to Islam was supported not only by various religious leaders, but by powerful gangs of robbers, who were especially valuable as messengers. Moreover, the escape of some hundreds of German and Austrian prisoners from Tashkent turned the enemy Legations at Tehran into armed camps. However, in November 1915, the advance of Russian troops in Northern Persia caused the enemy Ministers to flee from Tehran, after a fruitless attempt to persuade the weakling Shah to join them. This failure at the capital reacted on the general situation in Persia, but the German Missions had succeeded in driving the British and Russian subjects out of Central and Southern Persia by the end of 1915.

The Formation of the South Persia Rifles.—In the spring

arrival at Shiraz in November 1916. In this manner no German supporting Missions were left in Southern Persia. As a result the Amir was encouraged to remain loyal, and German prestige was diminished.

The Failure of von der Goltz, 1916.—The plan of forming a Persian army was a complete failure. Field-Marshal von der Goltz, who was in supreme command of the German and Turkish troops in Iraq and Persia, proceeded to Kermanshah, where a staff of German officers was attempting to organize the recruits who had been enlisted. The Persians disliked his Turkish escort and they still more disliked their German instructors. von der Goltz's summary of the position in February 1916 runs: "Anarchy in Persia; nothing to be done; dust, cupidity and cowardice; vast expenditure and no return ".1 A few days after this report was written, the Russians, encouraged by their splendid feat of arms at Erzerum, swept the Germans out of Persia.

Differences between the Germans and the Turks.—It is noteworthy that the Turks did not see eye to eye with the overbearing Germans. They feared, and with reason, that, in case of victory, Germany would treat Turkey as a conquered country. The Germans, as we have seen, aimed at the invasion of India by winning over Persia

addition of prisoners of war who had escaped into Persia from Russian Turkistan.

Captain Oskar Niedermayer, the leader of the German Mission to the Amir, experienced considerable trouble with the Turkish authorities at Baghdad, who wished to utilize the services of the Mission against the British in Iraq. They even tried to prevent it from penetrating into Persia. In spite of these difficulties, Niedermayer crossed the border early in 1915, when he was warmly welcomed by the Swedish officers of the Persian gendarmerie.

His party, to which was attached the Turkish Mission under Kazim Beg, included twelve Germans, the Indians Mahendra Pratap and Barkatulla, and some Persian gendarmerie, was about eighty strong. He travelled across Western Persia to Nain to the north-west of Yezd, and then entered the Lut desert and passed through Tabas and Duhuk.

Upon approaching the Afghan frontier he divided up his party into three sections with a view to himself escaping the British and Russian troops that were patrolling the southern and northern sections of the Perso-Afghan boundary respectively. He despatched one party, consisting mainly of sick camels, to the north, a The Arrival at Kabul.—Leaving Herat on September 7 the Germans reached Kabul some twenty days later and were placed under guard in the Bagh-i-Baber, outside the city.

The Attitude of the Amir.—The Amir immediately reported the arrival of the mission at Herat to the Viceroy. He stated that he had instructed the Governor to forward it to Kabul, where he would certainly ascertain its intentions. He ended his letter with assurances that its arrival would have no detrimental effect whatever on the neutrality of Afghanistan.

The Turko-German Mission at Kabul.—The Amir kept the German emissaries, who were not allowed to leave the garden for some weeks, waiting for an audience until towards the end of October. In a letter addressed to the German Minister at Tehran, which was intercepted, Niedermayer wrote in November 1915: "We were at last received by the Amir in a friendly manner on October 26. The Amir's explanations did not give us much hope. Please send as soon as possible the Turks for my expedition."

Another letter from Roehr (a member of the mission) ran: "I believe it is quite possible to draw Afghanistan into the war if about one thousand Turks with machine

basis of Afghan policy had been that her two powerful neighbours, Great Britain and Russia, were generally hostile to one another. The chief value of Afghanistan to Great Britain was the fact that it served as a buffer state, and though bound to Great Britain by treaties and obligations, the Amirs could yet, to some extent, play off one powerful neighbour against another. Great Britain and Russia thus entirely occupied the stage, whereas Turkey and Germany, although known in a somewhat vague way, had never had any direct contact with Afghanistan and were far distant countries.

When the World War broke out, Afghanistan was faced with the somewhat alarming fact that Great Britain and Russia were allies. The credit side of this new position of affairs was that the Amir was thereby able to point out to his Councillors who pressed him to declare Jihad that it would obviously involve the ruin of Afghanistan.

The Amir's Diplomacy.—The Amir, in view of the strong pressure exercised on him by the pro-Turkish party, headed by Nasrulla Khan and favoured by Inayatulla Khan, played a very difficult hand with consummate skill. He delayed matters by convening an assembly of leading Mullas and Chiefs, to whom he expressed his

action was required, realized that without the arrival in Afghanistan of a powerful Turkish force, there was no hope of winning over the astute Amir. The scheme for a coup d'état was considered, but was found to be impracticable.

The Dismissal of the Turko-German Mission.—There is little doubt that the capture of Erzerum by the Russians in March 1916 proved the impossibility of a Turkish division reaching Afghanistan, while the fall of Kut-al-Amara does not appear to have greatly perturbed Afghan opinion. The mission had definitely outstayed its welcome when, in May 1916, it was dismissed by the Amir in the presence of Sirdars Nasrulla Khan and Inayatulla Khan. Leaving Kabul on May 22, its members scattered, and, owing to the capture of most of the supporting German parties by my force and the vigilance of the frontier patrols, some of them were taken prisoners. Niedermayer, although wounded by brigands, finally reached Hamadan. His mission was a complete failure, but his courage and initiative, under most difficult conditions, were remarkable.

The Amir's Statement to the British Agent.—On September 6, 1916, the Amir stated to the British agent that he had entirely disapproved of the aims of the German

element. The leading Moslem Theological College is that of Deoband, which is attended by students not only from India but also from the tribal territory and from Afghanistan. The head of the college was Maulana Mahmud-al-Hasan, who was a widely respected religious leader. Strenuous efforts were made to secure his support and Maulvi Abdul Rahim of Lahore (the Obaydulla of the conspiracy) convinced him that India was Dar-al-Harb or a "Country of Disturbance" where Moslem religious rites could not be freely carried out and that consequently Jihad was obligatory. It is usual for Moslems at Friday prayers to pray for the ruler. Since the British Government was not a Moslem Power, the custom had arisen in India of praying for the Sultan of Turkey as Amir-al-Muminim or "Commander of the Faithful" and it was expected that on this account Mahmud-al-Hasan would proclaim Jihad. Contrary to expectation, however, the Maulana held that the teaching of the Koran forbade revolution or sedition and that the only course for Indian Moslems was hijrat or "migration" from India. He therefore sailed with a number of his followers bound for Mecca, where he intended to join in the Jihad. At Mecca, the Turkish Governor, Ghalib Bey, gave a cold welcome to the party. He

1820 a certain Sayyid Ahmad Shah of Bareilly, who had adopted the especially fanatical tenets of the Wahabis, founded a colony of Mujahidin; for a short period they ruled the Peshawar district, but were driven out by the Pathans. Later, they established themselves in tribal territory where they subsisted on subscriptions secretly collected in India and joined, to some small extent, in raids on British territory. Generally speaking, however, they were only anxious to live at ease on their income.

Indian Students abscord to Afghanistan.—Obaydulla, who had not followed the "migration" to Mecca, influenced some fifteen Indian students, whose oath on the Koran he secured, to "migrate" to Afghanistan, where they would preach Jihad and the invasion of India. Changing their names by way of precaution, they crossed the frontier and were welcomed at Asman by the Mujahidin. Disappointed by the lack of enthusiasm displayed by these tame "Warriors of the Holy War", the students crossed into Afghanistan and reached Jalalabad, where they were placed under arrest. The authorities then forwarded them to Kabul where, for some time, they remained under guard. Realizing that they were not welcome, they asked for permission to proceed to Turkey, which was refused. They declined to return to India

L TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 261

Maulvi Obaydulla organizes the Plot.—The studentconspirators met Inayatulla Khan who expressed deep sympathy with them, but their activities remained somewhat aimless until Maulvi Obaydulla, who arrived at Kabul in August 1915, induced them to co-operate for a common purpose. The plot was designed to unite all the states of Islam, the Turks, the Arabs, the Afghans, the Uzbegs, the Frontier tribes and the Moslems of India in a combined effort to overthrow the British Raj. The Mujahidin were to raise the fanatical tribesmen and be supported by a general rising of the Moslems of India. It was hoped that the revolutionary Hindus and Sikhs would join the Moslems and that their united forces would sweep the British into the Indian Ocean.

The plot was woven with some skill and emissaries were despatched to Mecca, to Turkey, to Russia, to Japan, to China, and elsewhere, to announce the creation of a Provisional Government of India and of an Army of Allah, with the aged Mahmud-al-Hasan as its Commander-in-Chief. The President was to be Mahendra Pratap, the Prime Minister Mulla Barkatulla of Bhopal, while Obaydulla, the moving spirit, was to be Foreign Minister. If the Amir agreed to join in the plot, he would be acknowledged as King of India. It would

grief, had absconded to Kabul with Abdul Hak, of whom he was, to some degree, in charge. Upon the Khan Bahadur asking why he had returned without his young masters, the reply given by Abdul Hak was so unsatisfactory that he was soundly beaten and thereupon gave up the letters. The Khan Bahadur handed them to the local authorities, who considered them to be unintelligible, but sent them to O'Dwyer; the latter realized their great importance and forwarded them to Simla.

The letters described the situation at Kabul and in India, referred to the arrival of the Turko-German mission and its departure, and gave the plan for the formation of the "Army of Allah". The headquarters were to be at Medina with the Maulana as Commander-in-Chief, while Obaydulla was to be the General Officer Commanding at Kabul. The absconding students were also given high military rank. To conclude this section: these letters, which were handed over to the Criminal Intelligence Department, revealed a plot with wide ramifications, and by their seizure, it was nipped in the bud. It was, however, no closely organized, dangerous conspiracy, but rather ineffectual plans, which depended entirely on the invasion of India by the Afghans. As it happened, the revolt of the Sharif of Mecca against the

TURKO-GERMAN MISSION TO AMIR 263

to make a brief reference to some disturbances on the North-West Frontier which, considering the efforts made by enemy agents, were of less importance than might have been expected.

L

The tribes kept quiet until Turkey joined the enemy, when, excited by the letter written by Ghalib Bey, and by the preaching of the Haji of Turangzai in April 1915, the Mohmands raided the Peshawar district in force, but were speedily driven out. At the same time, the Khostwalis raided the Tochi Pass and were only dispersed after serious fighting.

Later in this year, the Swatis attacked a British force at Chakdara, while the Bunerwals, joined by the Hindustani fanatics, attempted to invade British territory. Once again, in spite of the Amir's express prohibition, the Mohmands, in September, raided the Peshawar district and, on this occasion, they burned the Shenkargarh bazaar.

The economic blockade of the offending tribe and military operations forced it to sue for peace and to agree to pay a fine. But a new lashkar of 6000 men was again collected, which was dispersed by the terrifying action of the first aeroplane, termed Malik-ul-Maut or "Angel of Death" by the tribesmen, and in August 1917 peace was

CHAPTER LI

THE ASSASSINATION OF KING HABIBULLA AND THE ACCESSION OF AMANULLA KHAN

O Nation with a sense of honour! O brave army! While my great nation was putting the crown of the Kingdom on my head, I declared to you with a loud voice that the Kingdom of Afghanistan should be internally and externally independent and free, that is to say, that all rights of Government, that are possessed by other independent Powers of the world, should be possessed in their entirety by Afghanistan.—The Proclamation of AMIR AMANULLA KHAN.

The Rise of Nationalism in Afghanistan.—The keynote of recent history in Central Asia and indeed more or less everywhere in Asia may be found in nationalism. The so-called "unchanging East" realized the power and wealth of the West and its impact gradually caused it to awaken. Indeed, the victory of Japan over mighty Russia in 1904, proving that the West was not invincible, came to the East as a revelation. In neighbouring Persia it

CH. LI

Siraj-ul-Akhbar, in which journal he made constant attacks on Great Britain. Apart from this, the collapse of the Russian Empire seemed to offer the races of Central Asia the prospect of recovering their liberty.

The Amir's Demand for Representation at the Peace Congress.—In the spring of 1916 the Amir put forward a demand that he should send a representative to the Peace Conference. There was no doubt that this demand represented the views of what might be described as those of the party, which was headed by Sirdars Nasrulla Khan and Inayatulla Khan.

During the years of the Great War, Afghanistan, as we have seen, had been visited by a Turko-German mission, accompanied by capable Indian seditionists. Moreover, in 1918, with the complete defeat of Turkey by a Christian Power and the occupation by the victors of some of the Holy Places of Islam, fanaticism was aroused together with the bitter feeling that Afghanistan had failed Islam in her hour of need.

Owing to the Amir's inestimable services in maintaining the neutrality of Afghanistan, in the face of hourly danger to himself, its independence should surely have been promptly acknowledged after the Armistice. Had this boon been granted, is it not possible that the pro-

by an escort under the command of Ahmad Shah Khan of the Musahiban family.¹

In the morning of February 20, 1919, it was discovered that an unknown assassin had entered his tent and had shot him through the ear. As was natural, suspicions were aroused but since the descendants of the mullas of this district whom he had executed for a plot would be naturally anxious for vengeance, it may be that one of the number was the assassin.

His Character.—In a previous chapter King Habibulla is described as a patriotic ruler, keen on benefiting Afghanistan. He established a Council of State for tribal affairs and introduced Western medical and surgical methods. He also abolished the slave trade and founded a college conducted on European lines, but suitable to Afghan needs. If, in later years, he spent too much time and money on his pleasures, it is best to remember him as the Amir, who in face of almost overwhelming pressure and, at the constant risk of his life, remained true to his pledge of neutrality, and saved Afghanistan from the horrors of war.

The Accession of Sirdar Nasrulla Khan.—The position on the day of the assassination was that Nasrulla Khan, the Ulya Hazrat (mother of Amanulla Khan, the third

Inayatulla Khan, the eldest son of the late Amir, had left Jalalabad to take over charge of that important post by his father's orders. On the death of the Amir being known he was, however, recalled to Jalalabad.

The succession to the throne lay between Nasrulla Khan, representing the Conservative party, who was strongly supported by the mullas and tribes, and one of the sons of the late Amir. Inayatulla, the eldest, aged twenty-one, had no following and, at a Council composed of Inayatulla and the leading officials at Jalalabad, Nasrulla Khan was acclaimed Amir. On February 21, at a public durbar, Inayatulla, other members of the royal family, and the leading officials confirmed Nasrulla Khan's election as Amir. The Viceroy was informed and Nasrulla's accession was reported to be popular with the mullas and tribes.

The Accession of Amanulla Khan.—Meanwhile Amanulla, the third son, aged twenty-nine, who held the capital, the treasury, the army headquarters and the arsenal decided to bid for power. While Nasrulla remained inactive at Jalalabad mourning his brother, instead of riding to Kabul as advised, Amanulla outbid his uncle by offering the army 20 rupees a month pay as against 11 rupees. He also vehemently denounced the failure of Normalla VI and the consecution of the consecution

by his partisans, mainly members of the Musahiban family, with the sole exception of Kandahar, where the Loinab Khushdil Khan was a half-brother of the Ulya Hazrat.

Amanulla Khan informs the Viceroy of his Accession.— On March 3, Amanulla informed the Viceroy of his accession in a letter which contained the following passages:

Nor let this remain unknown to that friend that our independent and free Government of Afghanistan considers itself ready and prepared, at every time and season, to conclude such agreements and treaties with the mighty Government of England as may be useful and serviceable, in the way of commercial advantages to our Government and yours.

To this the Viceroy cautiously replied:

From this it seems possible that the commercial requirements of Afghanistan are thought to call for some agreement with the British Government, subsidiary to the treaties and engagements above mentioned.

Nasrulla Khan sentenced as responsible for the Murder.—At a public durbar held on April 13, Nasrulla Khan was declared to be guilty of instigating the murder of the late Amir and was sentenced to imprisonment for life.

proclamation of Jihad. The date of the durbar, at which Amanulla's actions landed him in almost inextricable difficulties, coincided with the tragedy of the Jhalianwala Bagh at Amritsar (where General Dyer had taken stern action against rebels 1), and there is every reason to believe that accounts of the serious position in the Punjab encouraged him to take his hazardous resolve. To give typical instances from correspondence that was seized:

The English are distracted in mind on account of the European War, and have not the strength to attack the Afghans. The people of India too are much dissatisfied with the English on account of their tyranny and oppression. They will never hesitate to raise a revolt, if they can find an opportunity, as their hearts are bleeding at their hands.

The Amir's endorsement ran:

Seen. You will try your best to keep us informed of affairs of this sort.

And again:

The Provisional Government has entered into a compact with the invading forces. Hence you should not destroy your real interest by fighting against them, but kill the English in every possible way.

This manifesto, found at Thal, was signed by Obaydulla,

CHAPTER LII

THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR

O my pious, brave nation! O my faithful lion-hearted army! Nobility fame, honour, courage and valour are among your attributes. Patriotism, piety and virtue are your natural characteristics.

.

I proclaim to all of you, the truthful subjects of my royal person, that the treacherous and deceitful English Government has been, since a long time, practising with diabolical treachery and fraud, many shameful oppressions on us.

.

I call upon my pious and brave royal army to strive and do their best, and upon all my faithful subjects to wage Jihad in the path of God with their life and property.—AMANULLA KHAN'S Proclamation of Jihad.

Cardboard brown hills flat against the skyline! Hills that had shape without bulk, and where the rock faces showed, the cardboard was stained and darkened. The first thing I noticed about the Khyber was its lack of detail. . . . Anything that moved on the mountains was without individuality. No wonder aeroplanes are of little use against the invisibility with which the hills protect their own. At five hundred feet, it would be difficult for an observer to pick out as many tribesmen ambushed on an apparently barren summit.—ROSITA FORBES.

The Policy of the Amir_In the First and Second

Internal Disturbances in India.—In the spring of 1919 serious internal disturbances caused the authorities grave anxiety. So much so was this the case that it was necessary to detain large bodies of troops awaiting demobilization or embarkation to England, to guard important centres and the vital lines of communication. These disturbances had, without doubt, encouraged the

Amir to pursue his hostile policy.


The Military Position in India.—The most important factor, in May 1919, was the large number of war-trained units still serving abroad. Moreover, to quote the official account: 2 " demobilization of British personnel had begun and large numbers of men had left for England without being replaced. The shortage of skilled artisans and mechanics in the technical branch was especially marked. The Indian units throughout were temporarily short of effectives . . . and a full complement of Indian officers and men had been permitted to proceed on furlough for the first time since August 1914." To conclude this brief survey: stocks of aeroplanes, railway plant, and military stores, which were only procurable from the United Kingdom, had run down and, owing to shortage of shipping, could not be speedily replaced. Animal transport, especially the supply of mules, had been completely -hand de de de la company de l

animals. Fortunately Sir Charles Munro was a most capable Commander-in-Chief.

The Disposition of British Troops.—In accordance with Lord Curzon's scheme of 1899, regular troops were mainly concentrated on the Indian side of the Administrative frontier, while the trans-border tracts were held by irregulars, with the exception of the garrisons of Chitral, of the Malakand and in the Tochi Valley. This system had worked well until 1919, although its risks and drawbacks were obvious.

A striking force, consisting of two divisions and two cavalry brigades, was available for offensive action on the Khaibar front and half that force on the southern front. A defensive rôle was assigned to troops in the Central area and to the garrisons of Malakand and Chitral. A general reserve of one division, two mobile brigades and one brigade of cavalry was kept in readiness. These latter units were short of effectives and of transport. Generally speaking, the force suffered from the drawbacks detailed above, but it had the great advantage of being provided with aeroplanes, although these were few in number and of an inferior class.

The Afghan Military Forces.—In this work I have pointed out more than once that the real military strength



were 14 battalions of infantry, 1 battalion of pioneers, 1½ regiments of cavalry and 44 guns. A still stronger force, concentrating in Khost under Nadir Khan, included 16 battalions of infantry, 2 battalions of pioneers, 4 regiments of cavalry and 60 guns. Concentrating at Kandahar were 13 battalions of infantry, 3 regiments of cavalry and 60 guns. Finally, at Kabul, there was a general reserve of 11 battalions of infantry and 5½ regiments of cavalry with 40 guns. The only arsenal, which was scantily supplied with equipment and munitions, was situated close to Kabul.


The First Act of War.—On May 3 an escort of Khyber Rifles which was, as usual, escorting the caravan to the Afghan border, was turned back by Afghan pickets who had established themselves on the British side of the frontier. On the following day large numbers of copies of the farman, signed by the Amir and exhorting all Moslems to Jihad, were distributed through the Afghan post office at Peshawar, together with leaflets which announced that Germany had resumed military operations and that India had revolted.

The Phases of Operations.—In consequence of the Amir's action, orders were issued on May 5 for the mobilization of the field army. The operations fall under

ing at Dakka towards the end of April, Afghan regulars crossed the frontier on May 3 and occupied Bagh and the heights above Landi Kotal with a force which, by the evening of May 6, included three battalions of infantry and two guns. A second body of 350 infantry with two guns held two hills situated some five miles to the north of Landi Kotal, while Shinwaris and Mohmands from Afghan territory were gradually assembling and joining the Amir's regular forces in large numbers.

The British Garrison at Landi Kotal.—During this critical period the British garrison at Landi Kotal merely consisted of two companies of Indian infantry and 500 men of the Khyber Rifles. Owing to the cry of Jihad and hostile propaganda among the tribes, the loyalty of the latter body could not be depended upon, and it was most fortunate that the Afghans allowed this golden opportunity to slip. Had they overpowered this weak force, the neighbouring tribes would undoubtedly have risen. As it was, rather in accordance with their custom, they watched to see what would happen. The situation was saved by the arrival, on May 7, of British reinforcements in lorries, to be followed by the 1st infantry brigade, which reached Landi Kotal on May 8.

Brigadier-General G. F. Crocker attacks the Afghan



tion stores, to burn the railway station and the cantonment. This threat was met by the sudden investment of Peshawar city, by the almost simultaneous closing of its gates and by the seizure of the Afghan Postmaster and the revolutionary leaders.


The Capture of the Afghan Position at Bagh.—On May 11 the Afghan position at Bagh was attacked in force. In spite of the great heat, which necessitated resting the troops at intervals, the Afghans were driven into flight with heavy losses, while the Royal Air Force completed the victory by bombing and machine-gunning groups of fugitives. On the following day the Royal Air Force bombed the Afghan camp at Dakka, whereupon the Amir's army hastily retired on Jalalabad, while their Mohmand allies, true to type, looted the camp. Dakka was subsequently occupied without opposition by the British.

Afghan Attack on the Camp at Dakka.—On May 16 a reconnaissance in force passed through the Khurd Khaibar Pass and advanced to the Mohmand village of Girdiz, which was occupied. Large numbers of the enemy, with artillery, who had concentrated for an attack on Dakka, threatened this column, which retired hard pressed back to its camp. Indeed, a charge of the King's Dragger Chards had to be made before the pursuers were

their right flank, began to retire at 1 P.M. and dispersed so rapidly that, although they left five out of their seven Krupp guns behind, their losses were not as heavy as was hoped.

The Afridis display Hostility.—In spite of the British victory of May 11, sections of the Afridis, seduced by Afghan money, raised the cry of Jihad. This movement, combined with the open enmity of an influential headman and an attack on a column, affected the loyalty of the Khyber Rifles, who began to desert with their arms and ammunition. The force was consequently disbanded, and the pass was strongly held by British regular troops.

The Bombing of Jalalabad and of Kabul.—To resume the main narrative: the Royal Air Force, although greatly handicapped by the inferior quality of its machines, carried out concentrated bombing raids on Jalalabad, where large portions of the military quarter were burned; troops on parade were also bombed. During the panic which ensued the neighbouring tribesmen looted arms, ammunition and treasure. To quote from an Indian eye-witness: "A few aeroplanes came over Jalalabad and made a bombardment for hours, two bombs exploding near the room I occupied at only a few yards. This



and sensation followed by a death silence after a few minutes. To appease the public from the panic, a band was played and a regiment brought on the parade ground for a few minutes, quite at unusual times."

The Amir's Request for an Armistice.—Preparations for an advance on Jalalabad were being made during this period, but unofficial Afghan overtures culminated on May 31 in a formal request from the Amir for the conclusion of an Armistice. Instructions were consequently issued that, although preparations were to continue, no further advance was to be made without fresh orders. Actually the position in the Central area called for strong reinforcements, which necessitated the transfer of a part of the mechanized transport of the Khaibar force.

The Central Front.—The force which held the Central Area was weak and lacked transport. Consequently it was not intended to assume the offensive. In the Upper Kurram Valley we were bound to defend the loyal Turis against their Afghan enemies, in spite of the disadvantageous fact that the valley formed an extremely narrow salient, with Afghan territory flanking it throughout on the west and to a less extent to the north. The exposed position was Parachinar, where, on May 7, a battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry and two sections of

Bannu or Idak on the Tochi. He finally decided to attack Thal and, using a route which had been reported as unfit for the passage of field guns, but which was passable for the elephants and mules which carried them, he appeared before Thal on May 26.

The Evacuation of the Tochi Valley and of Wana.—In view of the intense sensitiveness of the frontier tribes to any appeal from Kabul, it was considered that the Afghan advance would almost certainly result in a rising of the Mahsuds and Wazirs. Consequently, since the despatch of reinforcements was impossible, it was decided, on May 21, to withdraw the loyal elements of the militia without delay. This was a serious decision, since evacuation certainly meant that the surrounding tribes would become hostile and join the enemy. Moreover, in view of the strength of the posts, which could beat off any attack by tribesmen unsupported by artillery, withdrawal at this juncture was to be deprecated.

The Retreat of Major Russell.—Under the leadership of Major Russell, the most difficult evacuation of the posts was successfully carried out by means of forced marches into the Zhob Valley. No halt was made until the post of Mogulkot, forty miles from Wana, was reached. In this post there were only rations for twentyDuring the difficult period that followed, the destruction of a convoy and heavy casualties suffered by a column which marched out to rescue it, have to be recorded. It should be pointed out that these serious reverses were partly due to the officers and men, in some cases, being young and inexperienced in frontier warfare. However, reinforcements from Quetta relieved Fort Sandeman, which had been invested, and by the end of July the tribesmen had been punished and the disturbances caused by the repercussions of the Afghan War were ended.

The Thal Position.—To return to Nadir Khan: the fort at Thal, which was only built for defence against tribesmen armed with rifles, was the centre of the position, with an outer and an inner line of defence. It was garrisoned by four battalions of Indian troops, with two sections of mountain guns and two 3-inch trench howitzers. Its water-supply was obtained from a well situated 300 yards to the north-east of the fort.

The Afghans shell Thal.—The Afghan force consisted of 3000 infantry with two 10-centimetre (3.8 inch) Krupp field howitzers, seven 7.5-centimetre Krupp pack guns and a large force of tribesmen. The fort suffered severely from the fire of the howitzers, which outranged the British artillary and only temporary relief was obtained

the south of Thal. His sudden assault and the artillery fire scattered them and the position was taken. The 15-pdr. guns then silenced the Afghan howitzers.

The Defeat of Nadir Khan.—On the following morning, June 2, an attack was launched against the main Afghan position, on the slopes north-west of Thal. As it was developing, Dyer received a letter from Nadir Khan stating that he had received the instructions of the Amir to suspend hostilities. He asked for an acknowledgement to the communication. Dyer replied: "My guns will give an immediate reply, and a further reply will be sent by the Divisional Commander, to whom the letter has been forwarded". It soon became clear that the Afghans were retiring from the position, which was captured without loss. Armoured cars and aeroplanes pursued the defeated army, while the tired infantry was able to rest. The enemy camp was occupied on the following day and preparations were being made for exploiting the victory by a march on Matun, but the signing of the armistice on June 3 officially ended the war. Much credit for the relief of Thal is due to the indomitable Dyer and to his force.

The Tactics of Nadir Khan.—The advance of Nadir Khan on Thal, using a route considered to be impassable

Chitral included 450 rifles of the 1/11 Rajputs, one section of a mountain battery and the Chitral Scouts, 1000 strong, commanded by British officers, and the Mehtar's bodyguard. The Afghans invaded Chitral, but were driven out by the defending force, which crossed the frontier in pursuit and captured the village of Birkot. Other minor operations followed in which, generally speaking, the Chitral force more than held its own.

The Southern Front.—The situation on the southern front possessed the advantage that from the Gumal Pass southwards the frontier of the two states marched together and that, with the exception of a portion of the Zhob Valley, there were no tribes in unadministered territory to be considered. The boundary cantonment, as mentioned in Chapter XLVI, was New Chaman, distant some seventy miles from Kandahar, and five miles within Afghan territory was the Afghan fort of Spin Baldak.

At the outbreak of hostilities, the Afghan forces at Kandahar were estimated at 13 battalions, with 3 regiments of cavalry and 60 guns. There were also large forces of fighting tribesmen available. The Quetta-Zhob force consisted of 12 battalions of infantry, 4½ regiments of cavalry with 24 guns and 34 machine-guns.

regiment gallantly captured the ridge and towers before the main defences had been scaled. The Afghans displayed great bravery and were almost all killed or captured. The fall of the fort relieved the situation in Zhob, but the retirement of the remnants of the Wana garrison, referred to above, upset the neighbouring tribesmen and necessitated the despatch of a mobile column to that area.

Summary.—To conclude this brief outline of the Third Afghan War: in spite of the difficulties of the situation, which I have described, India placed 140,000 troops on the North-West Frontier within a fortnight of the commencement of the war. Within eight days of the opening of hostilities, in spite of the extreme heat, the main Afghan Army had been defeated and scattered at a distance of forty-five miles from railhead. Moreover, the rapid advance of the British in force up the Khaibar discouraged the Afridis and Mohmands and averted a long and far more serious campaign. Coming so soon after the close of the titanic conflict of the World War, this relatively insignificant clash of arms with Afghanistan passed almost unnoticed in Great Britain, but yet, taking all the circumstances into account, it represented no mean achievement, and many British and Indian units

CHAPTER LIII

AFGHANISTAN ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE AN INDEPENDENT STATE

After the breakdown of the Russian Empire in 1917, the sole inducement for Afghanistan to remain within the British orbit was removed (at any rate for the time being) and events were to prove that the sudden cessation of the pressure from the north had made a greater impression on the Afghan mind than the victory of Great Britain.—ARNOLD TOYNBEE, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923.

Peace Negotiations — the Amir's Letter.—The Afghan forces in every area of hostilities having been defeated, as described in the last chapter, Amanulla perforce decided to make peace. On May 28 a letter was received from the Amir, who ascribed the outbreak of the war to a misunderstanding and stated that Saleh Muhammad's operations were of a purely defensive nature. The Amir further complained of the air bombardments of Kabul and Jalalabad as unjustifiable acts of aggression, but added

invaluable buffer state between India and Soviet Russia, which she represented. Add to this question of policy the fact that the military operations had already cost over £16,000,000.

The Peace Treaty of Rawalpindi.—The Amir replied, objecting to the terms of the Armistice and pretending to misunderstand their purport, but agreed to send his representatives to India to discuss them.

The Afghan delegates, who possessed plenary powers, came to Rawalpindi with unduly inflated ideas. They expected that, even if they could not secure the old advantages of the subsidy with arrears, they would win something tangible which would permit them to return to Kabul with credit. They adopted at first a distinctly truculent and defiant attitude, refusing even to attend the first meeting unless they were permitted to retain their armed escort, alleging that their honour was involved in its retention. Their bluff was, however, called and they were informed that, unless they did attend as arranged, their train would take them back that night and hostilities would be resumed. Upon receiving this ultimatum, they became somewhat less unreasonable.

The main objects of the delegates were to gain freedom from British control of foreign relations, the

quarters for this letter. But it was evidently impossible to continue the old arrangement without making farreaching changes. The old order had served its purpose well in keeping Russia from annexing Afghanistan, but the Russian Empire had fallen to be succeeded by the chaos of Bolshevism which did not, at the time, appear likely to be permanent. Moreover, atheistical Bolshevism, although it is apparently now moving far away from the ideals of its early days, will never be permanently acceptable to religious Islam. Accordingly, taking the long view that it is in the interest of Afghanistan to be friendly with Great Britain, not only on account of trade relations, but also for securing help in case of invasion from the north, it would appear that the policy was justifiable and sound. At the same time, it was natural that the Peace Treaty should have been badly received by the army, since it conceded to the defeated enemy terms that would have been more suitable if the Afghans had been victorious.

The Afghan View.—As was to be expected, in Afghan eyes the admission of the independence of their country by the British Commission was regarded as a triumph, and Amanulla declared that he had drawn the sword to vindicate the claim of Afghanistan to independence, and

the Khalifat (Caliphate) and the action of the allies was bitterly denounced throughout the Moslem world. In India, the Khalifat movement gathered force and, in June 1920, developed into Hijrat, some 18,000 Indian Moslems emigrating to Afghanistan. At first they were welcomed, but admission was perforce finally refused; and the disillusioned emigrants gradually returned to their homes, where the benevolent Government of India arranged for them to regain their land and houses.

To turn to Russia: the Whites, who were advancing steadily in August 1919, had been defeated by the Bolshevists in April 1920. The Soviet and Ankara Governments had drawn together, while a Soviet Mission had been despatched to Kabul. Again, in Persia, the Anglo-Persian Agreement had been signed on August 9, 1919, but a year later it had not been ratified by the Majlis, which finally rejected it.² In Iraq there were serious troubles among the tribes, which culminated in the Arab revolt of July 1920. Taken in conjunction with the sinister unrest in Ireland, the situation, so far as Great Britain was concerned, had distinctly deteriorated.

The Situation on the North-West Frontier.—The position on the North-West Frontier after the termination of hostilities caused grave anxiety, since the Wazirs and

war. However, in spite of these intrigues, satisfactory progress was made with the Afridis and other warlike tribesmen. In Waziristan, Colonel Shah Daula, an Afghan officer, remained at Wana, but the decision to occupy Razmak and to construct a circular road in that area improved matters. It remains to add that the gradual re-establishment of British authority among the tribes was a severe blow to the Amir, who counted on his influence with them to serve as a diplomatic lever in his negotiations with the British.

The British Conditions of Friendship.—The Amir was asked to prove the sincerity of his intentions by the dismissal of Bolshevist missions and agents. He was also asked to dismiss Obaydulla, Mahendra Pratap, Barkatulla and other Indian seditionists. Friendly relations in connexion with the frontier tribes were also insisted on and, finally, improved treatment of the British Agent at Kabul.

Anglo-Afghan relations after the Treaty of Peace.— There is no doubt that Amanulla and his advisers entirely misunderstood British intentions and, as was only natural under the circumstances, believed that the British expected that the Bolshevists would have been defeated and that Turkey would have been partitioned during the Suritz at the end of the year and the negotiations hung fire for the time being.

The Amir's Policy.—Amanulla in this manner flouted the British demand for the exclusion of the Bolshevists. As to the dismissal of the Indian seditionists, friendly Habibulla Khan was not strong enough to take a step, which violated all Moslem ideas of hospitality, whereas Amanulla considered them useful allies to be encouraged. The question of the frontier tribes, which Amanulla rightly held to constitute his ace of spades, was the last question on which he would yield and, somewhat naturally, fearing a new British attack, intense intrigues by Afghan officials with the frontier tribes were the order of the day. Finally, the British Agent at Kabul was practically held a prisoner and was not released from confinement until August 8, while his correspondence was seized.

The Khaibar Demarcation, August-September 1919.— To add fuel to the fire, the undefined frontier, in the vicinity of Landi Khana from Sisobi to Palosi on the Kabul River, was demarcated by Mr. (later Sir John) Maffey, in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty. The proceedings were watched by an Afghan representative, whose report formed the subject of a strong protest spin Baldak; in the Kurram Valley, at the instigation of Nadir Khan, Tandisar, situated on the British side of the Peiwar Kotal, had been occupied by Afghan forces, as had also been the case of Lambarbat in Chitral. After these questions had been satisfactorily disposed of, the conference was resumed early in June.

Mahmud Tarzi now raised the question of the Khalifat, of the Turkish Peace terms and of the Holy Places, but was informed that the Sharif of Mecca was entirely independent, that the Khalifat had nothing to do with the British Empire, and that no modification in the Turkish Peace terms could be made out of regard for Afghan feelings.

As to the agitation among the frontier tribes, Dobbs pointed out that it was due to Afghan support, to Bolshevist intrigues encouraged by Afghanistan, and to Indian revolutionary agitation in tribal country. The Afghans thereupon boldly claimed that the tribes should be handed over to them and a yearly subsidy be paid to Kabul for controlling them! During the Conference, Dobbs, realizing how the world situation had deteriorated, replaced the demand for the dismissal of Bolshevists and Indian seditionists by a request for their control, to prevent them from using Afghanistan as a centre for hostile.

intentions and wishes of the British Government to the Afghan delegates at the close of the Conference. Although no striking success could be claimed for this meeting, some obstacles to the restoration of good relations had been removed, and the discussions had ranged over a wide area.

Russian Policy and its Reaction on Feeling in Afghanistan. —At this period Lenin and his chief henchman Trotsky were denouncing Great Britain as their chief enemy. In Central Asia, however, Moslem revolts were suppressed with ferocity and the Amir of Bukhara was driven out and took refuge in Afghanistan. His arrival and that of hundreds of Uzbeg refugees opened the eyes of Amanulla and his people to the real nature of Bolshevist policy and produced a revulsion of feeling in favour of the British and a readiness to negotiate a defensive alliance with them. Accordingly, on October 6, 1920, the Amir addressed the Viceroy and invited "trustworthy representatives, invested with power to conclude a Treaty", to Kabul. Had this invitation been immediately accepted, the situation would have been distinctly more favourable than it was three months later.

The Dobbs Mission to Kabul.—In response to the Amir's invitation, Dobbs proceeded to Kabul, ac-

which provided for reciprocal information by the two Governments regarding any measures that might appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the tribes on the common frontier. It also proposed periodical meetings between British and Afghan frontier officials.

The Treaties of Afghanistan with Russia, Persia and Turkey.—Arnold Toynbee, in his survey of the position of the Soviet Government after the revolution of 1917, writes that during the first ten years of its existence in its constant efforts to break the cordon of the "Capitalist" phalanx, it turned to the three Middle Eastern countries.1 He points out that after the Armistice Great Britain caused alarm to these three countries and opened the way for two sets of treaties, the first of which was built up during the year 1921, and the second during the years 1925-1928. In the former year we have the Russo-Afghan Treaty. There were also the Turko-Afghan Treaty and the Perso-Afghan Treaty, thus, since each country had a treaty with Russia, constituting a system of treaties linking Afghanistan, Turkey and Persia with Soviet Russia, and proving clearly that Russia was determined to build up a strong entente with these Moslem powers, and to unite them with one another. The community of interests at this period was mainly, it would soom hostility towards Crost Ruitsin

Kandahar, and the British Envoy was informed of this promise.

The British-Russian Trade Agreement.—The almost simultaneous signing by Sir Robert Horne and M. Krassin on March 16, 1921, of a British-Russian Trade Agreement, which had been negotiated without the knowledge of the Government of India, added considerably to the difficulties of Dobbs, since it would be unreasonable to expect Afghanistan alone to maintain opposition to Russian policy, while such opposition had not been shown by Great Britain.

The Afghan Mission to Europe, 1920–1921.—It seems desirable at this point to refer to the Mission headed by Sirdar Muhammad Wali Khan, who conducted conversations in Russia in 1920 preliminary to the negotiation of a Russo-Afghan Treaty. From Moscow the Mission visited Berlin, where arrangements were made for the engagement of German engineers and air personnel. At Rome it was received by the King and the Foreign Minister and an Agreement was signed by Count Sforza for the despatch of a Commercial Mission to Afghanistan and for the initiation of reciprocal diplomatic relations. Lord Curzon protested against the conduct of the Italian Government in concluding this Agreement. A treaty

the conversation, declaring that these negotiations had nothing to do with him, but were the sole concern of the Government of India and the India Office. The letter to the Foreign Ministry was then presented but was unopened during the interview; the Amir's letter to the King was also handed over to Curzon.

It was most unfortunate that this Mission was despatched to Europe before the conclusion of the treaty which was being negotiated at Kabul; a different course would have prevented misunderstandings. The instructions received by the Afghan representatives to have no dealings with the India Office were equally unfortunate and placed the Foreign Office in a very difficult position. However, a more courteous and sympathetic attitude by Lord Curzon might well have avoided compromising the sufficiently difficult position at Kabul.

A Suspension of Negotiations.—To return to that city: the suspicious loss of the Mission mailbag of July 30 caused a suspension of negotiations. During this period, on August 28, Mahmud Tarzi had written a note couched in terms of studied rudeness, complaining of the reception accorded to the Afghan Mission in London. This letter he cancelled shortly afterwards, but it supplied

The Amir signs the Treaty.—However, on November 15, 1921, the Amir, maintaining to the last the "extraordinary fiction" that his Foreign Minister knew nothing of the discussions preliminary to this decision, signed the Treaty.¹ Complimentary messages were then exchanged and, in a friendly communication from the King-Emperor, Amanulla was accorded the style of "Your Majesty".

A Retrospect.—The difficulties of the British Envoy were serious enough owing to the intransigent attitude of the Afghans. But they were materially increased by the signature of the Russo-Afghan Treaty shortly after the commencement of negotiations, by the deterioration of the world situation, by disturbed political conditions in India and by the frigid reception of the Afghan Mission by Lord Curzon. Finally, as we have seen, the Amir arranged with the Russian envoy that Russian consulates should not be founded at Ghazni or Kandahar and, apparently acting on impulse, signed the treaty.

Much credit is due to the ability and patience displayed by Sir Henry Dobbs, and, to close this somewhat depressing account of the negotiations in a lighter vein, I quote the remarks made by Brigadier-General Muspratt, the Military Adviser to the Mission: "The tedium of the negotiations was varied by a succession of ultimatums

CHAPTER LIV

KING AMANULLA INSTITUTES REFORMS

Afghans are never at peace among themselves except when they are at war.—Pennell.

The Situation in the Near and Middle East.—Before dealing with the situation which confronted Major (later Sir Francis) Humphrys on founding the British Legation at Kabul, a brief reference to external affairs in which Afghanistan was deeply interested is desirable. To commence our survey with Turkey: by the autumn of 1922 the Turks had defeated and driven out the Greeks from Asia Minor. The neutral zone covering the Bosphorus and Dardanelles was threatened, and the French and Italians withdrew from the Asiatic shore, leaving the British unsupported. Hostilities were narrowly averted at Chanak, but a modus vivendi was arranged by the conclusion of the Mudania Convention

which dumbfounded the leaders of the Khilafat movement in India.

The Arrival of the First British Minister.—Humphrys, who founded the British Legation at Kabul in March 1922, was a distinguished frontier officer and was also thoroughly conversant with Afghan mentality. It was clear that Russia, by paying a handsome subsidy in money and munitions, occupied a strong position at Kabul, albeit the Amir must have realized that any Russian threat to India could only be made good at the expense of Afghanistan.

As regards the tribes on the Indo-Afghan frontier, the Amir and his advisers naturally disliked British determination to occupy the misnamed "independent" area and they fished continuously in these troubled waters. Needless to say, they particularly disliked the construction of the Khaibar railway. The Soviet Minister thus found numerous agents ready and competent to conduct his sinister intrigues with the Wazirs, Mahsuds and other turbulent tribesmen.

The Amir's Dream of Bukhara.—At the time of the arrival of Humphrys the Amir, who was keenly interested in the rebellion of Bukhara, and hoped to draw advantage from it, had despatched troops under Nadir Khan to the

Frontier.—As was to be expected, upon the frustration of the Central Asian dream, the Amir once again turned his attention to the tribes of the Indo-Afghan Frontier. The British policy of an advance on Razmak at this period involved bombing action against hostile tribesmen, who, in consequence, fled to Afghanistan. The Amir strongly protested, more especially when some casualties occurred in Afghan territory. A Court of Inquiry was, however, promptly held, and the British paid an indemnity of 17,000 rupees Kabuli. This settlement was of considerable political value, since it proved the readiness of the British Government to act justly and pay for losses inflicted on Afghans. Generally speaking, however, the complaints made by the Afghan Government were proved to be based on unsubstantial grounds and were mainly an expression of Afghan fears as to "the thinning of the prickly hedge ".

A Crisis in British-Afghan Relations.—Murders of British officers and their wives, abduction cases and raids were, however, numerous at this period and naturally caused grave anxiety. The Afghan Government at first failed to fulfil their promises in seizing the guilty and in other ways, but were finally induced to comply with the reasonable demands of the British Government. This

numbered seventy-one. Turkey was represented by Fakhri Pasha, a fanatical Anglophobe. He was accompanied by a staff of instructors whose services were not utilized — much to his disgust.

Afghan Relations with Russia.—The promised subsidy to Afghanistan began to be paid in part, but was kept a good deal in arrears. Munitions were also supplied to some extent, but there was no indication of the promised transfer to Afghanistan of the Panjdeh area, as stipulated in Article IX of the treaty. Moreover, the expulsion by the Amir of the Indian seditionists was much resented by the Russian Minister.

The Internal Position in April 1924.—The Amir had attempted to push through his reforms, some of which were excellent, but all of them were disliked by his fanatical and suspicious subjects. Especially obnoxious was the new Administrative Code, drafted by a Turkish adviser, which the Mullas declared to be unlawful. Apart from this, the people resented the appearance of foreign doctors and engineers at Kabul, who were seen strolling aimlessly about the city. Meanwhile the army had been neglected, was unpaid and had deteriorated.

The Khost Rebellion, March 1924-January 1925.—
A serious revolt, which was symptomatic of Afghan

schemes for educational progress and had caused a serious deterioration of administration.

The British had helped Amanulla by the supply, on payment, of Lewis guns, rifles and ammunition, while two aeroplanes which were also supplied did much to restore the *moral* of Kabul and discouraged the rebels. Against this assistance, the appearance in Khost of Abdul Karim, a slave-born son of ex-Amir Yakub Khan as a claimant to the throne, aroused charges of British bad faith, which the suspicious Afghans readily accepted.

The Army.—At this point some brief account of the condition of the army, on which Amanulla mainly depended, may be appropriate. The soldiers were hardly able to feed themselves on the miserable pittance they received, and were very badly equipped. Their position was practically that of menial servants when stationed as guards to Government offices, etc. Their military training was utterly inadequate and medical treatment was lacking. The staff and the senior regimental officers were recruited from among young Afghans who had received a smattering of modern military education, either in Europe or at Kabul, and the older officers bitterly resented being superseded by these inexperienced youths. Generally speaking, except in time of need, the Amir grudged

This grave miscarriage of justice caused the Italian Government to demand an official expression of regret, including a visit to the Italian Legation of the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs, the return of the blood money and an indemnity of £7000. Meanwhile they held up a cargo of munitions on which £25,000 had been paid; they also attached the Afghan Minister's bank balance at Rome, amounting to £15,000. Negotiations proceeded on the lines so familiar to the British, and both the Italian and Afghan Governments were prepared to withdraw their Legations. On August 14, a few hours before the members of the Italian Legation were due to leave Kabul, the Amir intervened and the case was settled by a visit of the Under-Secretary of the Afghan Foreign Office to the Italian Legation to apologize, the dismissal of the Chief of Police and an indemnity of £6000. This unfortunate episode resulted in the departure of most of the Italian subjects from Afghanistan.

The Afghan-German Treaty of 1926.—The German colony in Afghanistan prospered, and schemes for a bank, for an air service with Tashkent and for wireless installations were mooted but failed to materialize. German airmen flew the two aeroplanes mentioned above

direction of the annexation to the Soviet Union of Afghan Turkistan.

The Urtatagai Incident, 1925.—In December there was a collision between Afghan guards stationed on this island (situated in the Oxus) and some Soviet troops who drove them out and occupied it. For a while there was extreme tension at Kabul, but finally it was realized that the trouble was due to a misunderstanding and the Soviet troops were withdrawn.

The Russo-Afghan Security Pact, 1926.—Partly owing to the above incident, which increased Afghan apprehensions, a "Pact of Neutrality and Non-Aggression" was negotiated between the two countries. This colourless instrument, which was barren of material advantages to Afghanistan, was of little importance and in no way compensated for the blow to Russian prestige of the Urtatagai incident.

A Retrospect.—To conclude: an attempt has been made in this chapter to show how Afghanistan was shaping under new and very difficult conditions. Amanulla's basic ideas were sound and reasonable. He sought association with the more highly civilized Powers of Europe, partly to avoid being a pawn in Anglo-Russian relations, and also with a view to the introduction of

CHAPTER LV

KING AMANULLA VISITS EUROPE

During our stay in England such favours, acts of kindness, and sincere regards were so profusely shown us by Your Majesties, members of the Royal Family, Your Majesty's Government and the people of England, that they will always remain treasured in our memories.—Message of King Amanulla upon leaving England.

The Invitation to King Amanulla.—The first official intimation of King Amanulla's intention to visit Europe via India, and to include London among the capitals which he would visit, was conveyed to the Foreign Office by the Afghan Minister in London in September 1927, who also stated that the Amir would leave Kabul on December 7. On October 2 the British Chargé d'Affaires at Kabul personally delivered to King Amanulla a cordial invitation from King George to visit London. The Viceroy, Lord Irwin, also invited him to stay at Delhi on his way to Bombay if that arrangement would be

where addresses were presented to him. He made a speech dwelling on the friendly relations existing between the Afghan and British Governments and peoples and strongly urged religious and social tolerance, especially warning his Moslem hearers against being led astray by ignorant Mullas. This speech was intended to be his "message to the people of India".

The Visit to Bombay.—At Bombay, where Sir Francis Humphrys met the Amir and took over political charge, Lord Irwin, who had intended to meet His Majesty, was unfortunately unable to do so owing to an attack of malaria. This contretemps caused grave suspicions in the mind of the Afghan Foreign Minister, who behaved discourteously in various ways, more especially as regards

the question of seating at the banquet.

There was, without doubt, an intrigue on foot among the Afghan Ministers to make the visit a failure. This party had gained an initial success by refusing to accept the Viceroy's invitation to break the journey at Delhi, and wished to pursue their policy still further. However, thanks mainly to the firmness and tact of Humphrys, the plot was foiled. Generally speaking, the Amir was gratified by the warmth of his reception, by the playing of the Afghan National Anthem and by the display of

crowds whose greeting was most friendly. He attended a State banquet, visited the Pyramids, and Fuad conferred the grand cordon of the Order of Mehemet Ali on him. It was reported that Amanulla asked Fuad whether, in view of the recent war with Great Britain, he would be well received in England. The reply was: "The English are the most generous nation in the whole world and you will be welcomed like a long-lost son".

King Amanulla visits Italy.—Leaving Egypt, early in January 1928, Amanulla landed at Naples from the s.s. Italia, and at Rome was welcomed by the King and Queen while military aeroplanes wheeled over and around the airship Esperia. Troops were massed at the station and lined the streets. There was the usual State banquet and the King conferred the Collar of the Annunciation upon his royal visitor. Amanulla also visited the Pope and received the Order of the Golden Spur from His Holiness. He was also well received by the populace.

The Visit to Paris.—The Afghan royal party which had left Nice on January 25 was met in Paris on the following morning by President Doumergue at the railway station, where troops and bands were massed. The President drove with the King, while M. Briand escorted Queen Souriya in the second carriage, to the

King Amanulla visits Berlin.—On February 23, for the first time since the revolution, Berlin gave a welcome to royal guests. A deputation met the party on the Swiss frontier and, at Berlin, President Hindenburg, who was dressed in black clothes and wore a silk hat, received King Amanulla. In the subsequent drive through streets lined by the Reichswehr there was an unpleasant incident near the Brandenburg Gate. The former Crown Prince suddenly appeared in his red motor-car to be greeted by cheering, which was immediately countered by hissing. Later, visiting the Tempelhofer Field, the Amir was presented with a Junkers commercial aeroplane. During the visit hopes were expressed by Hindenburg and other officials that Afghanistan would make use of capable German doctors, teachers and engineers. During this visit, Amanulla was much embarrassed by the people shouting, "Long live the Monarchy and down with the Republic!"

King Amanulla reaches England.—On March 13 King Amanulla was greeted at Dover by the Prince of Wales. At Victoria Station he was welcomed by King George, Queen Mary, the Prime Minister and other officials and drove in a State procession to Buckingham Palace. Later, visits were paid to the Cenotaph and to the Unknown Warrian's Crosses at wight the reaches State has guet

which hoisted the Afghan flag, and, with the s.s. Alresford conveying Queen Souriya and the suite in her wake, steamed out of the harbour. The submarine then submerged, the movement causing apprehension to Her Majesty, but she was speedily reassured by a message which ran, "I send you my best wishes from under the sea". The King was then invited to fire two torpedoes at the target ship. He fired and was immensely gratified by the receipt of a signal that both shots were hits. At a later date he visited the Atlantic Fleet and witnessed various demonstrations by destroyers, submarines and aircraft.

Their Majesties were also the guests of the Lord Mayors of Liverpool, Manchester and Sheffield. The speech at Liverpool, it may be noted, contained a Persian couplet, the translation of which ran:

> May the King's body be ever without pain, May his sitting ever be upon treasure, May the commander of his army ever be glad, May his mind be serene and his treasury full!

The tour also included the Royal Observatory at Greenwich and the University of Oxford, where His Majesty, who was praised for his determination to found a Uni-

Order, dispelled any suspicions that they may have entertained. Moreover, the warm popular welcome that greeted them wherever they went, alike in towns and in the countryside, made the royal guests fully realize the genuine nature of British hospitality. A point that was noted during the visit was Amanulla's indifference towards Moslem circles and institutions in England, where, indeed, he refused to receive an address. Again, the calm efficiency of the police never failed to excite his admiration. Of Windsor Castle he remarked: "It is the perfect abode of mighty Kings who have reigned through the centuries", and, on driving away from it, he experienced similar feelings to those his father had expressed on leaving India after his visit to Lord Minto. Indeed, a member of his suite with true Oriental hyperbole exclaimed: "No Englishman has the right to go to heaven when he is dead, since he has already enjoyed it on earth!" To conclude these remarks: The Times aptly compared the visit to England of Amanulla with that of Peter the Great of Russia.

The Visit to Russia.—On May 4 the Afghan royal party reached Moscow, where they were welcomed by the President, Mikhael Kalinin. They inspected the Kremlin, and there was a gala performance of Eastern music at the State Orang House. They also witnessed

Ghazi, and a banquet was given in honour of the royal visitors. At this function their host referred to the common origin of the two peoples, to their successful struggles for independence and he praised the work of social restoration undertaken by King Amanulla. In reply, the royal guest expressed his affection and admiration for Turkey and declared that "our two sister nations have the same policy and the same duties. Afghanistan is ready to perform those duties."

King Amanulla visits Persia.—At Constantinople where, on his return from Angora, he was received with much enthusiasm, Amanulla spent three days in witnessing a regatta, visiting the Military Academy and in sightseeing. He also saluted the troops at a march past. He then proceeded to Persia and, at Tehran, he was warmly welcomed by Shah Riza Pahlavi, who is one of the outstanding figures of this generation. While at this capital, in order to accentuate the new order introduced by the Shah, he personally drove the Queen and her sister into the bazaars.

The End of the Journey.—The long journey was finally ended by Amanulla driving his Rolls Royce via Meshed and Kandahar to Kabul, where his return was celebrated by three days' holiday, with general rejoicings

territory, the negotiations broke down. It is noteworthy that owing to the change in the international situation the influence that Russia had exercised over the Middle Eastern states had waned. In proof of this, whereas the treaties of 1921 were all signed at Moscow, in 1925-1928, only one out of eight instruments was signed at the Russian capital, as against six at either Tehran, Angora or Kabul. Moreover, at this period, Afghanistan, Turkey and Persia were extending their treaty relations, Turkey, for instance, concluding a treaty of neutrality, conciliation and judicial regulation with Italy in 1928. This extension of relations with the West was foreshadowed in the Turko-Afghan Treaty of 1928.

To quote Toynbee: "By 1928 it had come to be realized in the Middle East that the aggressions of the Western Powers, which had evoked the defensive treaties of 1921, was a temporary after-effect of the General War of 1914–1918... and that Western Governments, increasingly sensitive to opinion at home, were showing a correspondingly greater disinclination to act with a high hand." ¹

¹ Op. cit. for 1928, p. 366.

CHAPTER LVI

THE TRAGEDY OF KING AMANULLA

Haste is from the Devil.--Persian Saying.

The Five-Day Speech of Amanulla.—Upon his safe return to Kabul from his long journey, King Amanulla delivered a speech which lasted for five days. It contained a full narrative of his tour in Europe, Turkey and Persia, and referred with pride to the treaties which had been signed with many countries; it continued with an account of the impressions he had formed and concluded with a detailed outline of the policy he intended the Afghan nation to adopt. It was, indeed, a Homeric speech, which ended with the King embracing a soldier, an official, a civilian and a student as representatives of his subjects.

The Conflict between the Old Order and the New.—
During the long absence of their King the Mullas had

that, when the village women wore veils, the Queen would also cover her face in public. The Mullas thereupon departed thoroughly disgruntled.

The Formation of a Legislative Assembly, 1928.—In September a Jirga, under the instructions of Amanulla, decreed the establishment of the first Afghan Parliament to be elected by the votes of all literate Afghans. It constituted a Legislative Assembly of 150 members selected from the Grand Assembly to sit at Kabul for eight months every year. At its meeting, Queen Souriya was proclaimed Queen and the King's ten-year-old son Heir-Apparent. The length of compulsory service in the army was also increased from two to three years and all exemptions were abolished. Moreover, a national levy of 3 rupees for every male and a month's pay from every official was ordered to cover the purchase of armaments. The question of polygamy was then brought up, and Amanulla declared that it was the chief cause of corruption and that any Government servant who took a second wife would have to tender his resignation. Yet another proposal to fix the age of marriage for girls at 18 years and for youths at 22 years excited such strong opposition that it was withdrawn.

The Scheme for Education.—Amanulla decided that

realized that Mustafa Kemal was not only a victorious general, who was supported by a disciplined, well-paid army, but that Turks and, in a lesser degree, Persians, had been in touch with Europeans for many generations, whereas Afghans living, generally speaking, in isolated valleys in snow-clad ranges or on wide semi-desert plains, had hardly ever met with Europeans, whom their Mullas invariably termed Kafirs or Infidels.

Indeed, to anyone acquainted with Afghan tribesmen, it was evident that the issue of orders for new unpopular reforms almost weekly, without the loyal support of the army, would soon arouse the spirit of revolt. The first notice of tribal unrest, as it was euphemistically termed, was a rising of the Shinwaris who, living up to their reputation for lawlessness, attacked Jalalabad and burned the hangars of the local aerodrome, together with its contents. Failing to capture the city by blowing up a section of its wall, the rebels cut off its water-supply and closed the Peshawar-Kabul road. So intense was the indignation of the Mullas against the abolition of the purdah and the education of girls on European lines that they openly denounced Amanulla as a Kafir.

The Rise of Habibulla, "the Child of the Water-Carrier".

—In the district of Kuhistan to the north of Kabul, a

men and commenced his attack on Kabul by incessant sniping at night with the idea of alarming its citizens. Amanulla had despatched a strong force under Abdul Ali Jan to subdue the Shinwaris, and the capital was weakly held, while the feeling of the city was hostile to its King. News reached Kabul that the royal troops had been defeated by the Shinwaris, whereupon Habibulla increased his sniping which frightened the merchants and shopkeepers, who began to shut their doors and to hide their goods. Amanulla used his artillery without much success against bodies of rebels who made feints outside the walls, and at last, Habibulla, who had been joined by many of the unpaid soldiers, attacked the city in earnest.

The Abdication.—It was in vain that on January 7 Amanulla published a proclamation by the terms of which he cancelled most of his obnoxious reforms. On January 14, realizing that his soldiers had deserted him, "of his own free will", as he declared, Amanulla abdicated in favour of his elder brother, Inayatulla Khan, and escaped by car to Kandahar.

The Abdication of Inayatulla Khan.—The position of Inayatulla was an impossible one. Left in the Citadel, surrounded by a small body of personal servants, he was

tageous position. Humphrys, however, speaking through the closed gates, warned the would-be invaders of the immunity from attack of all foreign Legations. Thanks to his personality and intimate knowledge of the language, he averted this danger, but, throughout this period, the buildings suffered from shell fire while most of the window panes were broken by rifle bullets. The British women were thus living in daily risk of their lives, only one central building being at all safe. However, they bravely carried on.

The Evacuation of Women and Children.—The British Government adopted a policy of the strictest neutrality between the various claimants for the throne, in which category Amanulla was classed. In view of the seriousness of the situation, it was decided to evacuate the British women and children. Fortunately the Kabul landing-ground was available — albeit under fire at times — and the Royal Air Force supplied a Vickers-Victoria machine which was specially constructed for the transport of troops, together with escorting aeroplanes. After carrying the British to safety, members of the foreign colony were evacuated; the Russian colony also proceeded to Tashkent by air. It is to the credit of Habibulla, who wished to stand well with the British,

would be ruined under the new régime, were equally anxious to end it and, considering Amanulla unacceptable to the nation, initiated a search for a leader, who would overthrow Habibulla. Meanwhile the new Amir was attempting without much success to form an administration. He had found the treasury empty and immediately resorted to "squeezing" wealthy merchants to secure funds, with which to pay his supporters. Supplies were very scarce in the city, since there was no confidence as to payment being made under the reign of terror which was inaugurated.

The Proclamation of the New Amir.—One of Habibulla's earliest acts consisted of the issue of a proclamation signed by eighty religious leaders and officials declaring that Amanulla's heresies and the obnoxious innovations which he had introduced justified his dismissal. The proclamation announced that arrears of revenue would be written off, that conscription would be abolished, as well as all taxes that were additional to the lawful revenue. The new schools were also abolished. The proclamation then attacked the abandonment of Islamic clothing, especially the turban, the unveiling of women, the education of girls and the ex-King's objection to growing beards and clipping the middle portion of the capital and its vicinity and that conditions in Afghanistan were chaotic, it was decided to withdraw the British Minister and his staff. The last to leave was the gallant Humphrys, who bore with him the British flag which he had kept flying with such courage. The King heartily congratulated Humphrys on his safe return. His Majesty also congratulated the Royal Air Force on the great feat which it had performed. In eighty-two flights, carried out with consummate skill over snow-clad ranges, in the depth of winter, and in a country practically devoid of landing grounds, British flying officers had evacuated 580 passengers of many nationalities without a single casualty.

The Last Attempt of Amanulla.—In the early spring of 1929 Amanulla, who, as mentioned above, had won the support of the Durrani tribe, despatched an advance guard 1000 strong to Kalat-i-Ghilzai. Early in April his main body, 4000 strong, which included regular troops, was reported to have reached Shah Jui, situated between Kalat-i-Ghilzai and Ghazni. According to fairly reliable statements the royal troops, supported by a large contingent of Wardaks, had inflicted considerable losses on the opposing Sulayman Khel section of the Ghilzai tribe and were about to enter Ghazni. However, fear of

party was a delicate one, but was carried through successfully. There were difficulties raised in the case of Inayatulla, but Persian visas were finally secured for him and his party, which proceeded up the Persian Gulf bound for Tehran, while the other Sirdars went in different directions. Finally, on June 22, 1929, the

ex-King and his reduced party sailed for Europe.

Summary.—It is not difficult to analyse the causes of King Amanulla's failure. He must have been badly served by his ministers, but, even so, to force schemes of reform on conservative tribesmen without the support of a well-disciplined and well-paid army made disaster certain, not only for himself but for Afghanistan. While reigning he showed no fear in mixing with the wild, treacherous tribesmen, but, as a leader in the field, he lacked coolness and decision. He had certainly not inherited the staunchness of his grandfather and father. At the bar of history he stands condemned for having brought upon Afghanistan the scourge of the "Water-Carrier's Son ". Yet, in his defence, it may be pleaded that many of the reforms for which he lost his throne were desirable and will in the future gradually be carried out.

CHAPTER LVII

NADIR KHAN OVERTHROWS THE BRIGAND HABIBULLA AND IS ELECTED KING OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan affords an interesting contrast between the extremes of feudalism and democracy as represented by the tribesmen and townsfolk. The Government is an autocracy vested in the hands of one family. It is beneficent so far as the country is concerned, but ruthless with regard to its political opponents. And there is a gap of a thousand years between the point of view of the officials, many of them young intellectuals educated abroad, responsible for the modernisation of the cities, and that of the tent-dwelling nomads, unchanged since the days of Alexander or Genghiz Khan.—ROSITA FORBES.

Ali Ahmad Jan and Jalalabad.—In the last chapter the flight of Amanulla, that of his brother Inayatulla and the occupation of Kabul by Habibulla, "the Son of the Water-Carrier", have been described.

Two days later Ali Ahmad Jan, the brother of *Uliya Hazrat*, who had been in command of a force that had been despatched to quell the rebellion of the Shinwaris, proclaimed himself Amir of the Fastern Province but.

CH. LVII

Nadir Khan appears in Afghanistan.—Nadir Khan, the future King, was recovering from an attack of pleurisy at Nice when he heard of the capture of Kabul by the brigand Bacha-i-Sakau. Carried on board the P. & O. steamer on a stretcher, he reached Peshawar on February 28. He decided to proceed to Khost, where he had commanded the force which, as we know, had besieged Thal. Two of his brothers accompanied him, while a third, Muhammad Hashim, proceeded to the vicinity of Jalalabad to raise the tribes in that neighbourhood.

The General Position.—Nadir's reception in Khost was most disappointing, owing to tribal jealousies. Accordingly, he travelled to the outskirts of Gardez, where he opened negotiations with the Ghilzais, the Mangals and the Jajis. The general feeling among the fighting races was anger that a despised Tajik, or peasant, should usurp the throne. On the other hand the tribesmen much enjoyed looting and reviving ancient feuds. Treachery was everywhere, and Ghaus-ud-din, the Chief of the Ahmadzai Ghilzais, who had declared himself Amir of Ghazni, was playing a double game. By the flight of Amanulla the contest had become a straight fight between Habibulla and Nadir Khan. Habibulla, who occupied a central position with all its advantages, The Defeats of Nadir Khan.—Nadir Khan, at first, had no luck. He engaged the Kabul forces at Baraki, but was defeated by the treachery of Ghaus-ud-din, who attacked his rear and compelled him to retire to the Mongol country. Patiently reorganizing his force, he failed to hold Gardez, which was captured on June 26. Again, on July 10, his second offensive in the Logar Valley was defeated.

At this period Habibulla felt strong enough to despatch troops who occupied Kandahar. The irrepressible Ali Ahmad Jan, who had hoisted his flag in that city on the flight of Amanulla, was seized and taken prisoner to Kabul. There savage Habibulla nailed his arms and feet to the ground and then drove a nail

through his head from temple to temple.

The Propaganda of Nadir Khan.—Many men would have thrown up the sponge at these repeated reverses, but Nadir, in spite of his bad health, remained undismayed. He knew his fellow-countrymen. In July he was able to publish a weekly paper aptly named Islah, or "Peace", with the result that his appeals gradually produced their effect on the Kabul Khel Wazirs, and these doughty fighters of the North-West Frontier decided to send a lashkar to his aid, as did also the Mohmands.

Kandahar city without encountering much opposition, but did not capture the citadel.

The Final Offensive.—On September 18 the Wazir lashkar, which played the leading part in the third act of the drama, joined Nadir Khan's forces at Ali Khel and, marching on Kabul through the Logar Valley, reached the historical battlefield of Charasia on October 6. There the final battle was fought. Habibulla's troops were entrenched in this very strong position but, deceived by a feigned flight of the attackers, they left their trenches and pursued them. The Wazirs, delighted at the success of their ruse, suddenly turned round and, carrying all before them, captured the position and drove the enemy into headlong flight. At this juncture Sirdar Shahwali, who was in command, received reinforcements, and, on October 10, Kabul city was captured. Three days later, after a bombardment, the citadel was also taken.

Nadir Khan proclaimed King.—Nadir Khan entered Kabul as a victor. He was received with enthusiasm and was urged to accept the sovereignty, but at first declined to do so. In the event, the cry of the tribesmen that they would immediately disperse to their homes if he persisted in his refusal turned the scales. In this

by the National Assembly. The miscreants were shot and each tribesman fired a bullet into the corpse of Habibulla so as to be able to boast, "I helped to kill the Bacha-i-Sakau".

The Early Career of King Nadir Shah.—In Chapter L a brief account is given of the Musahiban family, as it was termed, and it was shown that the new King was descended from both of the ruling branches of the Durrani tribe. Born at Dehra Dun on April 9, 1883, he was educated in that town and learned English, Arabic and Urdu. In 1900 his grandfather, Sirdar Yahya Khan, obtained permission for the family to return to Afghanistan, where, in 1903, Nadir Khan was appointed to command a regiment of Household Cavalry and was promoted general a year or two later. He accompanied King Habibulla to India. His position after the assassination of that monarch and his actions as a general in the Third Afghan War have been already recorded. He continued to be a leading personage at Kabul under Amanulla until, owing to his opposition to the injudicious haste that that ruler displayed in his reforms, he fell out of favour and retired to the post of Afghan Minister at Paris. This appointment he resigned owing to illness, which did not, however, prevent him from responding to the trumpet-call brief reference to the sinister activities of some Moslem inhabitants of this area, who are termed Red Shirts, is desirable. Their moving spirits were Abdul Ghaffar and his brother Khan Sahib, sons of a landowner on the Peshawar border. Both brothers were educated at the Church Missionary Society School at Peshawar. Khan Sahib also took a medical degree at Edinburgh and, at one time, was medical officer of the Guides. Their sister married the *Haji* of Turangzai, a notable firebrand.

Abdul Ghaffar in 1919 started a violent agitation against the Rowlatt Act, and, but for the defeat of the Afghans in the Khaibar Pass, the trouble would have been serious. Later, the brothers joined the Congress party and organised an unscrupulous campaign of hatred and

vituperation against the British Raj.

In 1930 this occasioned the most serious crisis with which the British authorities had been faced since 1897. The Peshawar district was invaded with extraordinary rapidity from the west by large numbers of Afridis and threatened on the north by Mohmand and Utman Khel lashkars. Elsewhere, too, as in the Tochi Valley and Southern Waziristan, posts were attacked, while attempts were made by hostile Mullas to raise Mohmand and Bajaur lashkars. The Kurram Valley was also invaded.

Call history

A Soviet-Afghan Treaty.—In July 1931 a new treaty of neutrality and non-aggression between Russia and Afghanistan was negotiated. By its terms each Government undertook not to tolerate the existence in its territory of organizations or of individuals pursuing objectives which were hostile to the other. The treaty was to run for five years and included the neutrality of the one Power if the other Power were involved in war.

The Position in 1931.—It is interesting to note the steady progress made under Nadir Shah's beneficent rule. Shah Mahmud Khan, the Minister for War, after a campaign in the northern provinces, which involved much fighting, had subdued the lawless elements. He also had driven Ibrahim Beg, the "Robin Hood" of Bukhara, across the Oxus into the arms of the Soviet troops. Ibrahim Beg had been one of Enver Pasha's associates.

Peace thus reigned throughout Afghanistan, and the steady improvement of communications made for stability of government in this mountainous country. Nadir Shah was careful to restore to the *Mullas* their privileges and had rescinded the secularization of the laws and the abolition of *purdah*, the two changes which had most embittered them. He felt the necessity for reforms, but realized the

prohibition of alcoholic beverages; third, the establishment of a military school and of an arsenal for the manufacture of modern weapons; fourth, the maintenance of the diplomatic relations established by King Amanulla with foreign powers. Other measures included the repair of telegraphs and telephones and the reconditioning of roads; the collection of all arrears of public revenue; the development of commercial relations with foreign powers; the advancement of public instruction; and finally, the reconstruction of the old Council of State and the appointment of a Prime Minister who would form a Cabinet, subject to the royal approval. The Cabinet which was formed consisted of Shah Wali Khan as Prime Minister, with Shah Mahmud Khan as War Minister. A Minister of the Interior and a Foreign Minister were also appointed.

The Support of the leading Mulla of the Ghilzai Tribe.— King Nadir was especially fortunate in securing the strong support of the Hazrat Sahib of Shorbazar, the leading Mulla of the Ghilzai tribe and the brother of Shir Aza, his staunch supporter. In a speech he made to Afghan students this divine exhorted them to study the occidental as well as the oriental sciences on the ground that "all sciences are useful, being light from the determined to adopt measures for the substantial reduction of armaments, the vote was adopted by forty-one votes to two, with eight abstentions. The two votes against adoption were those of Germany and the U.S.S.R., while Afghanistan and Turkey figured among the abstaining states.

CHAPTER LVIII

THE ASSASSINATION OF KING NADIR SHAH AND THE ACCESSION OF KING ZAHIR SHAH, 1933

Master of Masters, O Maker of heroes!
Clean-slicing, swift-finishing,
Making death beautiful,
Life but a coin to be staked in the pastime,
Whose issue is more than the transfer of being —
I am the will of God,
I am the Sword.

HENLEY.

The Plot of Gholam Nabi Khan, 1932.—When the revolution led by the brigand Habibulla broke out Gholam Nabi Khan, as mentioned in the previous chapter, acting in the interests of Amanulla, captured Mazar-i-Sharif, but upon hearing of the abdication of that monarch he had retired across the Oxus. After the accession of Nadir Shah, Gholam Nabi, tendering his submission returned to Afghanistan. Proofs were

who were drug addicts. Upon his arrest he declared that his action constituted a protest against the British being permitted to take control of the tribes of the North-West Frontier. In the same year another member of the same body, after failing to reach the British Minister, murdered the Mir Munshi and an English chauffeur. The third tragedy was by far the most serious. On that November day King Nadir Shah was attacked by some of his own trusted servants just outside the royal harem. The assassins shot him three times and then despatched him with daggers. The cause of this murder was revenge for the execution of Gholam Nabi, the chief assassin being the son of one of that traitor's servants. He struck exactly one year after the death of Gholam Nabi.

Thus fell King Nadir Shah, who ranks among the greatest rulers of Afghanistan. Without money or following, and suffering from very bad health, by sheer force of personality and courage, he had rescued his country, which was groaning under the tyranny of a cruel usurper, and had thereby saved it from a period of anarchy that might well have lasted for a generation. On ascending the throne, by a blend of firmness, tact and kindness he had succeeded in bestowing the priceless gift of peace on Afghanistan and had laid anew the foundations

Shah, but these forebodings were happily falsified.

King Muhammand Zahir Shah.—The son of King Nadir Shah, who ascended the throne under such tragical circumstances, was born in 1914 and accompanied his father to France at the age of ten. There he studied for six years and learned French well; he also speaks English. Returning to Afghanistan in 1930, in the following year he married Princess Umaira, the daughter of his uncle Sirdar Ahmad Shah, and the union has been blessed by the birth of two sons and two daughters. In this year he attended the Military College at Kabul and, in 1932, was appointed Assistant War Minister.

Zahir Shah has clearly inherited his father's ability, as is proved by the keen interest he takes in his army and, more especially, in his air force. In short, he is essentially a virile Afghan, devoted to manly sports. Under the guidance of his uncle, the able Sirdar Hashim Khan, His Majesty is studying the intricate problems with which Afghanistan is faced and is winning golden opinions by the courtesy of his manners, alike to the rich and to the poor.

The Afghan Constitution.—The Government is a constitutional monarchy, supreme legislative power being invested in the King, the Senate and the National

the adverse balance of trade which existed. After an unsuccessful attempt in 1931, two years later, a National Bank was founded to deal with exchange, of which it was granted a monopoly, while the commercial side was dealt with by the formation of the Ashami (or Joint-Stock) Company. To it monopolies were granted which covered (a) the import of sugar and petroleum products; (b) purchases and sales on behalf of Government; and (c) exploitation of all mines and the establishment of industrial concerns in Afghanistan.

The Economic Policy of the Government.—By way of preface to the following remarks on the commercial policy of the Government, it must be remembered that Afghanistan is a poor country which supports an agricultural and pastoral people, many of whom perforce lead a nomadic life.

The chief export, which is a Government monopoly, is the sale of Karakuli lambskins, averaging perhaps one million sterling per annum. The second important export, which is valued at perhaps one-half of the former, is the fruit crop. The fact that the chief article of export is distinctly a luxury commodity, depending alike on prosperity and on changing fashion, constitutes a distinct weakness in the economic system of the country.

have been made, is petrol. In 1937 a concession to search for oil over an area covering 270,000 square miles in Western Afghanistan was granted to the Inland Exploration Company of New York. The existence of oil was, I understand, proved, in the Herat area, but most unfortunately the small size of the field, the distance to the coast of the Arabian Sea, involving the construction of an expensive pipe-line, and the insignificant local demand for the product, compelled the company to relinquish the concession.

German Mining Concession.—In the autumn of 1937 a company termed "Afghanistan Mines Ltd." was registered under joint German and Afghan management. Although minerals probably exist in the country, the company met with little or no success and the concession has been relinquished.

To conclude this brief sketch: in December 1938 the reports show that while exports have been maintained, imports have decreased, with the satisfactory result that the year closed with a favourable balance of 6,119,609 Indian rupees, a result on which the Government may be justly congratulated.

Modern Afghanistan in the Making.—Nadir Shah, before his untimely death, had laid the foundations of

mistrust its policy and abominate its atheism.

The Position on the North-West Frontier.—Nor is the position in relation to the restless fanatical Wazirs and their neighbours lacking in delicacy. For generations, as we have seen, the Amirs have used the tribes on the British side of the frontier as an important card in their dealings with that Government, the ex-King Amanulla being notorious in this respect. However, under the present conditions, with a government which has established law, order and education in Afghanistan, is it not reasonable to hope that the tribesmen who are now living between two organized areas of civilization may gradually give up their passion for feuds and raiding and become law-abiding citizens? Recent reports from the North-West Frontier tend to show that roads, education and hospitals, together with settled conditions under the pax Britannica, are beginning to be appreciated by the warlike tribesmen, if only from the commercial point of view, as affording access to markets for their crops.

The Position of Women.—As we have seen, Amanulla lost his throne, partly owing to his insistence, among other reforms, of women, headed by the Queen, throwing aside their veils. Today women in the towns are veiled as completely as before, in spite of the abolition of the

the League of Nations.—When the League of Nations came into existence in January 1920 Amanulla was in sullen mood after his defeat in the Third Afghan War, and took no part in its formation. The passing years, however, changed the situation, but for more than a decade, following the policy of holding aloof from the League favoured by the Soviet Government, neither Afghanistan nor Turkey desired membership in it.

Persia had already joined the League before negotiating her treaty with Russia in 1921; Turkey followed in the same year and the Soviet Union, undoubtedly influenced by the militant policy of Japan, joined the League in September 1934, to be followed a few days later by

Afghanistan.

The Four-Power Treaty of Saadabad, 1937.—In 1934 there arose a dispute between Iraq and Persia as to the rights of each Power on the Shatt-el-Arab. The tangled question came up before the League Council in January 1935, but without result. However, the case was subsequently removed from the agenda of the Council Meeting and the two Powers came to terms. More than this, in the autumn of 1935, preliminary negotiations for the formation of a Middle Eastern Pact were undertaken on the initiative of Persia, with the strong support

334

to a seat on the Council of the League of Nations.

Of this important treaty the Istanbul Correspondent of The Times writes: 1 " Its signature will receive general approbation, inasmuch as it indicates that these four Moslem countries — some of them so long strangers or enemies one to the other — are now desirous of co-operating for their mutual benefit". It remains to add that, owing to the treaty of Iraq with Great Britain, and the treaty of Turkey with Soviet Russia, the Pact of Saadabad was signed with the approval of both the above-named Powers.

The Policy of the British Government.—In a recent speech 2 Lord Zetland, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, made the following statesmanlike declaration: "A strong, stable and friendly Afghan administration has always been a British interest, and never more so perhaps than it is today, and if in the past we sought to secure our interests by a measure of control over and by granting subsidies to the Government of that country, we have now recognized the advantages of securing them through the agency of a stable, friendly and independent kingdom; for we are satisfied that the friendship of an independent sovereign State is a surer foundation on which to rest our common interests than a State subject to

uncles, Muhammad Hashim, the Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud, the Defence Minister, who visited us here in London in 1937 and 1936 respectively, and Shah Wali, who was King Nadir's first representative at the Court of St. James. . . . The two countries have likewise a common interest in the maintenance of peace in the tribal areas which lie between their respective boundaries, and when, as unhappily sometimes occurs, we are driven by the lawlessness of the tribes to embark upon military action against them, we always bear closely in mind the possible repercussions of any action which we may have in mind upon the tribes upon the Afghan side of the border and upon the interests, consequently, of the Afghan régime."

The Strategical Position of Afghanistan.—Before concluding this work it seems desirable to make a few remarks on the strategical situation of the country. The Afghan army is recruited by a mixture of compulsory service for two years and of voluntary service for life. Officers are recruited for life. The peace strength of the army is 60,000, but its armed tribesmen, who may be half a million strong, constitute a formidable second line. Mechanized transport has been introduced to some extent, and a small air force has been established.

country to be crossed presents few physical difficulties and is suitable for tanks, whippets, and lorries, albeit the roads are little more than tracks in most cases. If Persia were allied to Afghanistan, she might be able to attack the Russian lines of communication to some small extent.

We now take the other side of the situation. From the days of the Moghul Empire, Kabul and Kandahar have been held to be the Keys of India, and I should not envy the position of a Russian army which could only be supplied by a single-track railway from an immense distance, whether we reckon from Moscow via Orenburg and Bukhara or via the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea; the distance in both cases is about 2,200 miles. I have travelled along both these routes on more than one occasion, and was struck by the lack of towns of any importance and of commercial activity throughout. The recently built town of Magnitogorodsk in the Ural Mountains, with its rich iron mines, will, however, have improved the Russian position to some extent. There is also the recent but badly constructed Turk-Sib railway, which runs from the Trans-Siberian railway at Novo-Sibirsk to a junction between Pishpok (Frunze) and the Sir Daria, not far from Tashkent. But the whole province of Russian Turkistan is now devoted to growing cotton,

commercial centres in close proximity and rich corn lands, all of which are lacking in the vicinity of Northern Afghanistan. Consequently a Russian attempt to invade India across Afghanistan, more especially in view of the proved weakness of her army, would, in my opinion, be doomed to disastrous failure.

EPILOGUE

In concluding this work I would quote wise Doctor Johnson, who remarked: "Courage is reckoned the greatest of all virtues, because, unless a man has that virtue, he has no security for preserving any other". By a happy coincidence Abdur Rahman Khan, that truly great Amir who reunited all the provinces of Afghanistan under his sway, once remarked to Sir Mortimer Durand that all the virtues could be grafted on the stock of courage, without which no nation could prosper. I have been in touch with Afghans for many years and

APPENDIX A

THE SIMLA MANIFESTO

SIMLAH, October 1, 1838.

The Right Hon. the Governor-General of India having, with the concurrence of the Supreme Council, directed the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus, his Lordship deems it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons which have led to this important measure.

It is a matter of notoriety that the treaties entered into by the British Government in the year 1832, with the Ameers of Sindh, the Newab of Bhawalpore, and Maharajah Runjeet Singh, had for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facilitate the extension of commerce, and to gain for the British nation in Central Asia that legitimate influence which an interchange of benefits would naturally produce.

With a view to invite the aid of the de facto rulers of Afghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties, Captain Burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mahomed Khan, the chief of Caubul. The original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial nature. Whilst Captain Burnes, however, was on his journey to Governor-General, to the effect that, in the meantime, hostilities on his part should be suspended.

It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor-General that a Persian army was besieging Herat; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan, for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of her Majesty's Mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.

After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless negotiation at Caubul, it appeared that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Governor-General could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of his Highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandisement and ambition injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India; and that he openly threatened, in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Afghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was well apprised, and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Government, compelled Captain Rurnes to leave Caubul without having effected

their cause; and the Governor-General would yet indulge the hope that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence, until succours shall reach them from British India. In the meantime, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British Government, have been, by a succession of events, more and more openly manifested. The Governor-General has recently ascertained by an official despatch from Mr. M'Neill, Her Majesty's Envoy, that his Excellency has been compelled, by a refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the Persian Government, to quit the Court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two Governments. The necessity under which Great Britain is placed of regarding the present advance of the Persian arms into Afghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah, under the express order of her Majesty's Government.

The Chiefs of Candahar (brothers of Dost Mahomed Khan of Caubul) have avowed their adherence to the Persian policy, with the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests of the British nation in India, and have been openly

assisting in the operations against Herat.

In the crisis of affairs consequent upon the retirement of our Envoy from Caubul, the Governor-General felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories.

His attention was naturally drawn at this conjuncture to the position and claims of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united

schemes of conquest and aggrandisement.

After serious and mature deliberation, the Governor-General was satisfied that a pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, whose popularity throughout Afghanistan had been proved to his Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities. Having arrived at this determination, the Governor-General was further of opinion that it was just and proper, no less from the position of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, than from his undeviating friendship towards the British Government, that His Highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations.

Mr. Macnaghten was accordingly deputed in June last to the Court of His Highness, and the result of his mission has been the conclusion of a triplicate treaty by the British Government, the Maharajah, and Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, whereby his Highness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his ancestors. The friends and enemies of any one of the contracting parties have been declared to be the friends and enemies of all.

Various points have been adjusted, which had been the subjects of discussion between the British Government and his Highness the Maharajah, the identity of whose interests with those of the Honourable Company has now been made apparent to all the surrounding States. A guaranteed independence will, upon favourable conditions, be tendered to the Ameers of Sindh, and the integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be fully respected: while by the measures completed, or in progress.

out the approaching operations, British influence will be sedulously employed to further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile differences, to secure oblivion of injuries, and to put an end to the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and happiness of the Afghans have been impaired. Even to the chiefs, whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the British Government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable treatment, on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from opposition to that course of measures which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of their country.

By order of the Right Hon. Governor-General of India.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General

APPENDIX B

THE TREATY OF CAPITULATION

[The following are translations of the different documents referred to in the above-mentioned chapter, marking the different stages of the treaty under which the English evacuated Caubul. No. I is the draft of the original treaty which Macnaghten was negotiating at the time of his death. The articles, as proposed by the Afghan chiefs, are in inverted commas. The observations which follow contain the assent of the English representative. And the *Remarks* in brackets are those of the Afghan chiefs; the original being in the handwriting of Akbar Khan.]

I

Rough Draft of the Treaty with the Assent of the English Authorities

Article 1. "There shall be no delay in the departure of the English Army."

Agreed to. They will march twenty-four hours after having

It is agreed to. Do you name some proper person to accompany them.

[Remark. A relation of the Naib or of Mehtur Moossa.]

Article 5. "The Candahar force, and all other British troops in Afghanistan, shall quickly depart for Hindostan."

It is agreed. Let proper people accompany them.

[Remark. Newab Jubbur Khan.]

Article 6. "The whole of the property of the Ameer (Dost Mahomed Khan) which is in the hands of the English Government, or of individual officers, shall be left behind."

It is agreed to. Whatever is with the public authorities is known to you; whatever is with private officers point out and take.

Article 7. "Whatever property belonging to the English cannot be carried away, shall be taken care of, and sent by the first opportunity."

It is agreed to: but we have given over all that remains to the Newab.

[Remark. The guns, ordnance stores, and muskets, must be given to me.]

Article 8. "In case Shah Soojah should wish to remain at Caubul, we will give him yearly a subsistence of a lakh of rupees."

It is agreed to. Do whatever you think advisable, wishing to show your friendship for us.

Article 9. "In case the family of Shah Soojah should be left behind from want of carriage-cattle we will fix the place now

Article 12. "Four English gentlemen shall remain as hostages in Caubul until Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and the other Afghans shall have arrived at Peshawur, when the English gentlemen shall be allowed to depart."

It is agreed to.

[Remark. Let there be six hostages.]

Article 13. "Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan and Sirdar Oosman Khan shall accompany the English army to Peshawur, and take them there in safety." ¹

It is agreed to.

[Remark. Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan.]

Article 14. "After the departure of the English, friendly relations shall be continued, — i.e., that the Afghan Government, without the consent and advice of the English Government, shall not form any treaty or connection with a foreign power; and should they (the Afghans) ever ask assistance against foreign invasion, the English Government will not delay in sending such assistance."

It is agreed to, as far as we are concerned; but in this matter the Governor-General of India alone has authority. We will do our best to bring about friendship between the two governments; and by the blessing of the Almighty this wish will be obtained, and friendship exist for the future.

Article 15. "Any one who may have assisted Shah Soojah and the English, and may wish to accompany them, shall be allowed to do so. We will not hinder them. And if they remain here, no one will call them to account for what they have done, and no one shall molest them under any pretence. They may

We have set apart two lakhs of rupees for our expenses to Peshawur, which is twenty-four yaboos' loads. If there is more than this in the public treasury, either in gold mohurs, ducats, or rupees, it is yours. If you do not believe this, send some one to note and inspect the loads on the day of our departure. If we have said truly, give us a blessing; and if we have spoken falsely, it is your property, take it away, and we shall be convicted of falsehood.

[Remark. Let them pay the hire of the yaboos and camels.]

Article 2. "With reference to the remark that was made that we should give up all our guns but six, we have with the force one and a half companies of artillerymen. You have fixed six guns. Half of a company would remain without equipments. Be good enough to give three more small guns, such as are drawn by mules, for the other half-company. It will be a great kindness."

[Remark. They cannot be given.]

Article 3. "The muskets in excess of those in use with the regiments must be left behind."

This is agreed to. Whatever muskets are in addition to those in use with the regiments, together with shot and powder and other ordnance stores, all by way of friendship shall be the property of the Newab.

Article 4. "General Sale, together with his wife and daughter, and the other gentlemen of rank who are married and have children, until the arrival of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and the other Afghans and their families, and Douranees and Ghilzyes, from Hindostan, shall remain as guests with us; that when the Ameer

you also now show similar kindness, that friendship may be increased.

[Remark. Let them remain with their families. Let the family of the General stop in Caubul, until he himself comes from Jellalabad, — Sturt with his family, Boyd with his family, and Anderson with his family.]

ELDRED POTTINGER, Pol. Agent. W. K. Elphinstone, Major-Gen. 1

III

[The following is a draft of the new treaty submitted by the Afghan chiefs, containing the additional articles, and embodying the matter in Akbar Khan's "Remarks".]

Agreement of Peace that has been determined on with the Frank English gentlemen, to which engagement, if they consent and act accordingly, on the part of the heads and leaders of Afghanistan henceforward no infractions will occur to their friendly engagements.

1st. That the going of the gentlemen shall be speedy. In regard to the carriage-cattle, let them send money that they may be purchased and sent.

and. As regards the going of the Sirdars with the English army that no person may injure it on the way, Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan or Sirdar Mahomed Oosman Khan, whichever may be wished by the English, will be appointed and sent.

- 8th. If the family of Shah Soojah, on account of want of carriage, may remain here, they will be placed in the house of Hadjee Khan.
- 9th. Whenever the English army may arrive at Peshawur, they will make arrangements for the return of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, the Afghans and their families, that are in India.
- 10th. That the English gentlemen, with their families, will be left at Caubul as hostages, until the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, with the rest of the Afghans and their families, may arrive at Peshawur; or, secondly, that six hostages may be left.
- 11th. After the departure of the English there shall be perfect friendship between the two states in so much so that the Government of Afghanistan, without the advice and approval of the British Government, shall enter into no connection or correspondence with any other power; but if, in its defence, it may require the assistance of the English, they will not delay to afford it. Should the British Government not consent to this, the Afghans are free to make friends with any one they like.
- 12th. If any gentleman would wish to remain in Caubul, on account of his private affairs, he may do so, and will be treated with justice and respect.
- 13th. Whatever cash, whether gold or silver, may be in the treasury, shall be paid to Newab Zemaun Khan. A trustworthy person will be appointed, who will issue supplies from stage to stage as far as Peshawur.

IV

THE RATIFIED TREATY

Translation of a Treaty between the English Authorities at Caubul and the Afghan Nobles. (Dated in the month of Ze-vol-Kadh)

The cause of writing this confidential paper, and the intention of forming this unparalleled friendly treaty, is this: — That at the present happy moment, to put away strife and contention, and avert discord and enmity, the representatives of the great English nation — that is, the high of rank and respected Eldred Pottinger, the ambassador and agent of the English Government, and General Elphinstone, the commander of the English forces — have concluded a comprehensive treaty containing certain articles, which they have confided to the hands of the Afghan nobility, that by it the chain of friendship may be strengthened. And it has been settled that the Afghan nobles shall give a similar writing.

An engagement is now made by his Majesty Newab Mahomed Zemaun Khan, King of Afghanistan, and Naib Ameen-oollah Khan, and the chief nobles of Afghanistan, whose seals are affixed to and ornament this document. The articles of the treaty are as follows:

Article 1. That the British troops shall speedily quit the territories of Afghanistan and march to India, and shall not return; and twenty-four hours after receiving the carriage-cattle the army shall start.

Article 2 That on our part the Sirdars, Oosman Khan and

belonging to Sirdar Dost Mahomed Khan, which may be in the hands of the English, shall be given up, and none retained.

Article 7. Six English gentlemen, who remain here as our guests, shall be treated with courtesy. When the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and the other Afghans shall arrive at Peshawur, we will allow the above-mentioned English gentlemen to depart with honour.

Article 8. After the departure of the English army according to the treaty, should assistance against foreign invasion be at any time demanded, they (the English Government) shall not delay. Between (the Governments) friendship and good-will shall exist; and we will not make a treaty with any but the above-mentioned English Government. And in case the Governor-General of India should not agree to this proposal, we are at liberty to form an alliance with any other power.

Article 9. Should any English gentlemen be unavoidably detained in Caubul, we will treat him with all respect and consideration, and on his departure dismiss him with honour.

Article 10. The English can take six horse-artillery guns and three mule guns, and the rest, by way of friendship, shall be left for our use. And all muskets and ordnance stores in the magazine shall, as a token of friendship, be made over to our agents.

Article 11. Such English soldiers as may be left sick or wounded at Caubul shall be at liberty to return to their own country on their recovery.

This is the treaty, the articles of which have been entered into between the nobles of the Mahomedan faith and the distinguished

APPENDIX C

AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS HIGHNESS AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, on the one part, and SIR HENRY MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, on the other part

Whereas the British Government has represented to His Highness the Amir that the Russian Government presses for the literal fulfilment of the Agreement of 1873 between Russia and England by which it was decided that the river Oxus should form the northern boundary of Afghanistan, from Lake Victoria (Wood's Lake) or Sarikol on the east to the junction of the Kokcha with the Oxus, and whereas the British Government considers itself bound to abide by the terms of this Agreement, if the Russian Government equally abides by them, His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, wishing to show his friendship to the British Government and his readiness to accept their advice in matters affecting his relations with Foreign Powers, hereby agrees that he will evacuate

AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS HIGHNESS AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, on the one part, and SIR HENRY MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, representing the Government of India on the other part

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:

- (1) The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement.
- (2) The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.
- (3) The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time

From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Peha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half-way between the new Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand? The line will then pass half-way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and turning southwards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.

(6) The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier, and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail, such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future, as far as possible, all causes of doubt

and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

(7) Being fully satisfied of His Highness's good-will to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these pegotiations, the Government

APPENDIX D

TRANSLATION OF THE TREATY

Praise be to Allah!

His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din I Amir Habibulla Khan, Independent King of the State of Afghanistan and its dependencies, on the one part, and the Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary of the Mighty Government of India and Representative of the exalted British Government, on the other part.

His said Majesty does hereby agree to this that, in matters of principle and of subsidiary importance of the Treaty regarding internal and external affairs and of the engagements which His Highness, my late father, that is, Zia-ul-millat-wa-ud-din,² who has found mercy, may God enlighten his tomb! concluded and acted upon with the exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting, and will act upon the same agreement and compact, and I will not contravene them in any dealing or in any promise.

The said Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane does hereby agree to this that as to the very agreement and engagement that the exalted British Government concluded and acted upon with the noble father of His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, that is, His Highness Zia-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, who has found mercy,

APPENDIX E

ARTICLES OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT AS AFFECTING AFGHANISTAN

The high contracting parties being animated with a sincere desire to assure the perfect security of their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain there a solid and lasting peace, have decided to conclude a Convention to that effect.

Article I.—His Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan; His Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense and will not themselves take in Afghanistan, and will not encourage Afghanistan to take any measures threatening Russia. The Russia Government on their part declare that they recognize Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Majesty's Government. They further undertake not to send any agents into Afghanistan.

Article II.—His Majesty's Government having declared in

to Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of commerce establish the necessity for commercial agents, the two Governments will agree as to the measures to be taken, due regard being had to the Amir's Sovereign rights.

Article V.—The present arrangements will only enter into force from the moment when the British Government has notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Amir to the terms above stipulated.

APPENDIX F

THE TREATY OF PEACE OF AUGUST 8, 1919

The following articles for the restoration of peace have been agreed upon by the British Government and the Afghan Government:

Article 1

From the date of the signing of this Treaty there shall be peace between the British Government, on the one part, and the Government of Afghanistan on the other.

Article 2

In view of the circumstances which have brought about the present war between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan, the British Government, to mark their displeasure, withdraw the privilege enjoyed by former Amirs of importing arms, ammunition and warlike munitions through India to Afghanistan.

Article 3

Article 5

The Afghan Government accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early demarcation by a British Commission of the undemarcated portion of the line west of the Khyber, where the recent Afghan aggression took place, and to accept such boundary as the British Commission may lay down. The British troops on this side will remain in their positions until such demarcation has been effected.

THE LETTER OF SIR HAMILTON GRANT

You asked me for some further assurance that the Peace Treaty which the British Government now offer, contains nothing that interferes with the complete liberty of Afghanistan either in internal or external matters.

My friend, if you will read the Treaty carefully you will see that there is no such interference with the liberty of Afghanistan. You have told me that the Afghan Government are unwilling to renew the arrangement whereby the late Amir agreed to follow unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. I have not therefore pressed this matter, and no mention of it is made in the Treaty. Therefore, the said Treaty and this letter leave Afghanistan officially free and independent in its internal and external affairs.

Moreover, this war has cancelled all previous Treaties.

(Sd.) SIR HAMILTON GRANT

APPENDIX G

NOTE on Proposals of the British and Afghan Governments discussed by the Delegates of the Two States at the Conference held at Mussoorie, between the Months of April and July 1920, as a Preliminary to Definite Negotiations for a Treaty of Friendship

(1) It was agreed that it is in the mutual interest of both Governments that the Afghan State shall be strong and prosperous.

- (2) The British Government will be prepared to reiterate the undertaking, already given by them, to respect absolutely the integrity and independence of Afghanistan, both in internal and external affairs, and to restrain to the best of their ability all persons within the British boundaries from taking action obnoxious to the Afghan Government.
- (3) The British Government expect that the Afghan Government will similarly undertake to prevent to the best of their ability all action within the boundaries of Afghanistan, whether by their own subjects or by British subjects who are or may in the future be refugees from the British Dominions, or by subjects of other

Afghan Government to develop their country, would be willing to consider, as part of a Treaty of Friendship, the grant, for so long as the Afghan Government performed its undertakings to the satisfaction of the British Government, of assistance and concessions to Afghanistan on the following lines:

(a) A yearly subvention of eighteen lakhs of rupees.

(b) Reasonable assistance towards the education in Europe, at such places as might be agreed upon between the two Governments, of a moderate number of Afghan youths, to be selected by the Afghan Government with due regard to their educational qualifications.

(c) Reasonable assistance, to be granted gradually, as financial and other circumstances might permit, towards the construction in Afghanistan of railways, telegraph lines, and factories, and towards the development of mines.

(d) Technical advice regarding irrigation.

(e) The manufacture and supply of specially prepared paper for the printing of Afghan currency notes and (if necessary) provision of machines for note printing.

(f) Technical advice regarding the establishment of an Afghan Government or Commercial Bank, and regarding possibilities of improving the system of commercial credit in Afghanistan.

(g) The restoration of the privilege of importing arms and ammunition and military stores through India to Afghanistan, provided that the Government of Afghanistan shall first have signed the Arms Traffic Convention, and pro-

362 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

(j) An undertaking to permit the export from Afghanistan through India, in bond, and in sealed packages, by routes to be agreed upon between the two Governments, of opium and charas produced and manufactured in Afghanistan, provided that such opium and charas shall not be despatched from Indian ports to any destination to which the British Government are under an obligation to prohibit or limit the despatch of opium or charas.

(k) The facilitating of the interchange of postal articles between India and Afghanistan, and arranging in accordance with a separate postal agreement for the establishment of offices of exchange on their frontiers, provided that neither Government shall be permitted to establish a post

office in the territory of the other Government.

(1) Permission to establish at Peshawar and Quetta trading agencies of the Afghan Government, provided that the personnel and property of the agencies shall be subject to the operations of all British laws and orders and to the jurisdiction of British courts, and that they shall not be recognised by the British authorities as having any official or privileged position.

(m) Permission to establish Afghan Consulates at Culcutta, Bombay and Karachi, provided the Afghan Government permit the establishment of British Consulates at Jalalabad, Ghazni, and Kandahar. The Consuls of both Governments, with their staffs, to enjoy all the privileges conceded

by international practice to such officials.

telegraph system from the British frontier to Kabul and from Kabul to Kandahar; but it must be explained that immediate delivery could be made only of 160 miles, which would suffice for the line from the British frontier to Kabul. The balance of 300 miles could not be made available in less than a year from now, owing to shortage of material in India.)

(6) The following points are reserved for further consideration

at the time of negotiating a Treaty of Friendship:

(a) Permission to export from Afghanistan rouble notes through India to countries outside India where their entry is permitted.

(b) Representation of the Afghan Government in London.



APPENDIX H

TREATY

Preamble

The British Government and the Government of Afghanistan, with a view to the establishment of neighbourly relations between them, have agreed to the Articles written hereunder, whereto the undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, have set their seals:

Article 1

The British Government and the Government of Afghanistan mutually certify and respect, each with regard to the other, all rights of internal and external independence.

Article II

The two High Contracting Parties mutually accept the Indo-Afghan Frontier, as accepted by the Afghan Government under rights of irrigation from the aforesaid portion of the river shall be continued to British subjects.

Article III

The British Government agrees that a Minister from His Majesty the Amir of Afghanistan shall be received at the Royal Court of London, like the Envoys of all other Powers, and to permit the establishment of an Afghan Legation in London, and the Government of Afghanistan likewise agrees to receive in Kabul a Minister from His Britannic Majesty the Emperor of India, and to permit the establishment of a British Legation at Kabul.

Each party shall have the right of appointing a Military Attaché to its Legation.

Article IV

The Government of Afghanistan agrees to the establishment of British Consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad, and the British Government agrees to the establishment of an Afghan Consul-General at the headquarters of the Government of India, and three Afghan Consulates at Calcutta, Karachi and Bombay. In the event of the Afghan Government desiring at any time to appoint Consular officers in any British territories other than India, a separate agreement shall be drawn up to provide for such appointments, if they are approved by the British Government.

Article V

The two High Contracting Parties mutually guarantee the

privileges which are or may hereafter be granted to or enjoyed by the Minister or Consuls of any other Government, in the countries in which the places of residence of the said Minister and Consuls of Great Britain are fixed.

Article VI

As it is for the benefit of the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan that the Government of Afghanistan shall be strong and prosperous, the British Government agrees that, whatever quantity of material is required for the strength and welfare of Afghanistan, such as all kinds of factory machinery, engines and materials and instruments for telegraph, telephones, etc., which Afghanistan may be able to buy from Britain or the British dominions or from other countries of the world, shall ordinarily be imported without let or hindrance by Afghanistan into its own territories from the ports of the British Isles and British India. Similarly the Government of Afghanistan agrees that every kind of goods, the export of which is not against the internal law of the Government of Afghanistan, and which may in the judgment of the Government of Afghanistan be in excess of the internal needs and requirements of Afghanistan, and is required by the British Government, can be purchased and exported to India with the permission of the Government of Afghanistan. With regard to arms and munitions, the British Government agrees that, as long as it is assured that the intentions of the Government of Afghanistan are friendly, and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importation in Afghanistan permission shall

Afghanistan, provided that a certificate, signed by such Afghan authority or representative as may from time to time be determined by the two Governments, shall be presented at the time of importation to the Chief Customs Officer at the port of import, setting forth that the goods in question are the property of the Government of Afghanistan and are being sent under its orders to Afghanistan, and showing the description, number and value of the goods in respect of which exemption is claimed; provided, secondly, that the goods are required for the public services of Afghanistan and not for the purposes of any State monopoly or State trade, and provided, thirdly, that the goods are, unless of a clearly distinguishable nature, transported through India in sealed packages, which shall not be opened or sub-divided before their export from India.

And also the British Government agrees to the grant, in respect of all trade goods imported into India at British ports for re-export to Afghanistan and exported to Afghanistan by routes to be agreed upon between the two Governments, of a rebate at the time and place of export of the full amount of Customs duty levied upon such goods, provided that such goods shall be transported through India in sealed packages, which shall not be opened or sub-divided before their export from India.

And also the British Government declares that it has no present intention of levying Customs duty on goods or livestock of Afghan origin or manufacture, imported by land or by river into India or exported from Afghanistan to other countries of the world through India, and the import of which into India is not prohibited by law. In the event, however, of the British Govern-

shall not be recognized by the British authorities as having any official or special privileged position.

Article IX

The trade goods coming to (imported to) Afghanistan under the provisions of Article VII from Europe, etc., can be opened at the railway terminuses at Jamrud, in the Kurram, and at Chaman, for packing and arranging to suit the capacity of baggage animals without this being the cause of re-imposition of Customs duties; and the carrying out of this will be arranged by the trade representatives mentioned in Article XII.

Article X

The two High Contracting Parties agree to afford facilities of every description for the exchange of postal matter between their two countries, provided that neither shall be authorised to establish Post Offices within the territory of the other. In order to give effect to this Article, a separate Postal Convention shall be concluded, for the preparation of which such number of special officers as the Afghan Government may appoint shall meet the officers of the British Government and consult with them.

Article XI

The two High Contracting Parties having mutually satisfied themselves each regarding the good will of the other, and especially

Article XIII

The two High Contracting Parties agree that the first and second schedules attached to this treaty shall have the same binding force as the Articles contained in this treaty.

Article XIV

The provisions of this treaty shall come into force from the date of its signature, and shall remain in force for three years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified, twelve months before the expiration of the said three years, the intention to terminate it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. This treaty shall come into force after the signatures of the Missions of the two Parties, and the two ratified copies of this shall be exchanged in Kabul within 2½ months after the signatures.

(Sd.) MAHMUD TARZI
Chief of the Delegation of
the Afghan Government
for the conclusion of the
Treaty

Tuesday, 30th Aqrab 1300 Hijra Shamsi (corresponding to 22nd November (Sd.) HENRY R. C. DOBBS

Envoy Extraordinary and
Chief of the British
Mission to Kabul

This twenty-second day of November one thousand nine hundred and twentyone

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Account of the Outbreak of the Tartars into the Lands of Islam, by Ibn Athir.

Afghanistan, by Lieut.-General Sir George Macmunn. 1929.

Aitchison's Treaties, Nos. XI, XII, XVII.

Akbar the Great Mogul, A.D. 1542-1605, by Vincent Smith.

Ammianus Marcellinus, C. D. Yonge's translation.

"An Archæological Journey in Western Iran", by Sir Aurel Stein, Journal of Royal Geographical Society. 1938.

Ancient History of Assyria, by Sidney Smith. 1922.

Anecdotes of Aurangzeb, by Professor Jadunath Sarkar. 1912.

Anglo-Russian Relations concerning Afghanistan, 1837-1907, by William Hubberton. 1937.

Arab Conquests in Central Asia, The, by H. A. R. Gibb.

Archaeological History of Iran, by Dr. Ernst E. Herzfeld. 1935.

Archaeological Reconnaissances in North-Western India and South-Eastern Iran, by Sir Aurel Stein. 1937.

Argyll's Autobiography and Memoirs. 2 vols.

Arrian, Amabasis, trans. by E. J. Chinnock. 1884.

Asiatic Miscellanies, vol. i. Calcutta, 1785.

Baber, by Stanley Lane-Poole. Baber, Memoirs, by himself.

by Major W. R. Hay, Journal of Royal Geographical Society, vol. lxxxii, No. 4, Oct. 1933.

"Demetrius in Sind", by E. H. Johnston, Journal Royal Asiatic Society,

April 1939.

Early Empires of Central Asia, The, by Dr. W. M. McGovern. 1939. Early Jesuit Travellers in Central Asia, by C. Wessels.

Eastern Persia, edited by Sir F. J. Goldsmid. 2 vols. 1876.

"E/B R.H.A. at Maiwand", by Captain H. B. Latham, Journal of the Royal Artillery, vol. lv, No. 3, Oct. 1928.

Encyclopædia of Islam, The, edited by M. Th. Houtsma, etc. 5 vols. 1913-1938.

England and Russia in the East, by Sir Henry C. Rawlinson. 2nd ed. 1875.

Euripides, The Trojan Women, translated by Dr. Gilbert Murray.

Fall of the Mughal Empire, The, by Sir Jadunath Sarkar.

First Afghan War, The, by Major-General Sir Henry Durand.

Forty-one Years in India, by Lord Roberts. 1 vol.

Forty-three Years in India, by Lieut.-General Sir George Lawrence.

Fragments of Menander Protector, The, vide Yule's Cathay and the Way Thither. 4 vols.

From Alexander Burnes to Frederick Roberts, by J. L. Morrison. Raleigh Lecture, 1936.

"From Herat to Ourenbourgh", by Captain Sir R. Shakespear, Black-wood's Magazine, June 1842.

Frontiers of Baluchistan, The, by G. P. Tate. 1909.

Gates of India, by Sir T. H. Holdich. 1910.

History of the Afghans, by J. P. Ferrier.

History of Early Iran, by G. G. Cameron. 1935.

History of India, by Mountstuart Elphinstone. 6th ed. 1874.

History of India, by H. G. Keene. 2 vols.

History of India, The Cambridge. 1922.

History of India, The Oxford, by Dr. Vincent Smith.

History of Islamic Civilisation, by Jurji Zaydan (Gibb Memorial).

History of the Moghuls of Central Asia, A, by Ney Elias and Edward Denison Ross. 8vo. 1898.

History of the Mongols, The, by Sir Henry Hoyle Howorth. 3 vols. 1876-1888.

History of Persia, by Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes. 3rd ed. 2 vols. 1930.

History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India, The, translated from the Persian of Mahomed Kasim Ferishta by John Briggs.

History of the Sikhs, A, by J. D. Cunningham.

History of the War in Afghanistan, by Sir John William Kaye. 2 vols. 1851.

House of Seleucus, The, by Edwyn Robert Bevan. 1904.

Hudud-al-Alam, translated and explained by Professor V. Minorsky (Gibb Memorial Series, 1937).

In the Footsteps of the Buddha, by René Grousset. 1932.

India as I Knew It, by Sir Michael O'Dwyer. 1925.

India, Morley and Minto, by Mary, Countess of Minto. 1934.

Indian Administration of Lord Lytton, The, by Lady Betty Balfour.

Indian Borderland, The, by Sir Thomas Holdich. 1901.

Indo-Iranian Borderlands, The: Their Pre-history in the Light of Geography and of Recent Explorations, by Sir Aurel Stein. 1934.

"International Boundaries", by Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, Journal

Lady Sale's Journal.

Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, The, by Guy Le Strange. 1905.

L'Angleterre et l'Expédition Française, by Charles Roux, vol. ii.

"Les Allemands en Perse", by Georges Ducrocq, Revue du Monde musulman, vol. liv, 1923.

L'Histoire du monde, by La Vallée Poussin, vol. vi.

Life and Memoirs of Gulbadan Begum, The, translated by Annette Beveridge. Royal Asiatic Society, 1902.

Life of Amir Abdur Rahman, by himself.

Life of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, by Mohan Lal. 1846.

Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, by Monypenny and Buckle. 6 vols.

Life of Field-Marshal Sir George White, by Sir Mortimer Durand.

Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Munro, The, by General Sir George Barrow.

Life of Lord Carnock, The, by the Hon. Harold Nicolson.

Life of Lord Curzon, The, by the Earl of Ronaldshay. 3 vols. 1928.

Life of Lord Granville, The, by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice. 2 vols. 1905.

Life of Lord Lawrence, by Bosworth Smith.

Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, by Lady Gwendolen Cecil. 2 vols. 1922.

Life of Sir George Pollock, by C. R. Low.

Life of Sir Henry Durand, by Henry Mortimer Durand.

Literary History of Persia, by Edward Granville Browne. 4 vols.

Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, by Lady Betty Balfour. 1899.

March and Operations of the Army of the Indus in the Expedition to Afghanistan, The.

Original Letters illustrative of English History, by Sir Henry Ellis. 3 series. 11 vols. 8vo. 1825-1846.

Origins of the War, by G. P. Gooch and Major H. W. V. Temperley. 12 vols.

"Pamirs and the Source of the Oxus, The", by the Hon. George Curzon, Journal Royal Geographical Society, 1896.

Parliamentary Papers, 1873, 1878-1879.

Philip and Alexander of Macedon, by D. G. Hogarth. 1897.

Plutarch's Lives. 3 vols.

Political History of Parthia, A, by Neilson C. Debevoise. 1937.

Problem of the North-West Frontier, The, by Captain C. Davies, Ph.D.

Procopius, De Bello Persico.

"Recent Survey and Exploration in Seistan", by Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, Journal of Royal Geographical Society, Sept. and Oct. 1906.

Records and Reactions, by the Earl of Midleton. 1939.

Road to Oxiana, The, by Robert Byron.

Royal Anthropological Institute, Journal of.

Royal Berkshire Regiment, The, by F. Loraine Petre.

Rozat-us-Safa of Mirkhwand.

Russia in Central Asia, by Hon. G. C. Curzon. 1889.

Scythians and Greeks, by Ellis Hovell Minns. 1913. Second Afghan War, The, 1878-80 (Abridged Official Account). 1908. Second Afghan War, The, by Colonel H. B. Hanna. 3 vols. 1910. Sir Mortimer Durand, by Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes. 1926. Six Narratives of Travel in Persia by Italians in the Sixteenth and Seven-

teenth Centuries (Hakluyt Society).

376 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

Under the Absolute Amir, by Frank A. Martin. 1907. Ungarbled Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes, by Sir John William Kaye. Unter der Glutsonne Irans, by Captain Oskar Niedermayer. 1925.

Views and Opinions of General Jacob, by himself.

Wassmuss, by Christopher Sykes. 1936.

"White Huns and Kindred Tribes in the History of the Indian North-West Frontier", by Sir Aurel Stein, Indian Antiquary, vol. xxiv, 1905.

Zafar-Nama of Sharaf-ud-Din, Ali of Yezd, The.

INDEX

Abaka Khan (son of Hulaku Khan), i, 235; reign of, 236; battle of Hims, 237; corresponds with Europe, 237, 243 Abbasa (sister of Harun-al-Rashid), i, 177 Abbasid Dynasty, the foundation of, i, 172, 185, 197 Abbas Mirza, i, 401 Abbas II, i, 325 Abbot, Captain James, ii, 8, 84 Abdalis: become subjects of Shah Abbas, i, 313; they revolt and are forced to migrate to Herat province, 313; Ghilzais and, 325; rebellion of, 326; Nadir defeats force of, 329; Nadir decides to crush, 330; feuds among, 330; make overtures for peace, 333, 351, 352, 353 Abd-al-Rahman, i, 159 Abdul Ghaffar, a leader of the Red Shirts, 11, 323 Abdul Kuddus, ii, 270 Abdul Kuddus Khan, ii, 154 Abdullah Khan Sadozai, i, 330 Abdulla ibn Amir, Governor of Basra, i, Abdulla Tan Cinden Abdulla Tan /.....

early years of, 120; imprisonment, 121; Commander-in-chief, 122; flight of, 123; return and defeat, 123; decides to return to Afghanistan, 126; encouragement of, by Russia, 127; travels to Badakhshan, 127; arrival in Afghan Turkistan reported to British, 129; chief opponents of, 130; battle of Ahmad Khel, 131; question of Herat, 134; proclaimed Amir of Kabul, 137; acknowledged Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, 151 et seq.; occupies Kandahar, 153; defeats Ayub Khan, 154; capture of Herat, 154; the Panjdeh Crisis, 163-165; his claim on Jandol and Chitral, 170-171; Durand Mission to Kabul, 174 et seg.; Shinwari expedition, 189; Ghilzai rebellion, 190; rebellion of Ishak Khan, 191; the Hazara rising, 192; gazetted a G.C.B., 193; requests the appointment of Ambassador in London, 194; subjugation of Kafiristan, 195; improvements effected during his reign, 197-198; death, 198; character, 198; likened to William the Conqueror, 200; the situation after his death arre agree.

Abulistin, battle of, i, 237 Abul Muaskar (brother of Isa, Chief of Makran), i, 193 Abu Muslim, i, 172; raises the black standard, 172; 173, 174; assassinated, 174 Abu Said (grandson of Miranshah), reign of, i, 270 Abu Said (son and successor of Uljaitu), i, 242 Abydos, i, 59 Achaemenes (or Hakhamanish), Prince, i, Achaemenians, i, 8, 39, 44; dynasty, 1 footnote; inscriptions, 9; foundation of dynasty, 37 Achaeus, Viceroy of Asia Minor, i, 84 Acre, i, 239, 245, 246, 248 Adad-Nirari II, King of Assyria, i, 28 Adam, a Gakkar Chief, i, 302 Aden, Gulf of, i, 122 Adiabene, i, 99, 106, 114, 116 Adil Shah (Mubariz, Khan, brother-inlaw of Islam Shah), i, 302, 303, 304 Adina Beg, appointed Governor of the Duab of Jullundur, i, 358 Adrianople, battle of, i, 133 Adriatic Sea, i, 228 Adul Aziz, i, 315, 316, 326 Adulis (Zeila), i, 8 t Afghanistan, History of, vol. i: the land and the people, I et seq.; prehistory and early history in Egypt and the Near East, 17 et seq.; Medes and Persians conquer Iranian Plateau, 33; Cyrus the Great, 47 et seq.; at the dawn of History, Ah: Afghanistan satranies, 47:

emperors, 311 et seq.; Nadir Shah recovers the lost provinces of Persia, 325 et seq.; his conquests and death, 339 et seq.; Ahmad Shah founds the Kingdom of Afghanistan, 351 et seq.; Timur Shah and Zaman Shah, 368 et seq.; downfall of the Sadozai dynasty, 383 et seq.; Fath Khan governs the Afghans, 389; Dost Muhammad, 392 et seq.; siege of Herat, 400-401; Mission of Captain Burnes, 401 et seq.

Afghanistan, History of, vol. ii: the first Afghan War, 1 et seq.; Mission of Macnaghten to Ranjit Singh, 1-2; Simla Manifesto, 3, 339-343; surrender of Amir Dost Muhammad, 13 et seq.; retreat from Kabul, 22 et seq.; second reign of Dost Muhammad, 61 et seq.; Shir Ali establishes himself as Amir, 69 et seq.; advance of Russia across Central Asia, 83 et seq.; first Seistan Mission, 1872, 91 et seq.; the genesis of the Second Afghan War, 97 et seq.; Second Afghan War, 110 et seq.; Abdur Rahman, 120 et seq.; battles of Maiwand and Kandahar, 139 et seq.; Abdur Rahman is acknowledged Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, 151 et seq.; the Panjdeh Crisis, 158 et seq.; Durand Mission to Kabul, 169 et seq.; the Pamir and other Boundary Commissions, 178 et seq.; Abdur Rahman tames his rebellious subjects, 189; the McMahon Missions, 201; Amir Habibulla Khan negotiates a new treaty, 215 et seq.; Habibulla Khan visite India 225 et sea: Turko-German

decision to despatch a British Force to Kabul, 2; Simla Manifesto of October 1, 1838, 3; raising of the siege of Herat, 4; army of the Indus, 4; organization of transport and supplies, 4; contingent of Shah Shuja, 4; appointments of Macnaghten and Burnes, 5; line of march, 5; march to Bukkur, 5; march of Bombay division, 6; march up the Bolan Pass, 6; mission of Burnes to the Khan of Kalat, 7; advance on Kandahar, 7; entry of Shah Shuja into Kandahar, 7; position at Kandahar, 8; mission to Herat, 8; position of Dost Muhammad, 9; advance up the Khaibar Pass of the Sikh Force, 9; advance on Ghazni, June 27, 1839, 9; flight of Dost Muhammad, 11; occupation of Kabul, 11; withdrawal and distribution of British troops, 14, 15; surrender of Dost Muhammad, 20; rebellions of the tribes, 22-24; Sale's march to Jalalabad, 24-26; murder of Burnes, 27-28; disasters at Charikar and Shekabad, 29; Nott despatches brigade to Kabul, 29-30; Macnaghten's negotiations with Chiefs, 30; is murdered, 71; attitude of Akbar Khan, 31-32; retreat of British from Kabul, 33 et seq.; siege of Jalalabad, 40; position of Nott at Kandahar, 42; Pollock forces the Khaibar Pass, 46; relief of Jalalabad, 47; Lord Ellenborough's instructions, 47; Pollock advances to Gandamak, 49-50; battle of Tezin, 50; battle of Ghoaine, 51; Shame-ud-Din Khan

Charasia, 117; Roberts enters Kabul, 118; abdication of Yakub Khan, 118 Afghan War, Third: the first act of war, ii, 273; phases of operations, 273; British garrison at Landi Kotal, 274; attempted rising in Peshawar city, 2741 capture of the Afghan position at Bagh, 275; Afghan attack on the camp at Dakka, 275; Afridis display hostility, 276; Jalalabad and Kabul bombed, 276; Amanulla Khan requests an armistice, 277; movements of Nadir Khan, 277-278; evacuation of the Tochi Valley and of Wana, 278; the Chitral front, 280; Southern front, 281; summary, 282 Afridie, i, 307; ii, 114 Afshars, i, 328, 329, 333 Afzal Khan (father of Abdur Rahman), ii, 9, 13; governor of Afghan Turkistan, 71; rebellion of, 72-73; proclaimed Amir, 74; British communication to, 74, 75; death of, 75; 120, 121 Aga Khan, H.H., i, 232 Aga Muhammad Shah, founder of the Kajar dynasty, i, 371, 373 Agathocleia (daughter of Demetrius Invictus), i, 97, 101 Agathocles (son of Demetrius), i, 93 Agathocles (son of Lysimachus), i, 77, 78 Agbatana (Ecbatana), bit-Daiaukka, i, 36 Agesilaus, Spartan general, i, 56 Aghasi, Haji Mirsa, i, 409 Agra, i, 292, 298, 303, 304, 305, 311, 318, 323 Ahmad, Mahmud's treasurer, Governor of

Punjab, i, 193, 194

campaigns against the Marathas, 358 et seq.; third battle of Panipat, 362; defeats the Sikhs, 366; his last invasion, 366, 367; death, 367; character, 367 Ahmad (son and successor of Muhammad Shah), i, 355 Ahmad (son of Ibrahim), i, 195 Ahmad (Tagudar Oghlu, brother of Abaka), reign of, i, 238 Ahura Mazda, i, 38 Ahwaz, i, 125 Aitchison's Treaties, i, 378 footnote, 380 footnote, 388 footnote; ii, 65 footnote Akaba, Gulf of, i, 119, 122 Akbar, Emperor, i, 299; ascends the throne, 304; campaigns against the North-West Frontier tribes, 307; obtains possession of Kandahar, 307, 308; death, 309-310 Akbar Khan, ii, 9, 13, 14 Akbar Khan (son of Dost Muhammad), i, 398; ii, 30, 31, 32, 34, 40; battle of Tezin, 50; 54; 57; 61; his ambitions and intrigues, 62, 63; death, 63, 64; treaty of Capitulation, 344-351, Appendix B Akchah, i, 369; ii, 63, 80 Ak Darband, i, 335 Akhsi, i, 277, 278, 279, 280 Akkad, i, 20, 21 Ak Masjid, fort of, i, 290, 319; ii, 14, 39, 46, 58, 85, 87, 108, 112 Aktur Khan (son of Dost Muhammad), ii, 23, 44 Alafrank (cousin of Uljaitu), i, 241 Alamgir II, i, 358, 361 Alam Khan (uncle of Sultan Ibrahim), i.

Arbela, 62; marches on Babylon and Susa, 62; occupation of Persepolis and Pasargadae, 62-63; pursuit and death of Darius Codomannus, 63; conquest of Hyrcania and Parthia, 63; march through Seistan and up the Helmand, 64; passage of Hindu Kush and annexation of Bactria, 64; advance to Jaxartes, 65; Macedonian reverse, 65; capture of the Soghdian Rock, 65; descent to the plains of India, 66; passage of the Indus, 66; battle with Porus, 66-67; march to the Indian Ocean, 68; march from India to Susa, 68; death, 69; character, 70; destruction of his family, 71 et seq., 75, 80; account of, in the Shahnama, 124-125, 197, 203, 246, 253, 288, 337 Alexandretta, Gulf of, i, 245 Alexandria, i, 147, 248 Alexandria Ariana, i, 9 Alexandria Eschate (modern Khojent), i, 65, 74 Al-Hafar, i, 157 Ali, Caliph (son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad), i, 285 Ali (son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad), i, 229 Ali (son of Masud I), i, 207 Ali Adil Shah II, i, 321 Ali Ahmad Jan, ii, 318, 320 Ali bin Buwayhid, founder of Buwayid dynasty, i, 191 Ali Bin Isa, Governor, i, 177 Alikhanoff, Colonel, Governor of Merv, ii, 162, 163 Ali Khel. ii. 112, 116

Amanulla, King, accession of, ii, 267; Third Afghan War, 270 et seq.; Peace Treaty of Rawalpindi, 284; Anglo-Afghan relations after Peace Treaty, 287; Russo-Afghan Relations, 287; treaties of Afghanistan with Russia, Persia and Turkey, 291; Afghan Mission to Europe, 292; institutes reforms, 295 et seq.; seven months' journey during which he visited Bombay, 303; Egypt, 303; Italy, 304; Paris, 304; Berlin, 305; England, 305; Russia, 307; Turkey, 307; Pereia, 308; his abdication, 313; hoists the royal standard at Kandahar, 315; his last attempt to regain the throne, 316; leaves India and sails for Europe, 317; summary, 317 Amasis, King of Egypt, i, 45, 46 Ambala, ii, 77 Amida (modern Diarbekr), i, 131, 138 Amin (son of Zubayda), i, 178 Amir Abdur Rahman, i, 10 Amir Khan, Governor of Kabul, i, 320, 322 Ammon (modern Siwa oasis), visited by Alexander the Great, i, 61 Ampe, i, 50 Amritsar, i, 364, 386 Amr-ul-Lais, Saffar, i, 182, 183 Amu Daria (the Oxus), River, i, 7, 10 Anahita, Persian Goddess of Fecundity, i, 85; temple of, 94 Anandpal (son of Jaipal), i, 189 Anatolia, i, 41, 265 Ancyra, i, 177 Anderab, i, 156, 259

Antimachus, Governor of Herat, i, 93 Antioch, i, 76, 81, 84, 87, 93, 111, 114, 122, 126; sack of, by Noshirwan, 140-141, 146, 206, 248 Antiochus Hierax, Seleucid Prince, i, 81, 82, 126 Antiochus I (Soter), i, 75, 76; defeats the Gauls, 78-90; death, 80 Antiochus II (Theos), i, 80, 81 Antiochus III (the Great), i, 84; campaigns in the East, 84-85; march through Bactria to the Kabul Valley, 85, 86; defeated at Thermopylae, 86; battle of Magnesia, 86; Peace of Apamea, 86; death, 86; 89, 90, 103 Antiochus IV (Epiphanes), i, 91; retreats from Egypt, 92, 93; last years and death, 93-94 and footnote Antiochus VII, Sidetes, i, 96, 99 Antipater, King of Macedonia and Hellas, 1, 72, 73 Antony, Mark: battle of Philippi, i, 111; expedition against Parthia, 112; campaigns in Armenia, 112-113 Anushtigin (favourite cup-bearer of Malik Shah), founder of dynasty of Khiva, i, 216 Anzan (or Anshan), district of, i, 30, 37, 38 Aornos, i, 66 Apama (daughter of Spitamenes), i, 72 Apamea, i, 111, 142 Apamea, Peace of, i, 86 Apa-Sakae, the, i, 83 Apis, sacred bull, i, 57 Apollodorus, i, 100 Apollodotus, Satrap of Sind, i, 91, 94 Apollonia, i, 85

dynasty, 125; overthrows Ardawan, 125; defeats Severus Alexander, 125-126; invades Armenia, 126; death, 126 Ardeshir Dirazdast, vide Artaxerxes I (Longimanus) Ardeshir II, i, 133 Areia (or Aria), i, 90 Areobindus, the Goth, Roman champion, i, 134 Argaum, i, 375 Arghandab, River, i, 7, 11, 316, 325 Arghun, Shah Husayn, the ruler of Sind, i, 299 Arghun, Zun-Nun Beg, i, 287 Arghun (eldest son of Abaka), reign of, i, 238, 247 Argos, i, 56 Argyll, Duke of, Secretary of State for India, ii, 99, 100, 106 footnote, 108 Ariaramnes, King (son of Teispes), i, 38, 40, 46 Ariaspae, the, i, 64 Ariobarzanes, King of Cappadocia, i, 104 Aristagoras, Governor of Miletus, i, 49 Aristotle, i, 58, 70, 199 Arius (Hari Rud), i, 89 Ariyaruk, Governor of the Punjab, i, 193 Armenia, i, 18, 19, 44, 55, 93; relations with Parthia, 105; Antony's campaigns, 112; struggle for, by Rome and Parthia, 113; and Trajan, 114; evacuation of, by Hadrian, 115; conquest by Ardeshir, 126; seized by Tiridates, 129; treaty with Rome, 130; partition of, 133, 177; invasion of, by Golden Horde, 236, 248; conquered by Tamerlane, 256 Armorium, fortress of, i. 180

Artemisium, i, 51 Arukku (eldest son of Cyrus I), i, 38 Aryans, the, i, 13, 15, 28, 46; coming of the, 33; original home of, 33; first migration into India, 34; effect of immigration into Iran, 41; founded Ecbatana, 41; architecture and culture of, 41, 83 Aryenis (daughter of Alyattes), i, 40 Asad, Governor of Khurasan, i, 168 Asaf Jah, i, 323 Ashraf Khan, Abdali: released from prison, i, 327; defeats Turks, 327; faced with grave crisis, 328, 329; Nadir decides to march against, 331 Asia, ii, 102 Asia Minor, i, 48, 49; Peace of Antalcidas, 56; 77, 86, 87, 104, 112, 146, 177, 203, 204, 234, 245, 249, 261 Asii, vide Yueh-chi Askari, Mir & a (brother of Humayun), i, 297, 298, 300 Asmar, ii, 170, 171, 175 Asoka, i, 75, 97 Assassins, the, i, 229 et seq.; extirpation of, in Khurasan and Northern Persia, 231-232; 246 Assaye, battle of, i, 375 Assur, god, i, 32 Assur (modern Kala Shergat), i, 27, 28, 38, 39 Assurbanipal, King of Assyria, i, 22, 30-32, 38 Assyria, 1, 17, 29, 30; treaty with a Kassite monarch, 26; becomes independent state, 28; conquest of Babylon,

26-27, 28: invasion by Aramaean tribes.

Attalus of Pergamum, i, 82, 86 Atta Muhammad Khan, Nawab, mission of, ii, 104 Attica, i, 50 Attock, i, 7, 66, 288 Auckland, Lord, Governor-General of India, i, 398, 401, 405; his reply to Burnes, 406-407; ii, 1, 2, 3; instructions on retreat from Kabul, 22 et seq.; 38 Augustus, Emperor (Octavian), i, 101, 111, 112; restoration of Roman standards, 113 Aurangzeb, i, 315, 316, 317; wins fight for power, 318, 320; death, 321, 322, 323, 365 Aurelius, Marcus (Aurelian), i, 115, 128 Avaria, i, 348 Avars, the, i, 134, 147, 148 Avesta, the, i, 46, 48 Avicenna (Abu Ali bin Sina), i, 198 Avitabile, General, Italian governor of the Peshawar district, ii, 38, 39, 46, 58 Ayaz, Mahmud's favourite slave, i, 193 Ayn Jalut, battle of, i, 234 Ayub Khan (son of Shir Ali), ii, 76, 81, 101, 138; battle of Maiwand, 142; siege of Kandahar, 146, 147; again attacks Kandahar, 153; defeated by Abdur Rahman, 154; the final settlement of, in India, 155 Ayub Mirza (son of Timur Shah), i, 392 Azam, son of Bahadur Shah, i, 123 Azerbaijan, i, 159, 258, 260, 268, 269, 270, 333 Azes I, Saka Chief, i, 101

Indian Expedition, 290-291; Fifth Indian Expedition, 291; battle of Panipat, 291-292; battle of Kanwa, 294; battle of the Gogra, 294, 295; death, 295; 296, 314 Bab Salimeti, port of, i, 29 Babylon, i, 28, 40, 41; the first dynasty, 23; the second dynasty, 23-24; the Kassite dynasty, 26; capture and sack of, by Sennacherib, 30; fall of, 44; march on, by Cyrus the Younger, 54; reoccupation by Seleucus, 74, 76, 93, 108, 115 Babylonia, i, 17, 19, 22, 25, 28, 29, 30; invasion by Aramacan tribes, 28; Sennacherib's campaign against, 29-30; new kingdom of, 38 Bacon, Roger, i, 229 Bactra, capital of Bactria, i, 64, 88, 90 Bactria (modern Afghan Turkistan), i, 6, 44, 47, 63; annexed by Alexander the Great, 64-65; revolt of, 71-72; 74, 85, 88 et seq., 93, 94, 95, 98; conquest of, by the Yueh-chi, 100 Badakhshan (classical Bactria), i, 2, 10, 12, 44, 152, 221, 225, 246, 259, 297, 300, 301, 305; Akbar agrees to retention of, by Abdulla Khan, 307; Akbar thinks of recovering, 308; Goes traverses, 309; ruled by Janid dynasty, 313, 315, 316, 318; 357; ii, 127 Badghis, district of, i, 236, 244 Badia-az-Zaman (son of Sultan Husayn), i, 282, 283 Badr Khan, lord of Samarkand, i, 214

Bagh, ii, 275

Baikal, Lake, i, 219 Bairam Khan, Humayun's general, i, 303, 304 Baisungur, Mirsa, i, 271, 273, 277, 278 Bajaur, i, 288; ii, 170, 171 Bajgah, ii, 15, 19, 72 Baji Rao, i, 324 Baker, General Sir Thomas, ii, 117 Bakharz, i, 330 Bakhtiari Mountains, i, 19 Bakhtiaris, i, 337 Bakht-un-Nisa Begum, i, 305 Baki Muhammad, i, 313 Baku, i, 243, 285, 327 Bala Hissar, the, ii, 27, 28, 29, 30, 45, 56, 61, 63, 74, 114, 116, 118 Balaji Vishvanath, i, 324 Balas, Sasanian King, i, 137 Balfour, Lady Betty, ii, 98, 103 footnote, I 10 footnote Balkash, Lake, ii, 86 Balkatigin of Ghazni, i, 186 Balkh, i, 10, 122, 125, 127, 137, 143, 152, 153, 159, 160, 161, 167, 169, 181, 183, 186, 188, 193, 194, 196, 203, 215, 222, 225, 246, 249, 250, 255, 264, 277, 278, 286, 287, 301, 305, 307, 308, 313, 314, 315, 318, 341, 344, 345, 357, 369, 371, 392; ii, 11, 13 Baluchie, i, 4 Baluchistan, deserts of, i, 1, 25, 26, 44, 227, 307, 316, 317, 359, 392 Bam, i, 337 Bamian or Bamiyan, i, 7, 15, 153, 168, 223, 224, 314; 11, 55 Bampur, i. 68

Bayazid (the "Thunderbolt"), Sultan of Turkey, defeated by Tamerlane, i, 261-262 Baybars Bandukdar of Egypt, i, 234 and footnote; battle of Abulistin, 237 Baydu (cousin of Gaykhatu), i, 239 Bazar Valley, i, 341 Bazh (modern Faz), village, i, 199 Beaconsfield, Lord (Disraeli), ii, 101 footnote; policy in Asia, 102; 106, 108, 133 Beazley, Dr. Raymond, i, 218 footnote Begjit, Amir, i, 253 Behistun inscription, i, 83 Beirut, i, 28 Belisarius, Roman general, i, 139; campaigns of, 141 Bellew, Dr., i, 13 Belshazzar, son of Nabonidus, i, 45 Benares, i, 118, 194, 288 Benckendorff, Count, ii, 232 Benderski, M., Russia's Chief Survey Officer on Anglo-Russian Commission of 1895, ii, 181 Benedict Goës, i, 308, 309 Bengal, i, 214, 296, 305 Beni Temim, a Yemen tribe, i, 162 Berenice (daughter of Ptolemy Philadelphus), i, 80 Berenice (wife of Ptolemy), i, 78 Berowski, Russian general, i, 410 Bessus, Satrap of Bactria, i, 63-64; capture of, and death, 65 Bevan, Edwyn R., i, 71 Beveridge, Annette, i, 276 footnote, 287, 296 footnote Bevik Pass, ii, 182

Bosphorus, The, i, 146, 147, 176 Boundary Commissions, ii, 99; the Pamir Commission, 178-183; Udny Commission, 183-186; settlement of Mohmand boundary, 186; demarcation of boundary in vicinity of Arandu, 186; delimitation of the Kurram Valley, 187; boundary of Waziristan, 187 Bourquin, French general, i, 375 Bozai Gumbaz, ii, 179, 180 Brahuis, i, 4 Bravine, Bolshevist representative at Kabul, ii, 287 Briggs, John, i, 186 footnote, 195 footnote, 209 footnote Bright, General, i, 117 British Baluchistan, i, 3, 11 British Mission at Herat, ii, 103; Shir Ali declines to receive, 104; despatch of, to Kabul, 107 British Mission at Kabul, ii, 113; restores Kandahar and Jalalabad to Amir, 114; Amir agrees to receive, 114; retribution for murderers of, 116 British Mission of Alexander Burnes (1837), i, 401 et seq. Broadfoot, Captain William, ii, 28 Broadfoot, Major George, at siege of Jalalabad, ii, 40-41 Brooke, Brigadier-General, ii, 146 Browne, E. G., i, 171 footnote, 198 footnote, 199 footnote, 203, 204, 233, 243 footnote, 244, 252 footnote, 261 footnote, 266 Browne, Sir Sam, ii, 110; advances up

Khaibar Pass, 112; advances to Jalala-

bad, 112; British force of, broken up,

Burnes, Captain (brother of Sir Alexander Burnes), ii, 28 Burnes, Captain (later Sir) Alexander: Mission of, i, 401 et seq.; envoy to Dost Muhammad, 401-402; Kohandil Khan and, 402; Lord Auckland's reply to recommendations of, 406; ii, 3, 7; murdered at Kabul, 27 Burrard, Colonel S. G., i, 4, 5 footnote Burrows, Brigadier-General G. R. S., ii, 140 Burujird, i, 257 Bushire, i, 27, 87; ii, 66 Bust, i, 189, 196; destruction of, by Alaud-Din, 210, 337 Buwayhid (or Daylamite) dynasty, i, 191, 205 Buyr-Nur Tartars, i, 219 Byron, Robert, i, 267 footnote, 275 Byzantium, i, 128, 142, 176

Cadusian cavalry, i, 55
Caesar, Julius: fight for power with
Pompey, i, 110; assassinated, 111
Caesarea Mazaca, i, 127
Cairo, i, 235, 240, 248, 261
Callias, Peace of, i, 53
Cambay, Gulf of, i, 91
Cambyses I, King, i, 40-41
Cambyses II, conquest of Egypt, i, 45-46
Cameron, G. G., i, 17 footnote, 23 footnote, 37 footnote
Campbell, general of Shah Shuja, i, 396;
Abdur Rahman's training under, ii, 121;
death, 122
Capisa, i, 44

Cappadocia, i, 39, 44, 73, 76, 104

Yakub, 114; reaches Kabul as British envoy, 114; Afghan troops ask him to pay them, 115; murder of, 116 Cavendish-Bentinck, Lord William, i, 395 Cecil, Lady Gwendolen, ii, 69 footnote, 101 footnote Chaeronea, battle of, i, 58, 105 Chagai, i, 4; ii, 172, 207 Chagatay, i, 234, 276 Chagatay dynasty of Transoxiana, the, i, 252 Chaghanian, i, 165 Chakir Beg Daud, i, 194, 205, 207, 208 Chalcedon, i, 147, 148 Chaldeans, i, 29; Sennacherib's expedition against, 29 Chaldiran, i, 312 Chaman, ii, 202 Chamberlain, General Sir Neville, ii, 107; ordered to advance, 108; mission stopped by Afghans, 108 Champaner, i, 298 Chanda, i, 120 Chandragupta (Sandracottus), i, 75 Chang-an, i, 156 Chang Kien, Chinese explorer, i, 98 Charasia, battle of, ii, 117, 321 Charikar, i, 64, 251, 301, 316; ii, 29, 57 Charjui, i, 345, 347; ii, 80 Chaucer, i, 93, 95, 246 Chauth, i, 321, 324 Chehel Zina, i, 316 Chenab, River, i, 289, 290, 311 Chenghiz Khan (Temuchin): rise of, i, 219; relations with Muhammad of Khwarizm, 221; invades Transoxiana, 221: devastation of Khurasan, 222:

Chorasmia, i, 44 Chormaghun, Mongol general, i, 227 Chosroes, vide Noshirwan Chosroes of Armenia, i, 126 Chosroes II, vide Khusru Parviz Chotiali, i, 317 Christianity: persecution by Shapur the Great, i, 133; favoured treatment by Yezdigird, 133; persecution of Christians by Bahram Gur, 134; the "True Cross" carried off by Khusru Parviz, 146 Chuki (daughter of Muhammad Husayn Khan Kajar), i, 350 Chunar, fortress of, i, 298 Chupan, Amir, Regent of Abu Said, i, 242; rebellion and death, 242; 244 Chu Wentai, Governor of Turfan, i, 151 Cilicia, i, 77, 104, 107 Cilician Gates, i, 60, 78 Cimmerians, the, i, 38 Circesium, i, 132, 145 Clavijo, Ruy Gonzalez di, on embassy to the Court of Tamerlane, i, 263, 264 Clearchus, Spartan general, i, 54 Clement, Pope, i, 241 Cleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, i, 72 Clerk, George, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, ii, 38 Cocachin, Princess, i, 247, 248 Coele-Syria, i, 74, 77, 81, 84, 92 Colvin, John, Private Secretary to Lord Auckland, i, 405 Colvin, Sir Auckland, i, 406 footnote Congress of Berlin, ii, 106

Connolly, Captain, ii, 54

94

Craterus, Macedonian general, i, 67, 68, 69, 72, 85 Crocker, Brigadier-General G. F., in the Third Afghan War, ii, 274, 275 Croesus, King of Lydia, i, 43, 44 Ctesiphon, i, 115, 116, 127, 128, 129, 132, 142, 148 Cunaxa, battle of, i, 54 Cunningham, J. D., i, 386 footnote, 387 footnote, 393 footnote, 394 footnote Curzon, Honourable George, i, 7 footnote Curzon, Lord, i, 266; ii, 196, 216-224; receives Afghan Mission in London, 292, 293 Cutch, province of, i, 101; ii, 4 Cyaxares (Uvakhshatra), King of Media, i, 37; subjugates Scythians, 37; forms alliance with Nabopolassar, 38; first assault on Nineveh, 39; final assault and fall of Nineveh, 39; Battle of the Eclipse, 39-40; death, 40; 83 Cynoscephalae, battle of, i, 86 Cyprus, i, 53, 56, 80 Cyra, i, 44 Cyriadis, Roman pretender, i, 127 Cyrus the Great, i, 32, 41, 48; defeats Astyages, 43; rise of, 43; King of Medes and Persians, 43; invasion of Lydia, 43; Eastern campaigns, 44; conquest of Babylon, 44; cylinder of, 44; death, 45; character, 45; 83 Cyrus, the Younger i, 54; march on Babylon, 54; battle of Cunaxa, 54-55

Cyrus, the Younger i, 54; march on Babylon, 54; battle of Cunaxa, 54-5 Dacia, i, 114 Dadur, ii, 6 Daghestan, i, 333; Nadir Shah's cam-

57, 59; defeat of, at battle of Issus, 60-61; defeat of, at battle of Arbela, 62; pursuit of, and death, 63; 149 Darmesteter, James, i, 16 Darragaz, i, 328 Dasht-i-Margo, i, 10 Dastagird, the sack of, i, 148 Dattaji Sindia, Maratha Chief, i, 360 Daulat Khan, Governor of the Punjab, i, 288, 289, 290-291 Dayaukku (Deiocee), King of Media, i, 36, 41 Daylam, i, 176, 191 Debevoise, Neilson, i, 71, 105 foutnote Debul, port of, i, 165 Deccan, i, 75; importance of presence of Akbar in, 308; Abbas intrigues with rulers of, 312; Asaf Jah retires to his province of, 323; Angria secures right of collecting the chauth in, 324; 359 Deeg, battle of, i, 176 Definitive Treaty, i, 780 de Giers, M., ii, 127, 165, 168 Deioces, King of Media, i, 35 de Langele, Galfridus, mission to Mongol Court, i, 239 Delhi, i, 287, 288, 292, 298, 302, 303, 304, 324, 341, 358, 361 Delhi, battle of, i, 260 Delos, League of, i, 53 Delphi, i, 91 Demavend, Mount, i, 35 Demetrius, Poliorcetes: battle of Gaza, i, 74; raid on Babylon, 74, 76; battle of Ipsus, 76; overthrow of, 77; death, 78 Demetrius Soter (son of Seleucus IV), i,

Diu, port of, i, 298 Dizabul, Khakan of the Turks, i, 143 Dizful, i, 257 Dobbs, Henry (later Sir Henry), chief British representative at Mussoorie Conference, ii, 288; Mission to Kabul, 290 et seq.; Treaty with Afghanistan, 364-369, Appendix H D'Ohsson, Mouradja, i, 218 footnote Dokuz Khatun (wife of Hulaku Khan), i, 235 Domandi, ii, 201; arrival of the British Commission at, 203 Dost Muhammad, Amir, i, 386, 390; policy of, 395-396; battle of Kandahar, 396; attacks the Sikhs, 397; appeals to Lord Auckland, 398; mission of Burnes to, 401, 403 et seq.; First Afghan War, ii, 1 et seq.; his defeat in September 1840, 19; reappears in the Kuhistan, 19; his surrender, 20; the second reign of, 61 et seq.; quells the Ghilzai revolts, 63, 64; annexes Kandahar, 65; Second British Treaty with, 66, 67; captures Herat and dies, 67, 68; his sons, 71; 122, 123 Drangiana, i, 44 Dufferin, Lord, ii, 127, 164 Duhamel, General, i, 407 Dukak, Timuryaligh, Seljuk Chief, i, 204 Dukchi, ii, 167 Duki, i, 317 Dungi, King of Ur, i, 22 Dura-Europus, i, 115 Durand, Sir Henry, i, 395; ii, 3, 10; "Durand Medal", 11; 13, 21, 26, 27, 18 footnate. AI

Edward II of England, i, 241 Edwardes, Herbert, Commissioner of Peshawar, ii, 71 Egypt, i, 17, 19; conquest by Esarhaddon, 30; conquest by Cambyses II, 45; revolt of, 53; reconquest by Artaxerxes III, 56-57; annexed by Alexander the Great, 61; 72, 76, 78, 80, 93; evacuated by Antiochus IV, 92, 110; sea routes from, to India, 122; 206, 259, 262 Elam, state of, i, 19, 20, 27; founders of, 19; geographical sketch of, 19; conquered by Guti mountaineers, 22; overthrows Kassite dynasty, 27; as a great power, 27; alliance with Babylonia, 29; Sennacherib's campaign against, 29-70; first campaign of Assurbanipal against, 30; second, 31; third, 31; the fall of, 31; disappearance of, 32; 50 Elburz Mountains, i, 230 Elgin, Lord, ii, 72 Elias, Ney, i, 252 footnote, 276 footnote Elizabeth of England, i, 310 Ellenborough, Lord, Governor-General of India, ii, 39, 44, 47, 48, 49; his treatment of the hostages and prisoners, 58-59; his proclamation of October 1, 59; 61 Ellis, Sir Henry, i, 262 footnote Elphinstone, General W. K., succeeds Sir W. Cotton, ii, 27; the fatal indecision of, 29 et seq.; retreat from Kabul, 33

et seq.; detained as hostage by Akbar

Khan, 35; 42; death of, at Goudah, 54 Elphinstone, Mountstuart, i, 311 footnote, Euphrates, River, i, 5, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 29, 54, 55, 62, 69, 81, 95, 104, 107, 108, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 122, 127, 128, 130, 131, 140, 142, 146, 158 Euripides, i, 110, 226 footnote
Eurydice (wife of Philip Arrhidaeus), i, 73 Euthydemus, King of Bactria, i, 85, 89, 90 Exedares (80n of Pacorus II), i, 114 Eyre, Major-General Sir Vincent, ii, 31, 32 footnote, 33, 34, 35 Ezekiel, Prophet, i, 122 footnote

Faiz Muhammad (son of Dost Muhammad), ii, 71, 75 Fakhr-ud-Din, Kurt, ruler of Herat, i, 240, 242, 243, 244 Farab (Otrar), i, 184 Farah, i, 243, 256, 330, 337, 372, 373; ii, 63 Farah Rud, ii, 91 Farrukh-Siyar, i, 324, 366 Farrukhzad (son of Masud I), i, 207, 208 Fars, the province of (ancient Parsa or Pars), i, 38, 39, 40, 117, 125, 169, 181, 191, 217, 333 Fatehabad, ii, 36 Fath Ali Khan, Mir, Talpora Chief, i, 369 Fath Ali Shah, i, 378, 381, 401 Fath Jang, puppet King of Kabul, ii, 49, 56, 57 Fath Khan (eldest son of Paianda Khan), i, 381 et seq.; defeats the Persian Army, 390; blinding of, 391 Fathullah Khan Talpora, i, 172 Fatimid dynasty, i, 206, 207, 230

Fattel Muhammad Khan (son of Akbar

Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, ii, 162 footnote

Fort Sandeman, ii, 278, 279

"Forty-fourth Hill", ii, 36

Fowle, Lieutenant T. F. T., on battle of
Maiwand, ii, 143

Fukhur-ud-Din Altái, ii, 201, 213

Gabae, i, 94 Galerius, Emperor, i, 129 Gandamak, i, 388; ii, 25, 26, 35, 36, 49, 113; treaty of, 114 Gandash, Kassite Chief, i, 26 Gandhara, i, 44, 47, 90, 94, 96, 97, 100, 101, 118, 120, 138, 143, 152, 155 Ganges, River, i, 6, 67, 90, 91, 118, 260, 295 Ganja (modern Elizabetpol): Turkey to hold, 333; besieged, 336 Gardane, Le Chevalier de, i, 325 Gardanne, General, i, 179 Gardner, Prof. Percy, i, 103 Garmsir, i, 283 Gaud-i-Zirch or Zirra, i, 4; ii, 91, 207 Gaugamela, i, 62 Gauhar Shad (wife of Shah Rukh), i, 268, 270; mosque of, 274-275 Gauls: invasion of Macedonia, i, 79; defeated by Antiochus I, 79-80 Gaykhatu (brother of Arghun), i, 239, 248 Gaza, i, 61; battle of, 74 Gedrosia (now Makran), i, 68 Geok Teppe, ii, 89 and footnote Georgia, conquered by Tamerlane, i, 256, 261 Georgians, the, i, 228 Gerard, Major-General, British representa-

312; most powerful tribe in province of Kandahar, 325; success encourages Abdalis to rebel, 326; victories won by, 329; Nadir determines to recover Persia from, 330; complete vengeance exacted on, 331; Husayn Sultan despatches force of 3000 to support of Zufilkar, 332; secretly steal away, 333; repeatedly defeated by Nadir Shah, 336; Upper Helmand held by, 337; Nadir Shah enlists several thousands in his bodyguard, 338; 350, 352, 383; ii, 22, 130; rise against Abdur Rahman, 190 Ghiyas-ud-Din, Kurt, i, 242, 243, 244, 256 ud-Din), i, 227 Saif-ud-Din, i, 211, 213

Ghiyas-ud-Din (younger brother of Jalal-

Ghiyas-ud-Din Muhammad, successor of

Ghiyas-ud-Din Pir Ali, Kurt Prince, i, 244

Ghoaine, battle of, i, 51

Gholam Haidar (son of Dost Muhammad), ii, 61; becomes Dost Muhammad's heir-apparent and Vizier, ii, 64; negotiates for Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1855, 65

Gholam Nabi Khan (son of Ghulam Haidar), Cherkhi, ii, 319, 325

Ghorband, River, i, 90

Ghorian, i, 390

Ghulam Haidar, Afghan Commander-in-Chief and Chief Commissioner, ii, 183, 184, 185

Ghulam Sadik Khan, officiating Foreign Minister during Amanulla's European

Gogra, River, battle of the, i, 294, 295 Goldsmid, General Sir Frederic, ii, 94, 95 footnote, 96, 99; mission of, 208 Gondophares, i, 118 Gortchakoff, Prince, ii, 87, 88, 109 Goudah, ii, 54 Gough, Brigadier-General Hugh, ii, 133; at battle of Kandahar, 148 Govind Singh, tenth and last Guru, i, 365 Grand Duchess Marie, daughter of the Tsar, ii, 98 Granicus, battle of, i, 59-60 Grant, Sir Hamilton, ii, 284, 359,

Appendix F Granville, Lord, ii, 162, 163, 165

Great Britain: Mission of Captain (later Sir) John Malcolm, i, 378, 379; Mission of Sir Harford Jones, 379-380; Treaty of Lahore, 387; Elphinstone Mission to Shah Shuja, 387; Captain Burnes' Mission to Dost Muhammad, 401 et seq.; First Afghan War, ii, 1 et seq.; retreat from Kabul, 22 et seq.; Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1853, 65; Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1855, 65; Anglo-Persian War of 1857, 66; Indian Mutiny, 71; Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873, 87; first Seistan Mission, 1872, 91 et seq.; the genesis of the Second Afghan War, 97 et seq.; Second Afghan War, 110 et seq.; Abdur Rahman, 120 et seq.; battles of Maiwand and Kandahar, 139 et seq.; Abdur Rahman is acknowledged Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, 151 et seq.; Panjdeh Crisis, 158 et seq.; Durand Mission to Kabul, 169 et seq.;

Gujarat, i, 303; becomes obedient to orders of Akbar, 307; occupied by Baji Rao, 324; battle of, ii, 64 Gulbadan Begum, i, 302 Gul Muhammad, meets McMahon for the first time, ii, 204 Gulnabad, battle of, i, 326, 327 Gumal, River, i, 3 Gumal Pass, i, 3; ii, 171 Gumal Valley, i, 281 Gurgan, city of, i, 137; Yezid's campaign, 164-165, 172, 188 Gurgan, River, i, 67, 82 Gurgan Valley, i, 332 Gurgin Khan (Georgian Prince), i, 325; killed by Mir Wais, 326 Gur Khan, i, 220 Gurus, the, i, 364 Gushtasp, King, i, 124 Guti mountaineers, i, 22; conquest of Babylonia, Sumer, Akkad and Elam, 22 Gutium, i, 20 Gwadur, i, 68

Habibulla, Amir, ii, 355, Appendix D Habibulla, King, i, 16 Habibulla, "the Child of the Water-Carrier", ii, 312; attacks Kabul, 312-313; proclaims himself Amir, 314; 318; his successes against Nadir Khan, 319, 320; finally defeated, captured and executed, 321 Habibulla Khan: proclaimed Amir of

Afghanistan, ii, 216; announces his

accession to the Viceroy, 216; invita-

tion by Lord Curzon, 216, and his non-

acceptance, 217; acceptance of Lord

in the Third Afghan War, ii, 276 Halule, i, 30, 37 Halys (now Kizil Irmak), River, i, 19, 40, 86 Hamadan, i, 119, 122, 178, 193, 217; captured by Turkey, 327; reoccupied by Nadir Shah, 331; army of Tahmasp finally routed near, 333 Hami, i, 119, 151 Hamida Begum (wife of Humayun), i, 299 Hamilton, Lieutenant P. F. P., account of battle of Ahmad Khel quoted, ii, 171 Hamilton, Lord George, Secretary of State for India, ii, 194 Hammurabi, King of Babylon, i, 23; code of laws, 23; 28 Hamun, i, 4 Han dynasty, i, 98, 119 Hanna, Colonel H. B., ii, 139 footnete Hannibal, i, 86 Hansi, fortress of, i, 194 Hanway, Jonas, i, 325, 347 footnote, 348 footnote, 349 footnote, 350 Haraeva, vide Herat Haraiva (Herat), i, 34 Haraiwati (modern Kandahar), i, 8 Haran, i, 23, 109 Harappa, city of, i, 25 Harauwati (Arachosia), i, 47 Hardinge, Sir Charles (later Lord), ii, 233 Har Govind, i, 365 Hari Rud, River, i, 4, 7, 9, 211, 333; 11, 67 Hari Singh, Sikh general, i, 398 Harith ibn Suraj, rebellion of, i, 167

Harmozia (medieval Hormuz), i, 69

Halley, Captain R., of the Royal Air Force,

Hay, Captain W. H., British Commissioner, ii, 186 Hayatulla Khan, Moghul governor, i, 354 Hayden, H. H., i, 5 footnote Hayton, Christian King of Armenia, i, 237-238 Hazarajat, i, 7 Hazara Mountains, i, 282 Hazaras, the, i, 15, 16, 281, 282, 283; ii, 63; rise against Abdur Rahman, 192 Hazarasp, fortress of, i, 163, 346 Hecatompylus (Damghan), i, 119 Heliocles, Governor of the eastern satrapies, 1, 92 Heliocles (son of Eucratides), i, 96, 97, Heliodorus, Seleucid minister, i, 91 Hellas, i, 49; invasion by Xerxes, 51; 56; position after Peace of Antalcidas, 56; recognition of Alexander, 58; 59, 60, 72, 74, 78, 85, 86, 87, 92 Hellespont, i, 51, 59, 79 Helmand, River, i, 4, 7, 10, 34; ii, 91, 208 Henck, Dr., ii, 249 Henry the Second, Duke of Silesia, i, 228 Henry III of Castile, embassy to Tamerlane, i, 263 Henry III of England, i, 231 Henry IV of England, i, 262 Henry IV of France, i, 310 Hephaestion, i, 66 Heracles (illegitimate son of Alexander), i, Heraclius, Emperor: accession of, i, 147; projected flight to Carthage, 147;

373, 386, 390; the siege of, 400; second siege of, 408, 409; siege of, by Muhammad Shah, ii, 1; raising of the siege of, 4; mission to, 8; captured by Dost Muhammad, 65, 66; 76, 101, 102, 103, 105, 115, 122, 134; fortification of, 166 Herbert, Colonel, in command at Attock, ii, 64 Hermaeus, King, i, 101 Hermias, Seleucid minister, i, 84 Herodotus, i, 36, 37, 43, 44, 47, 48, 51, 83 footnote, 98 Herzfeld, Dr. Ernst E., i, 17 footnote, 18 footnote, 19, 33, 34, 36 footnote Himalayas, i, 4, 25, 303 Hims, battle of, i, 237, 240 Himu, the "Corn-Chandler", chief officer of Adil Shah, i, 302, 304 Hindal, Mirza (brother of Humayun), i, 297, 298, 301, 302 Hindu Kush, i, 3; origin of name, 4, 5; 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15; passage of, by Alexander the Great, 64; 64 footnote, 75, 85, 89, 94, 100, 101, 122, 153, 156, 170, 181, 186, 222, 225, 250, 259, 286, 300, 301; constituted northern boundary by Akbar, 307; crossed by Goës, 309; 357 Hindus, i, 322 Hindu Sahis, dynasty of, i, 189 Hindustan, i, 191 Hira, Arab state, i, 146 Hiram, King, i, 122 Hisar III, i, 25 Hissar, i, 280, 286, 287, 305 Histiaeus of Miletus, i, 49

Hotiki Ghilzaie, i, 338 Hou-han-shu, Chinese History, i, 119 footnote Howorth, Sir Henry, i, 218 footnote Hsieh-li, Khan of the Northern Turks, 149, 150 Hsuan-tsang, Buddhist monk and Chinese explorer, i, 2, 8, 44, 64, 103, 120, 139; commences his great journey, 150; meets the Khakan of the Western Turks, 151-152; crosses Central Asia, 152; arrives at Kapisi, 154; reaches Parushapur (Peshawar), 154; 155; his return journey, 155-156; granted an official reception at Changan, 156 Hubberton, William, ii, 83 footnote Hudud-al-Alam, the, i, 14 Hue-Chao, Korean monk, i, 168 Hulaku Khan (brother of Mangu), i, 191, 197; founded dynasty of the Il-Khans, 229; destroys Ismaili fortresses, 231-232; defeated by Mamelukes at battle of Ayn Jalut, 234; defeats Barka, Chief of the Golden Horde, 235; death, 236; 237, 243, 246 Humayun, Emperor, i, 250, 284, 290, 291, 297; Indian campaigns of, 297; capture of Champaner, 297-298; final defeat of, 298; the exile of, 299; retakes Kabul, 300, 301; blinds his brother Kamran, 301; invades India, 303; death, 303; character, 303; 304, 319 Humayun Mirza (eldest son of Timur Shah), i, 370, 372 Humphrys, Major (later Sir) Francis, ii, 295; first British Minister at Kabul, 296, 303

Huzha, Aryan tribe, occupation of Elam, 1, 41 Hydaspes, the (modern River Jhelum), i. Hyderabad, i, 323 Hykulzai, ii, 43, 44 Hyphasis (Beas), River, i, 67 Hyrcania, conquered by Alexander the Great, i, 63, 82, 85, 95 Hyrcanus (Jewish leader), i, 111 Hystaspes, Viceroy of Bactria, rebellion of, 1, 52 Hystaspes (father of Darius), i, 44, 46, 83 Ibn Battuta, Moslem traveller, i, 4; on Hindu Kush, 4; starts off on pilgrimage to Mecca, 248; meets Orkham Beg, 249; crosses the Oxus into Afghanistan, 249; visits Herat, Meshed and Nishapur, 249; crosses the Hindu Kush, 250; visits Kabul and Ghazni and marches down to the Indus, 250-251; compared with Marco Polo, 251 Ibn Hawkal, Moslem geographer, i, 170 Ibn-ul-Athir, the historian, 218 footnote, 219 Ibrahim, Governor, i, 177 Ibrahim Beg, the "Robin Hood" of Bukhara, ii, 324 Ibrahim (blind brother of Masud I), i, 195, 196 Ibrahim (brother of Farrukhzad), i, 208 Ibrahim (eldest son of Muhammad Ali), i, 172 Ibrahim Khan (brother of Nadir Shah), i, 347, 362, 263

Ibrahim Lodi, Sultan, i, 288, 289, 290;

Imeritia, province of, i, 104 Inayatulla Khan, Sirdar, ii, 226, 257, 258, 261, 313 Indabugash, King, i, 31 India: migration of Aryans into, i, 34, 41, 48; Indian campaign, 48; invaded by Alexander the Great, 67; 75, 94, 100, 101; sea routes from Egypt to, 122; White Huns invade, 138-139; 152, 153, 154, 155, 181; expeditions of Mahmud into, 188, 209; campaigns of Muizz-ud-Din, 211-212; 213, 227, 230, 232, 234, 243; invaded and plundered by Tamerlane, 258-260; Baber's first expedition into, 288; 297, 302, 307, 315, 319, 364, 373, 374; Napoleon's plan to attack, 377; ii, 104, 105, 108 Indian Mutiny, ii, 67 Indian Ocean, i, 12, 48; Alexander the Great's march to, 69; 91, 119, 122 Indo-European tribes, i, 33 Indra, god, i, 34 Indus, River, i, 1, 5, 24, 25, 26, 48, 49, 66, 69, 75, 91, 100, 101, 156, 213, 224, 243, 251, 259, 260, 288, 290, 303, 341, 354, 358, 359, 372, 373; ii, 4, 61, 011 Indus Valley, third centre of prehistoric civilization, i, 5, 6, 7, 24, 138, 195, 281, 295 Ionia, i, 41 Ionic revolt, i, 49 Ipsus, the battle of, i, 76 Iran, vide Persia Iranian Plateau, i, I footnote, 5, 11, 18, 19, 20, 20, 27, 41, 00

Iskandar Khan (son of Sulayman Mirsa). 1, 370 Iskandar (son of Kara Yusuf), i, 269, 272; proclaimed Khan, 305; 313 Islam: the rise of, i, 157, 160; the spread of, 168 et seq.; influence of the Seljuks, 203 et seq.; 309 Islam Shah (Jalal Khan, younger son and successor of Sher Shah), i, 301, 302 Ismail, Samanid Prince, i, 182, 183 Ismail, the disinherited Imam, i, 230 Ismailis, the, i, 230, 248 Ismail (younger son of Sabuktigin), i, 187 Issik-Kul, Lake, i, 99, 152 Issus, battle of, i, 60; 147 Istalif, ii, 57 Istami (brother of Chief Tumen), i, 143 Iyas, Chief of Tayy tribe, i, 145, 146 Izz-ud-Din, Vizier, i, 243 Jabbar Khan, ii, 11, 15 Jacob, General John, warden of the Sind frontier, ii, 70 and footnote Jacobabad, ii, 106

Jabbar Khan, ii, 11, 15

Jacob, General John, warden of the Sind frontier, ii, 70 and footnote

Jacobabad, ii, 106

Jafar-al-Sadik, i, 230

Jafar (son of Yahya, the Barmecide), i, 176; death, 177

Jagdalak Pass, i, 284, 320; ii, 35, 50, 53

Jahandar Shah, Mir, ii, 128

Jahangir: ascends throne, 311, 312; visits Kabul, 313; death, 313-314

Jahangir Mirza (brother of Baber), i, 278, 282

Jahan Khan, adviser to Timur Mirza, i, 358

Jaipal, Raja of the Punjab, i, 187, 188

Jajau, battle of, i, 323

Jaunpur, i, 297 Jaxartes (Sir Daria), River, i, 6, 7, 44, 45; Alexander's advance to, 65; 74, 78, 91, 143, 204 Jaz Morian, Lake, i, 69 Jemal Pasha, Turkish general, ii, 289 Jenkins, Colonel, ii, 133 Jenkinson, Anthony, envoy of Queen Elizabeth, i, 299 Jeremiah, Book of, i, 37 footnote, 40 footnote Jerusalem, i, 146, 248 Jesuits, i, 308 Jezailchis, i, 335 Jhelum, River, i, 66, 68, 97, 100, 289, 313 Johnson, Dr. N. K., i, 11 footnote Johnston, E. H., i, 88 footnote Jones, Sir Harford, mission of, i, 379-380 Jovian, Emperor, i, 132 Juan-Juan, the, i, 142, 143 Juji (eldest son of Chenghiz Khan), i, 221, 278 Julian, Emperor: expedition of, i, 131; retreat of, and death, 132 Jullandur, i, 303, 304 Jumna, River, i, 361 Junayd ibn Abdur Rahman, i, 167 Justin II, i, 147, 144 Justinian, Emperor, i, 139; peace treaty with Noshirwan, 141 Juwayni, historian, i, 225

Kabul, i, 5; captured by Babur, 7; 9; climate of, 11; 64, 97, 159, 162, 163, 170, 181, 186, 223, 225, 243, 250, 251,

Kaisar Mirsa (son of Zaman Shah), i, 373, 386, 391 Kajar dynasty, i, 371 Kakhaha, ii, 92, 93 Kala-i-Safid, i, 257 Kalaj Khan of Khaf, i, 373 Kalantar, i, 313 Kala Panja, i, 6 Kalat, i, 11, 336, 347, 349, 359; ii, 105, 110 Kalat-i-Ghilzai, i, 283, 284, 337, 371; 11, 42, 43, 44, 74, 117, 147 Kalat-i-Nadiri, fortress of, i, 238, 256, 729 Kallar, Vizier of Laga-Turman, i, 189 Kaluskin, Russian Resident Tehran, i, 347 Kamaroff, General, Governor of the Akhal Oasis, ii, 162, 163 Kamar-ud-Din, usurper, i, 255 Kamran Mirza (brother of Humayun), i, 297, 298, 300; blinded by Humayun, 301 Kamran Shah (son of Mahmud Shah), i, 384, 385, 386, 391, 400, 401; murder and plunder of, ii, 62 Kanauj, i, 190 Kandahar, i, 5, 8; made capital of Durrani Kingdom, 9; Shah Ahmad buried in, 9; 256, 259, 268, 277, 280, 283, 284; capture of, by Baber, 290; 300, 303, 304, 306, 307; Shah Abbas captures, 312; 314, 315; three sieges of, 316, 317; 318, 325, 326, 328, 336, 338, 345, 351, 352, 355, 368, 369, 371, 372, 381, 385; ii, 1, 2, 4, 5, 22, 42, 43, 65,

81, 110, 115, 117, 121, 130, 139;

Kara Osman (grandfather of Uzun Hasan), i, 272 Karapa Pass, i, 320 Karashahr, district of, i, 151 Kara Yusuf, Prince, i, 256, 261, 269 Kariz, village of, i, 1, 7 Karkheh, River, i, 19, 33 Karkuyah, city of, i, 170 Karluks, the, i, 173, 184 Karnal, i, 212, 341; battle of, 342 Kars, i, 256, 312, 336 Karshi, i, 255 Karun, i, 19, 33 Karun, River, i, 69, 73 Kashaf Rud, i, 90 Kashgar, i, 120, 121, 156, 164, 184, 185, 188, 203, 207, 220, 247, 268, 308, 309, 319 Kashmir, i, 13, 75, 120, 193, 307, 313, 365, 366, 385, 392 Kashtiliash II, i, 26 Kassites, the, i, 20, 27; derivation of name, 26; Kassite dynasty, 26, 27 Kataghan, province of, ii, 122 Kathiawar, i, 101, 190 Kaufmann, General, ii, 97, 98, 106, 107, 108, 113, 126 Kaydu (grandson of Ogotay), i, 236 Kaye, Sir J. W., i, 1, 402 footnote, 403 footnote, 404 footnote; ii, 38 footnote, 42 footnote, 48 footnote, 49 Kazan Khan, the Western Chagatay ruler, i, 252 Kazghan, Amir, i, 252, 253 Kazvin, i, 222, 230, 257, 299, 327, 328 Kazvini, i, 170 Keane, Sir John, ii, 4, 6, 11

Khalid (grandson of Amr-ul-Lais), i, 188 and footnote Khalil Sultan (son of Miranshah), i, 268 Khalsa, ii, 2 Khamiab, district of, i, 2 Khanate of Astrakhan, i, 313 Khan Dauran, Commander-in-Chief of Nizam-ul-Mulk, i, 341, 342 Khanka, i, 346 Khan Miraa, i, 283 and footnote, 290 Khan of Kalat, ii, 6, 7 Khan Sahib, a leader of the Red Shirts, ii, 323 Khanua, battle of, i, 294, 297 Khanzada Begum (Baber's elder sister), i, 279, 286 Kharak, island of, i, 410; ii, 66 Kharan, district of, i, 11 Kharijites, the, i, 167 and footnote Kharistan, i, 168 Khash Rud, ii, 91 Khaysar, fortress of, i, 243, 244 Khiva, i, 125, 215, 271, 315, 319, 328; Nadir Shah's campaign against, 346; 374; first Russian expedition, ii, 83-84; annexation of, 86-87; 98 Khivakabad, i, 347 Khizr Khan, Governor of Multan, i, 287 Khizr-Khels, the, i, 290 Khizr Khwaja Khan (son of Khwaja Ilyas), i, 255 Khoi, i, 263 Khojak Pass, ii, 5, 7 Khojand, i, 166, 167, 277, 278 Khokars, the, i, 189, 213 Khorasmia, i. 82

Khusru Shah (Ghaznavid dynasty), successor of Bahram, i, 210 Khusru (son of Jahangir): loaded with chains and subsequently blinded, i, 311; rebellions of, 313; 365 Khuzistan, i, 19; origin of name, 41 Khwaja Salar, ii, 88 and footnote Khwandamir, historian, i, 240, 285 footnote, 287 footnote Khwarizm dynasty, i, 215; founded by Anushtigin, 216; at its zenith, 216; 237, 347 Khwarizm (Khiva), i, 34, 163, 165; Mahmud's expedition against, 190-191; 206, 213, 214, 216, 253; conquered by Tamerlane, 255; 256, 278 Kila Alladad, ii, 75 Kilif, town of, i, 2, 7 Kin dynasty, i, 219 King, L. W., ii, 187 Kings, 1st Book of, i, 122 footnote Kipchak, i, 258 Kipchaks, the, i, 221 Kiriklu, i, 333 Kirki, ii, 80 Kirkuk, i, 334, 335 Kitchener, Lord, ii, 226 Kizil, River, i, 121 Kizilbash, the, i, 383, 384 Kizil Kum (or "Red Sand") desert, i, 152 Kizil Tapa, ii, 163 Knolles, Richard, i, 252 footnote, 261, 262 Kobad (son of Firuz): first reign, i, 137; second reign, 137-138; first war with Rome, 137-138; second war with Rome, 139-140 Kobad II (Siroes), i, 148; peace treaty with

Kuhistan district, i, 230 Kuh-i-Taftan, ii, 206 Kuhlberg, Colonel, Russian Commissioner, ii, 166 Kujbaz, battle of, ii, 73 Kujula Kadphises I, i, 118 Kul-i-Malik, i, 287 Kunar, River, i, 7, 288 Kunar Valley, i, 66 Kundar, River, i, 3 Kunduz, i, 156, 250, 254, 259 Kunduz Mountains, ii, 223 Kupkan, i, 328 Kur, i, 334 Kur, River, i, 107, 192, 236 Kurdistan, i, 19 Kurds, i, 329 Kurigalzu III, i, 27 Kurram, ii, 114, 115 Kurram Valley, ii, 110, 111, 114, 156, 323, 345; 11, 171 Kursul, the Baga Tarkhan, i, 168 Kurt dynasty, i, 15 Kurt Maliks, foundation of the dynasty of the, i, 243; extinguished by Tamerlane, 244 Kushan, the, i, 100 Kushan dynasty, i, 118 Kushi, ii, 117 Kushk, River, ii, 163 Kushk, town of, i, 2, 9 Kushk-i-Nakhud, ii, 141 Kutayba ibn Muslim, i, 160; campaigns of, 161 et seq.; death, 164 Kuth-ud-Din Aibak: appointed Viceroy and captures Delhi, i, 212; assumes title of Sultan, 213-214

Landi Kotal, i, 3; ii, 274 Lane-Poole, Prof. Stanley, i, 205, 252 footnote, 276 footnote, 295 Lansdowne, Lord, Viceroy of India, ii, 169, 272 Laodice (wife of Antiochus II), i, 80 Larkana, i, 345 Latham, Captain H. B., ii, 139 footnote Lawrence, A. W., i, 36 footnote, 71 Lawrence, Captain George, ii, 13 footnote, 20, 27, 31, 52 footnote, 56, 58 Lawrence, Sir Henry, letter to Lord Stanley, ii, 70 and footnote Lawrence, Sir John (later Lord): negotiates for Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1855, ii, 65; the close border policy of, 70; 75, 77 Layas or Ayaz, i, 245 Lazgie, the, i, 347 Lazica (ancient Colchis), campaigns of, i, 142, 145, 148 Leilan, i, 335 Leonidas, King, i, 51 Le Strange, Guy, i, 157 footnote, 263 footnote Liegnitz, i, 228 Lockhart, Dr. Laurence, i, 325 Lockhart, Sir William, i, 10 Loftus, Lord, ii, 107 Logar Valley, ii, 112 Lohanis, the, i, 295 Lomakin, General: proclamation and campaigns of, ii, 89; defeated at Geok Teppe, 89 Longfellow, H. W., his poem "Kambalu", 1, 232

Loppor, i. 121

Lynch, Major Hyacinth, ii, 139 footnote; his account of the battle of Maiwand, 144
Lysimachia, i, 79
Lysimachus, i, 74; battle of Ipsus, 76, 77; defeat of, and death, 78
Lytton, Lord, ii, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 113, 115, 116, 133

Macaulay, Colman, ii, 239 Macaulay, Lieutenant, ii, 187 McCaskill, General, ii, 50, 57 McCrindle, J. W., i, 139 footnote Macedonia, i, 49, 51; rise of, under Philip and Alexander, 58 et seq., 72, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80; invaded by the Gauls, 79; first Macedonian War, 85-86; second Macedonian War, 86, 87 McGovern, Dr. W. M., i, 98, 134 MacGregor, Captain (Political Officer), ii, 25, 29, 40, 41 Mackay, Dr., i, 17 footnote, 25 Mackenzie, Captain Colin, ii, 31 and footnote, 48 Mackeson, Captain, ii, 46 Maclaren, Brigadier, ii, 29, 30 MacLean, Major-General C. S., ii, 201 McMahon, A. H., i, 3 footnote McMahon, Captain (later Sir) Henry, ii, 91 and footnote; Commissioner on boundary between Afghanistan and Indian Empire, 1894-1896, 201-207; the benefits to Afghanistan, 207; British Commissioner and Arbitrator between Afghan and Persian claims in the province of Seistan, 208; presented with Order of

Madain, capital of the Sasanian monarche. 1, 159, 174 Madaktu, city of, i, 19, 30 Maffey, John (later Sir John), defines Khaibar demarcation, ii, 288 Magi, the, i, 117 Magnesia, battle of, i, 86, 89, 103 Mahabharata, the, i, 97 Mahendra, Indian seditionist, ii, 287 Mahmud of Ghazni, the "Idol-Breaker", i, 14, 187; ascends the throne and secures recognition of the Caliph, 187; first Indian expeditions of, 188; defeats the Ilak Khan, 188-189; defeat of an Indian confederacy, 189; annexed Ghur, 189; overthrow of Sahi dynastics of Kabul, 189; expedition against Khwarizm, 190; expedition against Muttra and Kanauj, 190; expedition against Somnath, 190; annexed Buwayhid provinces, 192; death and character, 191-192, 198; and the Seljuks, 204-205; 270 Mahmud, King (son of Muhammad), i, 258 Mahmud, successor of Sabuktigin, i, 184, 185 Mahmudabad, village of, ii, 142, 144 Mahmud-al-Hasan, Maulana, religious leader, ii, 259 Mahmud (brother of Sultan Ahmad), i, 27 I Mahmud (eldest son of Mir Wais), i, 326; appointed Governor of Kandahar, 326 Mahmud Khan, Sultan, ruler of Badakhshan, i, 271, 279 Mahmud Lodi, Sultan (brother of Sultan

mission to Persia, i, 378; second mission, 379 Malik Kaward of Kerman, i, 206 Malik Mahmud: raises army and marches to Gulnabad, i, 327; Tahmasp twice defeated by, 129 Malik, Shah, Seljuk, reign of, i. 206 Malleson, Colonel G. B., i, 351 footnote Mallet, Bernard, ii, 102 footnote Malloi, the, i, 68 Mallu Khan (brother of Sarang Khan), i. 259, 260 Malta, ii, 108 Malwa, i, 138, 303, 324 Mamelukes: dynasty, i, 180; 234 and footnote; battle of Ayn Jalut, 234; battle of Abulistin, 237; battle of Hims, 237 Mamun, i, 178-179; golden age of Moslem culture, 179; 182, 197 Mamun II, i, 190 Mandane, Princess (daughter of Astyages, and mother of Cyrus the Great), i, 41 Mandu, i, 298, 312 Mangu (son of Tuli), i, 229, 237, 243 Manishtusu, i, 21 Man Singh, Raja, i, 306 Mansur, Abu Jafar, i, 174, 176, 230 Mansur (son of Maudud), i, 197 Mansur I of Bukhara, i, 186 Maneur II, i, 184 Manuel II Comneni, i, 263 Manupur, the battle of, i, 354 Maracanda (now Samarkand), i, 65 Maragha, i, 235 Maratha Empire, i, 320, 321, 324 Marathas, i, 320, 321, 324, 358 et seq.

Masudi, Abul Hasan Ali, Arab historian, 1, 117 Masum Khan, Persian Commissioner, ii, 94, 96 Mathura (Muttra), i, 96, 97, 100, 120 Maudad (son of Masud I), i, 195, 196; campaign against the Seljuks, 196; rebellion of the Rajas, 196; rebellion of Toghril Beg, "the Ingrate", 196; rebellion in Ghur, 196-197; death, 197 Maues, Sakae leader, i, 101 Maurice, Emperor, i, 144, 145, 147 Maurya Empire, i, 75, 85, 90 Mayo, Lord, ii, 77, 100 Mazanderan, i, 222, 227, 256, 329, 338, 347 Mazar-i-Sharif, i, 10; ii, 113 Mazdak, i, 137 Mecca, i, 157, 175, 206, 230, 244, 248, 249, 301, 309 Medes, the, i, 28, 38; migration of, 35; the Empire of, 39; culture and art of, 41 Media, i, 15; Deioces, 36; Phraortes' conquest of the Persians, 36; Scythian invasion, 36; Cyaxares subjugates Scythians, 37; 71, 81, 83, 95, 96 Media Atropatene, i, 126 Medina, Muhammad's "flight" to, i, 157, 175, 206, 249 Mediterranean Sea, i, 28, 29, 74, 204, 234 Megasthenes, envoy to the Court of Chandragupta, i, 75 Mehdi, Caliph, i, 175, 182 Mehdi Ali Khan, mission to the Court of Persia, i, 377 Mehmandost, i. 221

Miletus, fall of, i, 50, 60, 80 Miller, M., Russian Consul, ii, 209 Miltiades, battle of Marathon, i, 51 Ming, Emperor, i, 119 Mingrelia, province of, i, 104 Minorsky, Prof. V., 14 footnote Minto, Lord, i, 380, 387 Mir Alam of Seistan, i, 356 Mir Ali Khel, ii, 278 Mir Ali Shir, Nawai, Vizier, i, 271 Mir Alum, Governor of Balkh, ii, 80, 126 Miranshah (son of Tamerlane), i, 260 Mir Atalik, ii, 122, 123 Mire, battle of the, i, 254 footnote Mirkhwand, historian, i, 267 footnote, 269, 271 Mir Wais, sent to Isfahan as prisoner, i, 325-326 Mitannu, i, 34 Mithra, god, i, 34 Mithradates I, King of Parthia, i, 95 Mithradates II, King of Parthia, i, 99, 101, 104 Mithridates, King of Pontus, i, 81 Mithridates VI, King of Pontus, i, 104; and Mithridatic wars, 105-106 Mithridatic wars, i, 105-106 Moa, vide Maues Modhar Arabs, i, 175 Moghul dynasty, i, 276 et seq. Moghulistan, i, 254 Moghuls, i, 306, 307, 309, 315, 317, 319, 320, 323, 324, 325 Mogulkot, post of, ii, 278 Mohamera, ii, 66 Mohan Lal, i, 403 footnote; ii, 28 footnote Mohenio-Daro, city of, i. 25, 26

Motasim, Caliph, i, 180 Muaffak (brother of Caliph Motamid), i, 181, 182 Muavia, Caliph, founder of Umayyad dynasty, i, 159 Muazzam, Prince, i, 323 Mughan plain, i, 336 Mughlani Begum (mother of Muin-ul-Mulk), i, 358 Muhabbat Khan, Chief of Kalat, i, 313, 337 Muhammad, Prophet, i, 125, 146; founds a mighty empire, 157; 203, 249 Muhammad Afzal (son of Dost Muhammad), ii, 61; appointed governor of Afghan Turkistan, 64 Muhammad Akram (son of Dost Muhammad), ii, 61 Muhammad Ali (head of the Abbasid family), i, 172 Muhammad Ali (son of Shir Ali), ii, 72; killed at battle of Kujbaz, 73 Muhammad Amin, Governor of Kandahar, ii, 71; killed at battle of Kujbaz, 73 Muhammad Azim Khan (eldest of the Barakzai brothers), i, 392, 393 Muhammad Azim (son of Dost Muhammad), ii, 61 Muhammad Bahlim, Governor of the Punjab, i, 200 Muhammad bin Suri, i, 189 Muhammad bin Zaid, i, 183 Muhammad (brother of Sultan Sanjar), i, 214 Muhammad Hakim Mirza (half-brother of Akbar), i, 304; invades the Punjab, 305

Muhammad Shah, successor of Fath Ali Shah, i, 401, 402, 403, 407; second siege of Herat, 408 et seq. Muhammad Shah Khan, Ghilzai Chief, ii, 63 Muhammad Sharif, Governor of Farah and Girishk, ii, 71; deseated at battle of Kujbaz, 73 Muhammad (son of Ismail), i, 230 Muhammad (son of Kasim), i, 165 Muhammad (son of Mahmud), i, 193 Muhammad Wali Khan, Sirdar, heads Afghan Mission to Europe, ii, 292 Muhammad Yusuf Sadozai, ii, 66, 67 Muhammad Zaman Khan, i, 710 Muin-ul-Mulk (son of Kamr-ud-Din, the Vizier), i, 355, 357 Muir, Sir William, i, 157 footnote; ii, 104 Muizz-ud-Din Muhammad, i, 210; Indian campaigns of, 211-212; defeat of, by Ala-ud-Din of Khwarizm, 212; last campaign of, in India, 213; death, 213 Muizz-ud-Din (third son of Ghiyas-ud-Din), reign of, i, 244 Mukarrab Khan, regent, i, 259 Mukim (son of Zunnun Arghun), i, 280, 283, 284 Mulahida (or "Heretics"), sect of, i, 230, 232 Mulhar Rao Holkar, ruler of Indore, i, Multan, i, 68, 165, 188, 190, 205, 209, 211, 224, 230, 259, 333, 357 Mumtaz Mahal, Shahjahan's unfailing love for, i, 319 Munro, General Sir Charles, ii, 272, 278 Murad Baksh, i, 318

Muttra, i, 190
Muzaffar dynasty, i, 257
Muzaffar Husayn Mirza, Safavi Governor of Kandahar, i, 307
Muzaffar Khan of Multan, i, 387
Muzaffar-ud-Din, Amir, of Bukhara, ii, 79, 80, 123
Muziris, port, i, 122
Mysore, i, 75, 321, 324, 374

Nab, i, 211
Nabonidus, King, i, 44
Nabopolassar, King, i, 38; forms alliance
with Cyaxares, 38-39
Nadirabad: Nadir Shah names town, i

Nadirabad: Nadir Shah names town, i, 337; population of Kandahar moved to, 338

Nadir Khan, ii, 270; movements during Third Afghan War, 277; besieges the fort at Thal, 279; defeat of, 280; returns to Afghanistan to fight against Habibulla, 319; suffers reverses, 320; but succeeds at third offensive, 320-321; proclaimed king, 321; summary of his early career, 322; Soviet-Afghan Treaty, 324; publishes declaration of policy, 324; assassination of, 327

Nadir Kuli Beg (later Nadir Shah), i, 328

Nadir Shah: recovers lost provinces of Persia, i, 325-338; origin of, 328; defeats a force of Abdalis, 329; decides to crush Abdalis, 330; defeats Ashraf at Mehmandost, 331; reoccupies Hamadan, Kermanshah and Tabriz, 331; besieges Herat, 332; captures Herat, 333; defeat of, 224; victory of Baghayand, 235;

Nana, goddess, image of, carried off to Susa, i, 22; restored to Erech, 22; 31 Nangrahar, i, 196 Nao Nehal Singh, ii, 19 Napoleon Buonaparte: expedition to Egypt, i, 376; plans to attack India across Persia, 377 Naram-Sin, Stele of, i, 22 Narbada, i, 320 Narmashir, i, 85 Narses, Sasanian monarch, campaigns of, 1, 129-130 Nasatya, god, i, 74 Nasir, Caliph, i, 217, 221, 227 Nasir Khan, Governor of Kabul, i, 354 Nasir Khan, Subadar of Kabul and Peshawar, i, 340, 341 Nasir Khan of Kalat, i, 356, 359, 371 Nasir Mirza (brother of Baber), i, 284 Nasir-ud-Din, Shah, ii, 75 Nasir-ud-Din of Tue, astronomer and philosopher, i, 236 Nasir-ul-Mulk (eldest son of the Mehtar of Chitral), ii, 187 Nasr, Samanid prince, i, 182 Nasratabad, ii, 95 Nasr ibn Sayyar, Governor of Khurasan, i, 167; the campaigns of, 168, 171 Nasr II, reign of, 183-184; 198 Nasrulla Khan, Shahzada (second son of Abdur Rahman), his visit to England, 11, 193

Nasrulla Khan, Sirdar, ii, 226, 230, 246,

Nasrulla Mirza (second son of Nadir Shah),

257, 258, 260, 261, 263

1. 242

Nasrulla Khan of Bukhara, ii, II

Nicolls, Sir Jasper, Commander-in-Chief in India, ii, 38, 47 Nicopolis, i, 261 Niedermayer, Captain Oskar, German Agent, ii, 251; leader of German Mission to the Amir, 255; his scheme for a coup d'état found to be impracticable, 258; failure of his Mission, 258 Nile, valley of, i, 17, 18, 25, 72 Nineveh, i, 28, 31, 32, 36, 38; Cyarares' first assault, 39; final assault and fall, 39; 62 Ninhar (Ningrahar), King of, i, 14 Nisa, i, 223 Nishapur, i, 159, 172, 174, 181, 182, 184, 194, 200, 205, 215, 222, 223, 225, 236, 250, 263, 308, 356 Nieibie, i, 116, 126, 127, 130, 139, 144 Nizak, Prince of Badghis, i, 161; rebellion of, 162 Nizam, dynasty of the, i, 323 Nizami, poet, i, 269-270 Nizam-ul-Mulk, i, 206, 207, 230; Viceroy of the Deccan, 340, 341, 342 Noman, Arab Chief, i, 146 Norman, Sir Henry, ii, 104 Northbrook, Lord, proposed guarantee, ii, 99; 100, 101, 102, 104, 106 Northern Afghanistan, i, 25 Northern Khurasan, i, 333 North-West Frontier: problem of, an economic question, i, 319; Auranzeb leaves, 320; main body of imperial forces on, 321; negotiations during Durand Mission, ii, 175; 196 North-West Frontier Province, i, 3, 13 Noruz, Mongol general, i, 240, 243

Nushtigin, Governor of the Punjab, i, 207, 208 Obaydulla, Indian seditionist, ii, 287; expelled from Afghanistan, 296 Ochus, Prince, afterwards Darius III, q.v. Odenathus of Palmyra, i, 128 O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, ii, 271 footnote Ogotay (third son of Chenghis), i, 226, 227, 228; death, 228 Olympias (wife of Philip of Macedonia), i, 58, 72, 73 Omar Khayyam, i, 136, 199, 200-201 Omar Shaykh Mirza (father of Baber), i, 270, 271; death, 276 Omar II, i, 169 Onon, River, i, 226 Orakzais, i, 307 Orenburg, ii, 83, 84 Orissa, i, 307 Orkhan Beg (son of Othman Chuk), i, 249 Orobazus, Parthian ambassador, i, 104 Orodes II, King of Parthia, i, 107, 108, 110 Orta Bel Pass, ii, 182 Osh, i, 221, 279 Osman, Topal: Turkish army under, i, 334; defeat of, and death, 335 Osmanli Turks, i, 249, 261 Osroes, King of Parthia, i, 114-115 Ostrogoths, the, i, 141 Othman Chuk, eponymous founder of Ottoman dynasty, i, 249 Othman Khan of Samarkand, i, 213, 220 Otrar, i, 265 Ottoman Empire, i, 332 Oudh, i, 297, 323, 374, 375

Palmer, Colonel, ii, 43, 55 Palmerston, Lord, i, 400, 405, 410 Palmyra, i, 128 Pamir, River, tributary of River Oxus, i, Pamirs, i, 2, 5, 6, 119, 120, 121, 156, 232, 309; Anglo-Russian rivalry, ii, 178; boundary questions finally settled, 180 Pan-Chao, Chinese general, i, 119; establishes authority of China to Caspian Sea, 119; 120 Panipat: battle of, i, 291-292, 304; third battle of, 362 Panjdeh Crisis: Russian advance on the Panjdeh Oasis, ii, 162; defeat of the Afghans, 164; settlement of, 165 Panjshir, i, 251 Panjshir, River, i, 7, 66, 90, 118, 121, 154; 11, 53 Papak (father of Ardeshir), i, 125 Paphlagonia, i, 104 Parachinar, ii, 277 Parapamisadae, the, i, 75 Paris, Matthew, i, 227, 231 Parker, E. H., i, 142 footnote Parmenio, Macedonian general, i, 61 Parni, the, i, 83 Paropamisus, i, 4, 5, 90, 94, 96, 101, 118 Parsa (or Pars), province of, vide Fars Parsii, the, i, 100, 101 Parsua, district of, i, 35, 37 Parsumash, district of, i, 30, 37, 38, 39, 40 Parthamasiris, Prince of Armenia, i, 114 Parthia, i, 39, 44, 63; rise of, 82; earliest mention of 82-82: 85, 87, 00, 02, 05,

Pelly, Sir Lewis, Commissioner of Peshawar, ii, 104, 105 Pelusium, i, 46 Penkelaotis, i, 66 Perdiccas, Macedonian regent, i, 71, 72, 78 Pergamum, i, 103, 105 Perovski, Count, ii, 84 Peroz (son of Yezdigird III), i, 160 Persepolis, i, 18, 41; occupation of, by Alexander the Great, 62; 94, 127, 192, 197 Perseus, King of Macedonia, i, 92, 103 Persia: Persians and Medes conquer Iranian Plateau, i, 33 et seq.; Cyrus the Great, 43 et seq.; Alexander the Great, 58 et seq.; decline of Persian Empire, 146 et seq.; first invasion of, by Arabs, 157; battle of Khadesiya, 158; Arab conquest of, 159; Abbasid dynasty and its decay, 171 et seq.; growth of Persian language, 197; birth of Persian literature, 198; Tamerlane's early campaigns in, 256; sieges of Kandahar, 316-317; Nadir Shah, 328 et seq.; French negotiations with, 377-379; siege of Herat, 400; mission of Captain Burnes, 401 et seq.; Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1853, ii, 65; occupation of Herat, 65-66; Anglo-Persian War of 1857, 66; campaigns against the Turkoman, 88 Persian Baluchistan, i, 11, 183 Persian Gulf, i, 19, 20, 21, 27, 29, 87, 93, 115, 119, 183, 245, 248, 285; ii, 102 Pertinax, Emperor, i, 116

Peshawar, i. 8, 118, 122, 187, 180, 197,

Phraates II (son of Mithradates), King of Parthia, i, 96, 99 Phraates III, King of Parthia, i, 106 Phraates IV, i, 112, 113 Phraortes, the Mede, i, 36; reduced Teispes to position of vassal ruler, 38 Phrygia, i, 72, 79 Piraeus, i, 105 Pirai (successor of Balkatigin), ruler of Ghazni, i, 186 Pir Muhammad (son of Jahangir), i, 259, 267 Pir Paimal, village of, ii, 148 Pishin, ii, 114 Pithon, satrap of Media, i, 72 Plataea, battle of, i, 52 Pliny, i, 44, 123 Plutarch, i, 52, 74, 77, 104, 107, 109, 110 Poles, the, i, 228 Pollock, General Sir George: at Peshawar, ii, 39; 44; forces the Khaibar Pass, 46-47; relief of Jalalabad, 47; his reply to Ellenborough, 48; 49; advances to Gandamak, 49, 50; battle of Tezin, 50; reoccupation of Kabul, 56-57; 94, 96, 112 Pollock, General Sir Richard, Commissioner of Peshawar, ii, 94; 102 Polybius, the historian, i, 82, 92, 95 Polyperchon, Regent of Macedonia, i, 73 Polytimetus (now Zerafshan) Valley, i, 65 Pompey: takes command of Roman armies, i, 106, 107; results of campaign, 107; fight for power with Caesar, 110 Pontus, i, 107, 111

Ptolemy Keraunus, i, 78; assassination of Seleucus, 79; defeat of, and death, 79 Ptolemy Philadelphus, reign of, i, 78 Ptolemy III (Euergetes), reign of, i, 81, 87, 84 Publius (son of Crassus), i, 109 Pul-i-Khisti, ii, 163 Pul-i-Sanghin, i, 286 Punic Wars: First, i, 85; Second, i, 86 Punjab, the, i, 48, 57, 67, 93, 94, 97, 125, 188, 208, 211, 259, 281, 288, 289, 290, 291, 303, 323; Ahmad Shah's first invasion of, 354; second invasion, third invasion, 357; fourth invasion, 358; seized by the Marathas, 358-359; dominated by the Sikha, 366; 372, 373, 392 Pura, i, 68, 69 Purdil Khan (brother of Dost Muhammad Khan), i, 394 Pushyamitra, Commander-in-Chief to Asoka, i, 75 Pydna, battle of, i, 92 Pyne, Salter (later Sir Salter), ii, 173 and footnote Pyrrhus, Prince of Epirus, i, 77, 78 Pythia, the, i, 91 Quetta, ii, 6, 7, 11, 106, 110, 114, 156, 290 Rafi bin Lais, i, 178, 182

Rafi ibn Harthama, i, 182, 183
Raghunath Rao, i, 358
Rahman (son of the murdered Abdullah
Khan Sadozai), i, 330
Rahmdil Kahn, ii, 65

Geography", i, 13; surveyed Ganges Valley in 1764, 13; and Himalayas, Resht: occupied by Peter the Great, i, 327; the Treaty of, 334 Rhagae (near Tehran), the medieval Rei, 1, 41 Rhodes, i, 76 Ridgeway, Colonel (later Sir) West, British Commissioner, ii, 161, 163; Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission, 166; the Khamiab and Khwaja Salar question successfully settled with Russia, 167-168; 178 Rig-Veda, the, i, 8 Rim-Sin, King of Elam, i, 23 Rimush, successor to Sargon I, i, 21 Ripon, Lord, Viceroy of India, ii, 173, 152 Riza, Imam, i, 250, 264 Riza Kuli (son of Nadir Shah), i, 332, 341; blinding of, 348 Roberts (father of Lord Roberts), Brigadier-General, ii, 27 Roberts, Lord, ii, 100, 107 footnote, 110 footnote, 111, 112, 116, 117; enters Kabul, 118; proclamation of, 118, 119; 132, 133, 136; march from Kabul to relief of Kandahar, 146, 147, 149 Robertson, Dr. (later Sir) George, Political Agent at Gilgit, ii, 184 and footnote Rockhill, W. W., i, 218 footnote Rodwell, General, i, 201 footnote Roe, Sir Thomas, i, 312 Rohtas, fort of, i, 305 Rome, i, 85, 86, 87; battle of Magnesia, 86; battle of Pydna, 92; eastward

expansion of 102: first intercourse

Roux, Charles, i, 377 footnote Roxana (wife of Alexander the Great), i, 66, 71, 71, 88 Rubruquis, William of, Mission to the Mongols, i, 229 Rudagi, Persian poet, i, 198 Rukn-ud-Din (son and successor of Shams-ud-Din), i, 243 Rukn-ud-Din (son of Taj-ud-Din), i, 243 Russell, Lord Odo, ii, 109 footnote Russell, Major, retreat of, in Third Afghan War, ii, 278 Russia, i, 4, 6, 228, 257, 258, 327, 334; declares war on Turkey, 336; 398, 400, 407; ii, 79, 80; first Khivan expedition, 83; advance of, across Central Asia, 83 et seq.; further conquests and annexation of Khiva, 85-87; Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873, 87; Russo-Turkish campaign, 89; 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108; encourages Abdur Rahman, 127; her policy in Central Asia supported by Germany, 162; Panjdeh Crisis, 162 et seq., 178; Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission of 1895, 181; Russo-Afghan relations during the reign of Amanulla, 287; policy of Soviet Government and its reaction on feeling in Afghanistan, 290; British-Russian trade agreement, 292; Soviet-Afghan treaty, 324 Russian Turkistan, ii, 98 Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission, ii, 166; the question of Khamiab and

Khwaja Salar, 167; Ridgeway's successful settlement with Russia, 167-168;

Safdar Jang, Nawab of Oudh, i, 355 Saffar dynasty, rise of, i, 180, 183, 185, 198 Safid Kuh, i, 3, 5 Sagala (Sialkot), i, 90, 97 Said bin Amr al-Harsshi, i, 166 Said bin Othman, Arab leader, i, 160 Said Muhammad (half-witted son of Yar Muhammad), ii, 65 Saif-ud-Din, Prince of Ghur, i, 209 Saif-ud-Din Muhammad (son and successor of Ala-ud-Din), i, 211 Saighan, ii, 15, 19 St. John, Colonel (later Sir Oliver), ii, 141, 153 Saka, i, 44 Sakae, the, i, 35, 51, 83, 90, 98, 99, 100, 128; conquests of, ii, 101 Sakastene (Seistan), i, 99 Salamis, battle of, i, 51-52 Sale, Brigadier-General Robert: his march to Jalalabad, ii, 24-25; refuses to march back to Kabul, 26; 36, 37; siege of Ialalabad, 40 Sale, Lady: Journal quoted, ii, 52 footnote, 53; 54 Muhammad, Akbar's Saleh negotiates with British for release of captives, ii, 55 Saleh Muhammad, Commander-in-Chief of Amanulla Khan, ii, 270, 273 Salih ibn Nasr, ruler of Bust, i, 180, 181 Salih Khan, Superintendent of Nadir Shah's household, i, 349 Salih (uncle of Abul Abbas), i, 172 Salim, Prince, i, 309, 311 Sali Noyan, i, 243

capture of, by the Ghuzz, 215; escape of, and death, 215; 231 San Stephano, Treaty of, ii, 89 Sara or Sarai, Barka's capital, i, 245, 249 Sarakhs, i, 34, 256 Sarasti, fortress of, i, 193 Sarasvati (later Arachosia), i, 34 Sardes, 1, 43, 44, 52, 54; captured and burned, 50; surrendered to Alexander, 60; 77, 84 Sargon I, i, 21 Sargon II, King of Assyria, i, 29 Sari, i, 129 Sarikol Valley, i, 6, 232 Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, i, 311, 322, 351 footnote Sarmatians, the, i, 41 Sasanian dynasty, i, 117, 121; rise of, 124 Satibarzanes, Satrap of the Arcians, i, 67-64 Satok Boghra Khan, i, 184 Sattagydia, i, 44 Saxa, Decidus, Roman general, i, 111 Sayyid dynasty, i, 287, 288 Sazonoff, Serghei Dmitrievich, Russian statesman, ii, 250 Schiemann, Doctor, ii, 84 footnote Schouvaloff, ii, 100 Schveikovski, General Pavolo, Governor of Ferghana and Russian representative on Anglo-Russian Commission of 1895, ii, 181 Scylax, a Greek, i, 48 Scythians, the: invasion of, i, 36-37; 38, 41, 65; campaign led by Darius, 48 Seistan, i, 7, 47; Alexander the Great

marches through, 64-65; 85, 90, 93,

Semites, supremacy of, i, 32 Seneca, i, 103 Sennacherib, naval expedition of, i, 29; campaigns against Elam and Babylonia, 29-30 Seringapatam, i, 375 Seurk, Shaykh, 1, 352 Severus, Emperor, i, 116 Severus Alexander, i, 125-126 Shabkadar, ii, 186 Shah Abbas the Great, i, 306; captures Herat, 308; his contemporaries, 310; makes peace with the Turks, 311; captures Kandahar, 312; subjects of, 313; death, 314; 336 Shah Abbas II, i, 306, 307, 308, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 319 Shah Ahmad (Durrani monarch), i, 9 Shah Alam (Ali Gauhur, son of Alamgir II), i, 364, 366 Shah Alam (Prince Muazzam), i, 323 Shah Beg, i, 290 Shah Husayn: taken from harem to ascend throne, i, 325; surrenders and abdicates, 326; 327, 338 Shahin, Persian general, i, 148 Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavi dynasty, i, 267, 285; defeats the Uzbegs, 285-286, 312 Shahjahan: marches with reinforcements to Mandu, i, 312; Muhabbat Khan flies to join, 313; accession of, 314; the Uzbegs and, 314; 316; summary of the reign of, 318 Shah Kamran, ii, 8 Shah Mahmud Khan, Afghan Minister of War ii. 124. 125

Shah Wali Khan, Afghan Prime Minister, 11, 325 Shah Wali Khan, Ahmad Shah's Vizier, i, 362, 363, 368 Shahyar (youngest son of Jahangir), i, 314 Shakespear, Captain Sir Richmond, ii, 8, 56, 84 and footnote Shal, ii, 6, 14 Shalmaneser III, King of Assyria, i, 35 Shamakha, i, 327 Shame-ud-Din, Muhammad I, founder of the dynasty of the Kurt Maliks, i, 241 Shams-ud-Din Khan, Governor of Ghazni: battle of Ghoaine, ii, 51; flight to Kabul, 52 Shansab, ancestor of the natives of Ghur, i, 189 Shansabani house of Ghur, i, 243 Shapur Mirza (a younger son of Shah Shuja), ii, 61 Shapur the Great: first campaigns against Rome, i, 130; Eastern campaigns, 130; second campaign against Rome, 131; expedition of Julian, 131; retreat and death of Julian, 172; restoration of the five provinces and of Nisibis, 172; death, 133 Shapur I: invades Syria, i, 126; second campaign against Rome, 127; capture of Valerian, 127; the later years of, 128; contest with Odenathus, 128 Shapur III, i, 133 Sharaf-ud-Din, historian, i, 259 footnote, 260, 262, 264, 273, 274 Shash (modern Tashkent), i, 152, 163, 182 Shawal range, i. 2

rebel against, 72-73; battle of Kujbaz, 73; rebellion of Abdur Rahman, 73-74; battle of Sheikhabad, 74; battle of Kalat-i-Ghilzai, 74; battle of Zurmat, 76, 77; visits India, 77, 78; internal reforms, 78, 79; Persian Mission to, 79; receives Mir Abdul Malik of Bukhara, 79-80; Yakub Khan rebels against, surrenders, and is forgiven, 81, 82; flight and death of, 112, 113; Second Afghan War, 97 et seq.; 118, 123, 140 Shiraz, i, 27, 181, 227, 235, 257, 331 Shirin (wife of Khusru Parviz), i, 147 Shir Muhammad Khan, General, i, 384, 385; the rebellion of, 386 Shir Singh, Maharaja of the Punjab, ii, 61 Shirwan, province of, i, 235, 312 Shirzad, son of Masud III, i, 208 Shiz (earlier name Praaspa, q.v.), fortress of, i, 145 Shuja-ud-Daula, Nawab of Oudh, i, 360 Shuja-ud-Dola (son of Zaman Khan), ii, Shuja-ul-Mulk (brother of Zaman Shah), i, 381, 383, 384; ascends the throne, 385, 386; expedition against Kandahar, 394-395; defeat of the Amirs of Sind, 395; advance on Kandahar, 395, 396; murder of, ii. 45; vide also under Shah Shuja Shustar, i, 257 Shutargardan Pass, ii, 112, 117 Shutruk-Nahhunte, King of Elam, i, 27; stele of, 27 Siah-Push Kafirs (Wearers of Black Clothes), i, 10, 15; converted to Islam,

Sinope, i, 104 Sir Daria (Jaxartes), River: Kutayba raids across, i, 164, 165, 167, 226, 265; Russian advance up the, ii, 85 Sirhind, i, 125, 303, 341, 354, 361, 366 Sir-i-Kul (Lake Victoria), i, 2, 6 Sir-i-Pul, i, 278; ii, 67 Sirjan, district of, i, 69 Siroes, vide Kobad II Sivaji, i, 320, 321 Sivas, i, 261 Skandagupta, ruler of the Gupta Empire, i, 138 Skeen, General Sir Andrew, in Third Afghan War, ii, 275 Skinner, Captain, ii, 35 Skobeloff, General, ii, 89-90 Skrine, F. H., i, 157 footnote Slade, Captain, ii, 145 Smith, Bosworth, ii, 69 footnote Smith, Dr. Vincent, i, 71, 121, 125 footnote, 296 footnote, 311, 321 Smith, Sir Euan, ii, 94 Smith, Sidney, i, 17 footnote Smyrna, i, 262 Snow Mountains, i, 153 Sobraon, battle of, ii, 64 Sogdiana, i, 44, 88, 94, 98 Soghdian Rock, capture by Alexander the Great, i, 65 Solomon, King, i, 122 Somatash, ii, 179 Somnath, i, 190 Sophagasenos, King, i, 85 Sophocles, i, 77 Soteriadis, Prof., i, 50-51 and footnote Sothic cycle, introduction of, i, 18

Sturt, Lieutenant, ii, 27 Subutay, Mongol general, i, 236 Sughd (Sughdiana), i, 166, 167, 173, 174 Sughdians, the, i, 160, 161, 163 Sui, national dynasty of the, i, 149 Sukkur, ii, 4 Sulaiman or Sulayman Mountains, i, 14, 251 Sulayman, Caliph, i, 164 Sulayman Mirza (cousin of Humayun), i, 300, 305 Sulayman Mirza (eldest son of Ahmad Shah), i, 368 Sulla, i, 104-105 Sultaniya, city of, i, 241, 242 Su-Lu, Khakan of the Turgesh, i, 166, 168 Sumer, i, 20, 22, 25, 33; conquered by Guti mountaineers, 22 Sumerians, the, i, 20; influence on civilization, 24 Sung-Yun, Chinese pilgrim, i, 138, 139 Sunni Sect, the, i, 14, 353 Suraj Mal, Jat Chief, i, 360, 361 Surastrene, province of, i, 101 Surat, i, 320 Suritz, Bolshevist representative, ii, 288 Susa, city of, i, 19, 22, 27, 30, 31, 37, 49, 52, 53, 54; Alexander's march to, 68; 71, 72, 93 Susia (medieval Tus), i, 63, 90 Susiana, i, 81, 126 Sutlej, River, i, 212, 303, 354, 387 Swat Valley, i, 66, 155 Syria, i, 21, 74, 76, 77, 79; invasion of (third Syrian War), 80; 85, 87, 96, 107, 109, 110; Parthian invasion, 111; invaded by Vologases III, 115, 110;

Taj Mahal, i, 319 Taj-ud-Din (brother of Izz-ud-Din), i, 243 Taj-ud-Din Harb, Malik of Seistan, i, 211 Taj-ud-Din Yildiz, Governor of Kerman, 1, 217 Takhtapul, ii, 121 Takht-i-Suliman (Throne of Solomon), i, 14 Takla Makan desert, i, 119 Takrit, captured by Tamerlane, i, 258 Tala, island of, i, 236 Talas, i, 141 Talha (son of Tahir), i, 180 Talikan, i, 161, 223, 309 Tambal, leader of the conspirators against Baber, i, 278 Tamerlane, i, 242, 244; appointed Governor of Kesh, 253; early adventures of, 253; Seistan campaign, 254; campaigns against Khwaja Ilyas, 254; struggle with Amir Husayn, 254; conquest of Jatah and of Khwarizm, 255; early campaigns in Persia, 256; final conquest of Persia, Armenia, and Georgia, 256-257; campaigns against Toktamish, 257; again invades South Persia, 257; occupies Baghdad and captures Takrit, 258; invades and plunders India, 258-260; battle of Delhi, 260; last campaigns of, 260-261; defeats Bayazid, "the Thunderbolt", 261-262; projected invasion of the Chinese Empire, 265; death and character, 265-266; tomb, 266; 267, 276, 278, 288, 308

T'ang dynasty, i. 140

Taxila, the city of, i, 66, 90, 97, 100, 101, 118 Taxiles, King, i, 66 Ta-yuan, the, i, 98 Tegh Bahadur (youngest son of Har Govind), i, 365 and footnote Tehran, i, 329, 331, 347, 374, 401; ii, 101 Teispes (son of Achaemenes), i, 37, 45 Tejen (Kabul), River, i, 8 Tekish, Khwarizm Shah, i, 216 Ten Thousand, retreat of the, i, 55, 61 Terek, River, i, 257 Termez, i, 122, 153, 249, 259, 264, 315 Teuman, King, i, 30 Teutonic Knights of Prussia, i, 228 Tezin, ii, 35, 36; battle of, 50; 53 Thal, fort of, ii, 279; relief of, 279 Thales of Miletus, i, 40 Thanadar of the Persian frontier, i, 322 Tharshish, a port, i, 122 Thebes, i, 56, 58; destroyed by Alexander the Great, 59 Theodora (wife of Uzun Hasan), i, 272 Theodore (brother of Heraclius), i, 148 Theodosiopolis (modern Erzerum), i, 134, 138 Theophilus, Emperor, i, 180 Thermopylae, i, 51, 78, 86 Thessaly, i, 59 Thrace, annexation of, by Darius, i, 48, 49; 51, 59 Tian Shan Pass, i, 122 Tiberius, Count, i, 144 Tiberius, Emperor, i, 144 Tibet, i, 13, 160 Tien-Shan range, i, 151

Tiridates (Arsaces II), i, 83; annexed Hyrcania, 83; 89 Tiridates (son of Chosroes), i, 129 Tiridates I of Parthia, i, 113 Tochari, vide Yuch-chi Tochi Pass, ii, 171 Tochi Valley, ii, 278 Todd, Major, Envoy to Herat, ii, 1, 8, 17, 62, 84 Toghril Beg, Seljuk king, i, 194, 205; death, 206 Toghril Beg, "the Ingrate", rebellion of, i, 196, 207 Toghril III, i, 216 Toktamish, defeat of, by Tamerlane, i, 257 Toramana, Ephthalite king, i, 138 Torno, fort of, i, 320 Toynbee, Arnold, ii, 291 footnote, 309 Trajan, Emperor, i, 113; first campaign against Parthia, 114; second campaign against Parthia, 114-115; retreat of, 115; 207 Transoxiana, i, 83, 160, 167, 168, 182, 183, 184, 185, 204; invaded by Chenghiz Khan, 221; 236, 237, 252, 256, 268, 269, 278 Trapezus (modern Trebizond), i, 55 Trasimene, i, 86 Traxiane, i, 90 Treaty of Berlin, ii, 107, 108 Treaty of Paris, ii, 66, 67 Treaty of Peace of August 8, 1919, ii, 358-359, Appendix F Trebizond, i, 263 Trevor, Captain, ii, 31 Trilochapula, last monarch of the Hindu

327; treaty with Russia for dismemberment of Persia, 327; provinces held by, 328; 331; Nadir makes truce with, 332; 333; Nadir decides to start campaign against, 734; Russia declares war on, 336 Turkistan, Chinese (or Sin-Kiang), i, 6, 119, 121, 134 Turko-German Mission to the Amir during the Great War: Amir's declaration of neutrality, ii, 246; entry of Turkey into the War, 246; Amir's statement to British Agent at Kabul, 247; German influence in Middle East, 248; German Emperor visits Constantinople, 248; German activities in Persian Gulf, 249; gains influence in Persia, 251; Turko-German Mission to Afghanistan, 252; German agents in Persia, 252; the Mission of Wassmuss, 253; formation of the South Persia Rifles, 253; failure of von der Goltz, 254; differences between Germans and Turks, 254; Turko-German Mission to Afghanistan, 254; reception at Herat, 255; arrival at Kabul, 256; attitude of Amir, 256; Turko-German Mission at Kabul, 256; the Amir's diplomacy,

257; dismissal of the Mission, 258 Turkoman: Persian campaigns against, ii, 88; Russian defeat of, 89, 90

Turko-Persian Treaty of 1639, i, 335

Turks, 13, 15; rise to power, 142-143; relations with Noshirwan, 143; conquest of the Northern Turks, 150; 334, 336, 350

Turshiz, i. 256

Ulugh Beg (son of Shah Rukh), i, 268; interest in astronomy, 269; death, 269 Ulugh Mirza, i, 280, 285 Umaira, Queen (wife of King Zahir), ii, 329 Umarkot, i, 345 Umayyad dynasty, i, 159, 168, 169; overthrow of, 171, 172, 173 Umra Khan of Jandol, besieges British force at Chitral, ii, 184, 185 Und, i, 156 Uppis of Partakka, i, 83 Ural Mountains, i, 278 Urartu, Kingdom of, i, 28, 40, 41 Ur dynasty, i, 22-23; conquest of Elam and Lulubium, 22; Elamite invasion, Urganj, capital of Khwarizm, capture of, i, 222, 223 Urghundeh, ii, 11 Urtaku, King, i, 30 Urtupa, battle of, i, 257 Urumia (Urumiea, or Urmia), Lake, i, 35, 37, 112, 236, 312 Uzbeg, Khan of the Golden Horde, i, 242 Uzbegs, i, 10, 13, 267, 269, 270, 283, 284; defeated by Shah Ismail, 285; defeat of, at Pul-i-Sanghin, 286; defeat of Baber at Kul-i-Malik, 287; 301; annex Badakhshan, 305; dispute over Herat between Persians and, 306; 307, 313, 314, 315, 317, 318, 345, 346,

Vahri-Datya (Oxus), River, i, 34 Valerian, Emperor, i, 127; capture by Shapur, 127

384; ii, 63

Vologases V, i, 116 Vonones, Parthian Prince, i, 100

Wade, Captain C. W., i, 394, 405; ii, 1, 9, 14 Wahab, Major, ii, 187 Wakhan, district of, i, 2, 246; ii, 175, 181 Wakhijir Pass, i, 6 Waksh-ab, River, i, 7 Waller, Frances Tezeena, ii, 36 footnote, 54 footnote Waller, Major, ii, 36 Wana, ii, 278 Wapshare, Lieutenant-General, storming of the Spin-Baldak fort, ii, 281 Wassmuss (German agent), ii, 249 Wathik, Caliph, i, 180 Waziristan, i, 3 Wei dynasty, i, 149 Welid, Caliph, i, 164 Wellesley, Colonel Arthur, i, 375 Wessels, C., 308 footnote White, Major (afterwards Field-Marshal Sir) George, ii, 117, 149; on battle of Kandahar, 149 Wild, Brigadier-General, ii, 38, 39 Wima Kadphises II, i, 118, 120 Winchester, Bishop of, i, 231 Wolseley, Sir Garnet, ii, 136 Wood, Lieutenant John, i, 401, 402 footnote Woodburn, Captain, ii, 23 Woolley, Sir Leonard, i, 17 footnete, 21, 35 footnote Wu-sun, the, i, 98

Wu-ti, Emperor, i, 98

Wymer, Colonel, ii, 22

Yamin-i-Nizam, Persian Commissioner, 11, 209 Yarkand, i, 119, 120, 121, 156, 220, 247, 309 Yarkand, River, i, 6 Yar Muhammad Khan, Vizier of Kamran Mirza, i, 400, 408, 410; ii, 8, 22, 62; seizes and plunders Shah Kamran, 62; conspires against Kohandil Khan, 62, 63; campaigns of, 63 Yasodarman, leader of the rising against King Mihirakula, i, 139 Yasur, Prince, the Nikudari, i, 244 and footnote Yate, Sir Charles, ii, 163 Yathrib (now termed Medina), i, 157 Yavanas, the, i, 90, 96, 97, 101 Yelui Tashi, founder of Kara Khitai dynasty, i, 214, 215 Yemen, the. i, 175 Yermuk, battle of, i, 158 Yezd, i, 169, 245, 326, 349 Yezdigird I (the Wicked), i, 133 Yezdigird II, relations with Rome and the White Huns, i, 136 Yezdigird III, last Sasanian monarch, i, 148-149 Yezid II, the campaign of, i, 164-165 Yissugay (father of Chenghiz Khan), i, 219 Yonoff, Colonel, Russian officer, illegally arrests Captain Younghusband and Lieutenant Davidson, ii, 179 Younghusband, Captain (later Sir) Francis, illegally arrested by Colonel Yonoff, ii, 179; 240 Yueh-chi, the, i, 98; conquest of Bactria,

414 HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

Zamindawar, i, 159, 189, 283 Zanakhan, ii, 77 Zanasana of Partakka, i, 83 Zanzibar, i, 232 Zarah, i, 256 Zarangia, i, 69 Zaranj (medieval Zahidan), i, 159, 256; ii, 92 Zaranka (modern Seistan), i, 47, 48 Zargan, i, 331 Zaydan, Jurji, i, 169 and footnote, 176 and footnote Zela, i, 111 Zelenoi, General, ii, 161 Zemarchus, the Cicilian, i, 143 Zenobia, i, 128 Zetland, Lord, Secretary of State for India, ii, 334

Zeugma, i, 122 Zhob Valley, ii, 278 Ziyad, i, 173-174 Ziyad bin Abihi, i, 160 Ziyad bin Salih, Governor of Bukhara, i, Zoroaster, the Prophet, i, 65 Zoroastrianism, i, 87, 117, 120, 134, 169 Zugmayer, Dr., German Agent, ii, 252 Zuhak, legendary monarch, i, 189 Zu-Kar, battle of, i, 146, 158 Zulfikar Khan (elder son of Muhammad Zaman Khan), i, 330; heads Abdali rebellion against Nadir Shah, 332-333; 338 Zulfikar Pass, i, 2; ii, 166 Zuzan, i, 223

